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PArT V. UZBEK forEIgN PolIcY: moVES ANd STABIlITY
flexibility or Strategic confusion?
foreign Policy of Uzbekistan
farkhod Tolipov
1
(2014)
Observers tend to describe Uzbekistan’s foreign pol-
icy in terms of fluctuation, pro- and anti-biases; fur-
thermore, some have even evaluated it as flexible and
maneuvering. However, the analysis of the Uzbek
international behavior reveals more of a fundamen-
tal problem, namely a lack of strong understanding
of national interests. As evidence of this, I can point
to the considerable gap between the declared Uzbek
policy principles and their actual implementation.
The modality of any foreign policy activity is
predetermined by the nature and character of the in-
ternational system. At the same time, it depends to
a significant degree on policy makers’ perceptions
of this system. Such notions as “bipolar,” “unipolar,”
or “multipolar” world order prevails not only with-
in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy institutions, but also
within global academia. The swift dissolution of the
Soviet Union and Central Asia’s advent into world
politics has had a twofold impact on geopolitical
thought: on the one hand, these events reinforced
once again geopolitical narratives, contemplations,
and speculations after a long period of relative geo-
political stability; so geopolitics became the “ultimate
explanatory tool” in the overall analyses of the post-
Soviet transformation. On the other hand, theoret-
ical transformation is underway within the field of
geopolitical studies itself. These new circumstances
have created wide spread confusion among political
scientists dealing with Central Asia, as well as among
local political regimes whose attempts to pursue their
own geopolitics—micro-geopolitics of micro-heart-
lands—have also modified the macro-geopolitics of
great powers.
2
In this respect, the Central Asian states’, espe-
cially Uzbekistan’s, foreign policy doctrines are pro-
nounced by negative and positive diversifications.
Negative diversification revitalizes the classical bal-
ance of power in international relations and the ze-
ro-sum game between great powers at the expense
of the Central Asians. Positive diversification avoids
the zero-sum approach and is inclusive in character:
it means not only the equal involvement of external
powers but also, what is more important, the coordi-
nated policy of the Central Asian states themselves.
From this perspective, Tashkent’s pendulum-like in-
ternational behavior bears rather a trait of negative
diversification.
The first concept of a Foreign Policy of the
Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted in 1993, declared
such principles as: non-participation in any mili-
tary-political bloc; active participation in interna-
tional organizations; de-ideologization of foreign
policy; non-interference in internal affairs of other
states; supremacy of international law and priori-
ty of national interests. The second Foreign Policy
Concept was adopted in September 2012 and de-
clared, among others, 4 “no”s: no to deployment of
foreign bases in Uzbekistan; no to the membership
in any military bloc; no to the participation in inter-
national peace-keeping operations; and no to medi-
ation of any external power in the resolution of re-
gional conflicts in Central Asia. This policy affirms a
“national interests first” principle, but does not make
clear whether and why national interests dictate four
such “no”s and what the national interests by-and-
large are. One of Tashkent’s recent foreign policy
“innovations” is the shift to bilateralism as the key
principle of its international and regional actions,
which means that the country now aims to deal with
major international and regional issues on a bilateral
level. On the functional level, however, the foreign
pol icy of Uzbekistan has been more convoluted and
controversial than what is declared on the doctrinal
level. This policy can be delineated by three sets of
1 Director, Non-governmental Education Institution “Bilim Karvoni,” Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
2 F. Tolipov, “Micro-Geopolitics of Central Asia: An Uzbekistan Perspective,” Strategic Analysis 35, no. 4 (2011): 629-639.
Farkhod Tolipov
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