Uzbekistan new indd

The Weakness and Ineffectiveness of 
International Efforts to counter the drug Trade
The most important obstacle to the reconstruction 
of Afghanistan—and therefore to the development 
of Uzbek-Afghan economic cooperation—is the 
growing resistance of the international drug cartels. 
Moreover, it was precisely after the Taliban regime 
was overthrown and NATO forces arrived that the 
production of drugs in Afghanistan began to rise rap-
idly. According to UN data, the production of heroin 
in Afghanistan rose by 61 percent from 3,600 tons in 
2010 to 5,800 tons in 2011—a figure that exceeds 90 
percent of global output. A similar quantity of other 
drugs is also produced in Afghanistan. Altogether, 
over the ten years since the start of the “antiterrorist 
campaign” the production of drugs in Afghanistan 
has increased by a factor of 40.
The international drugs business is a powerful 
force in Afghanistan—financially and organization-
ally incomparably stronger than the Karzai govern-
ment and, apparently, even stronger than the forces 
of the American-led anti-terrorist coalition. Indeed, 
according to certain estimates, revenues from the 
sale of Afghan drugs are in the magnitude of $640 
billion a year, while the incomes of Afghan farmers 
and the revenues of the Afghan government togeth-
er amount to just $4 billion a year. Therefore, in or-
der to maintain its control over this hugely lucrative 
business, the drug cartels have an objective interest in 
keeping the central government in Kabul weak and in 
perpetuating the situation of “smoldering conflict” in 
Afghanistan.
In sum, the process of reconstruction in 
Afghanistan—and also the development of Afghan-
Uzbek economic ties—is making little headway, with 
the international community yet to devise a clear, 
coherent, and agreed upon international program to 
provide funds and resources for this task.
Conspicuous by its absence has been the po-
tential contribution of regional cooperation to this 
task, which, instead, has been almost completely 
neglected. All this renders international efforts to 
reconstruct the Afghan economy and provide securi-
ty in the country even less effective than they would 
otherwise be. As a result, Afghanistan has entered 
a vicious circle. On the one hand, without targeted 
international investment in the development of the 
Afghan economy (transportation, industry, agricul-
ture) and stimulation of regional cooperation there 
can be no guarantee of even a modicum of stabili-
ty in Afghanistan, but, on the other hand, without 
any guarantee of stability there will be no regional 
cooperation or large-scale foreign investment in the 
Afghan economy.