Uzbekistan new indd

main obstacles to the Economic reconstruction 
of Afghanistan: A View from Uzbekistan
Regarding Afghanistan as an inseparable part of 
Central Asia, Uzbekistan focuses its main efforts on 
the search for mechanisms to rebuild the country. At 
the same time, it is understood in Uzbekistan that the 
current level of economic relations with Afghanistan 
is extremely low and does not correspond to the 
interests of either country. However, the chief rea-
sons for this have very little to do with Uzbekistan 
and Afghanistan themselves, but rather because the 
“Afghan problem” is a direct result of the global con-
frontation of the Cold War period. It is therefore ap-
propriate that the main measures for the reconstruc-
tion of Afghanistan should also be international in 
scope.
Especially relevant here is an analysis of the in-
ternational effort to aid Afghanistan. It should be rec-
ognized that, hitherto, the aid provided by the inter-
national community has been extremely ineffective 
and has done very little to tackle the country’s under-
lying structural problems. The three main problems 
are as follows:
•  The weakness and ineffectiveness of inter-
national efforts to restore the transportation 
infrastructure of Afghanistan;
•  The weakness and ineffectiveness of interna-
tional efforts to restore the Afghan economy 
and the country’s regional economic ties;
•  The weakness and ineffectiveness of interna-
tional efforts to counter the drug trade.
Not only does the volume of international aid fall far 
short of the real needs of Afghanistan, but even those 
foreign funds that are available are put to extremely 
ineffective use in terms of the contribution they make 
to restoring the country’s economy.
The United States spends enormous financial 
resources in Afghanistan. American financial out-
lays have been increasing year on year. Thus, while 
in 2002-2004 the United States spent about $12 bil-
lion per year, by 2010-2011 annual expenditure had 
already reached around $160 billion; in 2012 the 
White House allocated $110 billion to the war in 
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, practically all this mon-
ey is allocated to maintaining the American military 
presence and the establishment of the new Afghan 
army and force structures. Even these enormous 
outlays have thus failed to normalize the situation 
in Afghanistan. To a large extent this is because the 
United States takes no account whatsoever (or does 
not wish to do so) of the real needs and interests of 
Afghanistan itself. Practically nothing is allocated to 
finding a systemic solution to the problems of restor-
ing the devastated Afghan economy, creating em-
ployment, and normalizing the everyday lives of the 
population.