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Three main reasons Why multilateral Solutions 
to Water do Not Work
There are three main reasons to explain the failure of 
multilateral water cooperation in Central Asia. The 
first is the legacy of the Soviet water distribution ap-
proach which links cross-border water flows to inter-
state energy distribution in a context of independent 
states with increasingly divergent needs and policies. 
The second is the lack of political will for regional co-
operation. The third is the securitization of the water 
issue, that is, the development of a narrative about 
the alleged scarcity of water, and the ensuing risk of 
interstate conflicts. In all three instances, the focus is 
put on water distribution, while it should be on the 
real problem, namely, water consumption.
Reproducing the Soviet Water Distribution 
Approach
The basin-wide water management approach is a 
legacy of the Soviet Union. The Soviet water resource 
management was based on a regional water vs. en-
ergy barter system which balanced the water needs 
of downstream countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan) and the energy needs of up-
stream countries (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). The 
allocation of water was dependent on the main area 
of specialization of a republic. Under this system, 
intensive agricultural development was a priority 
and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were given sig-
nificantly larger water quotas than Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. In exchange for the water from upstream 
countries to power irrigation pumps in downstream 
countries during the summer, the Soviet Union en-
sured the delivery of natural gas from downstream 
countries to upstream countries during the winter. 
This system was complemented by the electricity 
delivery through the Unified Central Asia Energy 
System.
After gaining independence in 1991 Central 
Asian countries agreed to keep the water-energy bar-
ter system and left the water quotas at the same level. 
1 Nariya Khasanova graduated from the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, where she studied International Economic 
Relations. She has undergone two internships at the UN (UNDP Office in Uzbekistan; UNDP Bratislava Regional Center). She has also been work-
ing on an Asian Development Bank Project in Uzbekistan. Her interest in development, peace, and conflict studies led her to the UN Mandated 
University for Peace, where she obtained her master’s degree in Sustainable Urban Governance and Peace. During her fellowship she has been 
studying alternate solutions to the tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the Rogun issue.
2 One study focused on the technical and economic viability, and the other on the social and environmental impact of the dam. See, among others, 
“Key Issues for Consideration on the Proposed Rogun Hydropower Project,” Draft for Discussion, World Bank, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/
content/dam/Worldbank/Event/ECA/central-asia/WB%20Rogun%20Key%20Issues.pdf.

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Revisiting Water Issues in Central Asia: Shifting from Regional Approach to National Solutions
129
However, maintaining the Soviet water distribution 
system quickly revealed three main problems. 
First, there is no central redistribution of bene-
fits anymore. During the Soviet time Central Asian 
republics were part of one country that regulated not 
only the distribution of natural resources, but also 
the distribution of their benefits. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union left the newly independent states with 
water distribution mechanisms, but with no central 
authority able to take over a regulatory role in the 
barter system. Negotiations over the exchange of wa-
ter for hydrocarbons regularly broke up while the re-
gional electricity trade declined from 25 GWh (giga-
watt hours) in 1990 to 4 GWh in 2008.
3
 The work 
on the grid was interrupted several times because of 
withdrawals by Turkmenistan, and withdrawals and 
returns by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Second, Central Asian countries are now inde-
pendent states and their policies are driven by na-
tional interests and needs that often do not align. 
Central Asian states have growing demands for water 
and constantly increase their water use without rene-
gotiating the agreement
4
. 
Third, Afghanistan (8% of Amu Darya is formed 
on its territory) was excluded from the regional dis-
tribution structures. The Soviet Protocol 566 dated 
March 12, 1987 specified the annual amount of wa-
ter use in Central Asia at 61.5 km
3
 2.1 km
3
 of which 
was assumed to go to Afghanistan. That said, the 
current rough estimation of Afghanistan’s water de-
mand is of 6.09 km
3
.
5
 With the Amu Darya feeding 
40% of Afghanistan’s irrigated lands
6
, it is likely that 
Afghanistan will increase its water use and claim its 
rights in the years to come, generating new tensions 
with other bordering states and thus, compromising 
regional cooperation.
Political Will for Regional Cooperation Is Lacking
Regional cooperation over water does not work 
because the majority of water initiatives taken in 
Central Asia in the 1990s and 2000s reproduced the 
Soviet water management approach. 
This is the case both at the intra-regional level 
and at the level of international donors. At the in-
tra-regional level it is represented by the 1992 Almaty 
Agreement, the Interstate Commission for Water 
Coordination, and the International Fund for Saving 
the Aral Sea
7
. 
Regional water benefit-sharing approach-
es through the establishment of the Central Asian 
Water and Energy Consortium were discussed in 
1997 and later in 2003, and 2006.
8
 However, disagree-
ments with respect to the share in the consortium, 
reluctance to compromise, and low level of trust and 
regional political competition have hindered the im-
plementation of this project.
9
Regional cooperation remains the overarching 
principle for many international donors, working 
both at regional and national levels. These interna-
tional projects include the EU Water Initiative; the 
German inspired “Berlin process” aiming to im-
prove regional cooperation in water; UNECE and 
3 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, “Regional Organizations in Central Asia: Patterns of Interaction, Dilemmas of Efficiency,” University of Central Asia’s 
Institute of Public Policy and Administration Working Paper No. 10, 2012.
4 K. Wegerich, “Hydrohegemony in the Amudarya Basin,” Water policy 10, no. 2, IWA Publishing, 2008.
5 K. Wegerich, “The New Great Game: Water Allocation in post-Soviet Central Asia,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 10, no. 2 (2009): 
117–23.
6 A. Nazariy, “BVO “Amudar’ya” o voprosakh vodnoy bezopasnosti v basseyne reki Amudar’ya,” 2013, www.eecca-water.net/file/nazariy-1113.pdf.
7 “Regional Water Intelligence report Central Asia,” SIWI baseline report, Paper 15, 2010.
8 Y. Sigov, “Vodnoe peremirie. Kak reshit’ vopros razdela vodnykh resursov Tsentral’noy Azii?,” Delovaya nedelya, April 25, 2008, https://www.ca-
news.info/2008/04/26/22.
9 I. Kirsanov, “Bitva za vodu v Tsentral’noy Azii,” Fond Nasledie Evrazii, 2006, http://www.fundeh.org/publications/articles/48/
Table 1. Annual Water Withdrawal in Amu Darya by CA Countries in 2011 as Opposed to Allocated Water 
Quotas (Km
3
)