Turkey in the mediterranean during the interwar era

This unpromising operating environment did not deter Turkey from promoting schemes for regional collaboration. Ankara realized that the rivalry between the great powers was the primary obstacle in the way of peace. On the other hand, these powers knew how to cooperate with each other when their interests required them to do so. For example, Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany "shared the same doctrine, aimed at the same ends, and had the same enemies," asserted Goering.⁵⁷⁷ Mussolini’s passion to assert Italian leadership in Europe and promote, what he defined as, the cause of the “have-not”⁵⁷⁸ nations provided the main motivations behind his proposal for the Four-Power Pact between Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. In other words, according to Rome, the “have-not” nations, Italy and Germany, should have the same rights as the “have” nations, Britain and France, in dividing the region into spheres of influence.
Renewed Italian “Menace” in the Mediterranean
When Mussolini realized that his Four Power-Pact proposal did not stand any chance for realization because both France and Britain did not want to involve Hitler’s Germany in the pact, he adopted a strategy that emphasized competition over cooperation. On 18 March, 1934, Mussolini openly stated his goal to assert Italian power and declared that Italy’s future lay in Africa and Asia. Mussolini added that: “Italy’s position in the Mediterranean, the sea which has regained its historic function of joining East and West, gives her the right and duty to accomplish this task”.⁵⁷⁹ This message was aimed at warning other European powers, that they could no longer ignore the Italian challenge in the region.

Mussolini’s speeches alarmed Turkish leaders as their country stood at the intersection of the Mediterranean and Asia. Shortly afterwards, Mussolini took great strides in assuring Ankara that he did not mean to apprehend Turkey, which he regarded as a European country anyway. In his speech at the Grand National Assembly, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras took the issue of Mussolini’s declaration and his assurances to Ankara. Nevertheless, he failed to make the customary reference to “friendly relations” between Italy and Turkey.⁵⁸⁰

A month after Mussolini’s speech, Aras openly affirmed the Turkish apprehension of Bulgaria’s intimate association with a “Mediterranean power.”⁵⁸¹ Moreover, during his visit to Ankara, Greek General George Kondylis added fuel to the Turkish apprehensions by warning İnönü about the possibility of a coordinated Italian-Bulgarian attack.⁵⁸² Finally, Mussolini declared that a new chapter had opened in the history of mankind which rendered the disarmament irrelevant and rearmament the order of the day.⁵⁸³ Around same time, Italian diplomats in Ankara reported that İnönü had expressed the need to increase the defense budget to tackle new security challenges.⁵⁸⁴

A potential source of instability in the Mediterranean was the Greek uprising in Rhodes. The Turkish press published alarming reports that Italian reinforcements poured into Rhodes to suppress the uprising.⁵⁸⁵ Indeed, Italian build-up of naval fortifications and armaments was not limited to Rhodes. Turkish Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya pointed to the Italian fortification of Leros as the key to Turkish mistrust of Italy. He argued that fortification was like a gun pointed at Turkey, and placed Turkey within striking range of bombers.⁵⁸⁶ Located at the northern tip of the Dardanelles, the Italian control of Leros accentuated the Turkish sense of vulnerability due to demilitarized status of the Straits.

Mussolini explained to Turkish Ambassador Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur the strategic significance of Leros for the Italian security. According to Mussolini, the fortification of Leros was developed in view of Italian competition with Britain and France than with Turkey.⁵⁸⁷ Baydur also approached the Italian ambassador in Ankara, Lojacano, who explained the fortification in Leros along similar lines. Baydur’s curiosity was part of Ankara’s endeavors to figure out why the Italians began to fortify the Dodecanese. Baydur, thus, brought it up with Lojacona, questioning why his country felt compelled to fortify Leros since Italy enjoyed freedom of passage through the Straits.⁵⁸⁸ Lojacono argued that it was defensive measure taken against France, which was nuisance for Italy in the Mediterranean.⁵⁸⁹

