Understanding International Relations, Third Edition

part, is a work of international political theory in the traditional mould; in the
1950s Waltz had been the secretary of the American Rockefeller Committee
for the Study of the Theory of International Relations which was founded in
1954, and was conventionally realist in orientation and traditionalist in
method. Theory of International Politics, on the other hand, is anything but
traditionalist in style and presentation, or conventional in its arguments.
Waltz’s basic strategy for preserving realism in the face of the pluralist
challenge is to restrict its scope. First, whereas for Morgenthau ‘theory’ is
quite a loose term – despite his frequent references to laws of politics and
such like – for Waltz, theory is defined quite precisely in his first chapter,
and in terms drawn from the thinking on scientific method of Karl Popper
as refracted through the lens of modern economic theory. Waltz is
concerned to produce interrelated, linked, law-like propositions from which
testable hypotheses can be drawn – although he does acknowledge that
‘testing’ is likely to be a more impressionistic process in International
Relations than it is in the exact sciences. Waltz vehemently denies being a
‘positivist’ in any wider sense of the term, but his apparent belief that there
are real-world regularities that it is the role of theory to explain would seem
to put him in that camp, at least given the usual implications of the term
positivism (Waltz 1997, 1998).
However, Waltz does not just restrict the kind of theory he is producing;
crucially he also restricts its scope. His aim is to produce a theory of
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the international system and not a general account of all aspects of
international relations. This enables him to gaze benignly on many of the
changes described by the pluralists, because they do not address the nature
of the international system as such, only aspects of its component units.
One of the positions he advocates most forcefully is that it is only possible
to understand the international system via systemic theories; to attempt to
understand the system by theories which concentrate on attributes of the
units that make up the system is to commit the ultimate sin of reductionism.
We know reductionism is wrong because we know that there are patterns of
the international systems that recur over time even when the units that
make up the system change; these patterns must be the product of the
system itself, and cannot be the product either of mutable features of its
sub-systems, or of human universals, such as an alleged tendency towards
aggression, that, by definition, appear throughout history and not simply in
international systems. Thus, to take one of his examples, Lenin must be
wrong to explain imperialism in terms of the dynamics of monopoly
capitalism, because imperialism has been around for ever, while monopoly
capitalism is of recent origin (Waltz 1979: 19ff.). In fact, this is not a com-
pelling critique of Lenin, because the latter recognizes this point and stresses
that modern imperialism is different from its predecessors – nonetheless,
Waltz’s general point is clear.
Once we focus on the system we can see, he suggests, that there are only
two kinds of system possible – a hierarchical or an anarchical system. In a
hierarchical system, different kinds of units are organized under a clear line
of authority. In an anarchical system, units which are similar in nature, even
though they differ dramatically in capabilities, conduct relations with one
another. The distinction between hierarchy and anarchy is crucial to Waltz;
the present system, he argues, is clearly anarchical, and has been since its
late medieval origins. None of the changes identified by the pluralists
amounts to a change of system – this would only come if hierarchical
institutions were established, that is, some kind of world government.
Much of Theory of International Politics is given over to demonstrating
that this is not taking place, and that the sort of developments identified by
pluralists only scratch the surface of things; the underlying reality of the
system remains the same.
The international system is a ‘self-help’ system; states (which for theoret-
ical purposes are assumed to be unitary actors) are obliged to look after
themselves, because there is no one else to look after them. Waltz does not
assume that states are self-aggrandizing, necessarily aggressive bodies, but
he does assume that they desire to preserve themselves. This means that
they are obliged to be concerned with their security, and obliged to regard
other states as potential threats. They must continually adjust their stance
in the world in accordance with their reading of the power of others and of
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