might be at the top of the international agenda at any particular time,
whereas realism assumes that security is everywhere and always the most
important issue as between states (Keohane and Nye 1977/2000). These latter
two points are, of course, related; it is largely because
of the low salience of
force in these relationships that there is no hierarchy of issues. The complex
interdependence model does not assume that these three features exist
everywhere – there may be, indeed are, relations where realism still holds.
The point is to challenge realism’s claim to be the only theory of international
relations, holding for all relationships.
States have always been interdependent; what is new about
pluralism is
that rather than seeing
relationships as a whole, they are seen as disaggre-
gated. Different
issue-areas – such as security, trade or finance – display
different modes of mutual dependence. The politics of complex interdepen-
dence stems from these differences. The
sensitivity of actors varies according
to circumstances, as does their
vulnerability.
By sensitivity is meant the
degree to which actors are sensitive to changes in a given issue-area, and by
vulnerability is meant the extent to which they are able to control their
responses to this sensitivity – thus, for example, all advanced industrial nations
in the early 1970s were very sensitive to the price of oil, but they varied con-
siderably in their
vulnerability to price changes; some had options to deal
with the situation (such as developing their own resources, or increasing
industrial exports) which others did not. This opens up the possibility of
actors employing strengths in one area to compensate for weaknesses in
another. A favourite case study for this process was the ‘Smithsonian Crisis’
of 1971, which revolved around the decision of the US government to
attempt to force a change in the rate at which dollars were changed into
gold. Under the rules
of the Bretton Woods system, finance was supposed
to be kept separate from trade, and both were to be isolated from military–
security concerns – but in 1971 the US employed trade sanctions as a means
of forcing parity changes, and US diplomatic heavyweights such as Henry
Kissinger were wheeled on to back up the American stance by making
scarcely veiled threats about a re-evaluation of US security guarantees to
Germany and Japan if these countries failed to respond positively. Since the
US was
not reliant on foreign trade, and was a clear provider of security, it
was able to use its comparative invulnerability and insensitivity in these
areas in order to compensate for its greater sensitivity and vulnerability in
the realm of international finance (Gowa 1983).
Another feature of the world as seen by pluralists is that ‘
agenda-setting’
is a matter of some significance. In the realist world of power politics, the
agenda sets itself – what is or is not significant is easy to determine in
advance, because only the big issues of war and peace are truly significant.
Not so for pluralism, where, in principle, any issue
could be at the top of the
international agenda – here the ways in which actors are able to promote
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