Turkish Foreign Minister Aras argued that it was equally plausible to regard those measures as against Turkey or France. If they were directed against Turkey, then Turkish apprehensions would be amply justified.⁵⁹⁰ If they were built as part of Italian strategy against France, then, Ankara would again have reason to worry about spread of Franco-Italian naval hostilities into Turkish territorial waters. Such a development would inevitably jeopardize Turkey’s security. It had a large territory by Balkan and even by European standards, however, Turkey was lacked the means to defend its territory alone.⁵⁹¹ This assessment accounted for Ankara’s pursuit of joining a security arrangement much stronger than its Balkan neighbors could provide. There is also evidence to suggest that Ankara began to weigh seriously the pros and cons of a number of power configurations in the Mediterranean after 1935. For instance, a naval study concluded that Turkey’s friendship was likely to yield more strategic benefits to France than to Rome in the Mediterranean.⁵⁹²

Mediterranean Pact: Prospects and Limits
A year before the Italian attack on Abyssinia, Turkey had stepped up its diplomatic efforts to promote a pact in the Mediterranean. In May 1934, when Aras was in Paris for an official visit, French Foreign Minister Louis Bartou inquired about how Ankara would receive to a proposal for consolidation of the Balkan Entente by a Mediterranean pact.⁵⁹³ Turkey welcomed Bartou’s proposal, as did other Balkan countries. Although the idea of a Mediterranean pact originated from Paris, Ankara enthusiastically picked it up. As a matter of fact, even before Bartou’s proposal, Suad Darvaz, the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, had told French Ambassador, M. de Beaumarchais, that Turkey was interested in the development of a “Mediterranean Locarno” project back in 1930.⁵⁹⁴ The French diplomats saw no problem with relating to their Italian counterparts their impressions that Turkey was ready to take part in any entente consolidating peace.⁵⁹⁵

In other words, Ankara lent its unqualified support to a Mediterranean pact that would include Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, France and Spain. Because the proposed arrangement was supposed to secure naval frontiers against any naval or air attack, it had to include Britain, the strongest important naval power in the region as well. In June 1934, Turkish press also picked up the idea of a Mediterranean pact. For instance, Cumhuriyet published reports on the talks between the representatives of Turkey, Greece, Britain, and France at Geneva on the formation of a Mediterranean defense arrangement.⁵⁹⁶

Also in June 1934, France and the Little Entente countries agreed on the creation of a Mediterranean entente to which France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria would join. France pledged to secure the Italian participation in the proposed entente.⁵⁹⁷ However, the Mediterranean pact did not enjoy the same level of appeal on all countries of the region. Turkish enthusiasm was not shared by others. By the end of June, it became evident that Britain and Italy would not commit themselves to a comprehensive security arrangement in the Mediterranean.⁵⁹⁸

Again in 1934, the Turkish Ambassador in Rome, Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur, solicited Mussolini’s opinion on the Italian participation in a Mediterranean entente. The latter brought up two points in connection with Baydur’s question. First, Britain’s absence would seriously undermine the proposed entente’s effectiveness and credibility. Second, Italy had already concluded bilateral treaties with Turkey and Greece to deal with security issues in the Mediterranean. Instead of general arrangement, Italy would prefer to consider extending their scope in case of need.⁵⁹⁹ Turkey’s another Mediterranean neighbor, Greece, was not very supportive of the proposed Mediterranean pact either. A foreign press summary that Turkish Foreign Ministry compiled indicated that the Greeks did not have much of a faith in France or the Little Entente for the realization of the proposal.⁶⁰⁰ For the Greeks, it would be impossible to conclude a Mediterranean entente without Britain and Italy. Greece might consider joining the pact only if it included all Mediterranean countries.⁶⁰¹

Moreover, in October 1934, the death of Louis Bartou, the French Foreign Minister and the initiator of a Mediterranean pact, dealt a serious blow to the prospects for regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. Just before his death, Bartou had decided to make an official visit to Rome to discuss directly with Mussolini questions pending between the two countries. At this meeting, it was anticipated that Mussolini would promise to respect the independence of Austria and not to press any revisionist demands against its neighbor, Yugoslavia.⁶⁰² Such a meeting never took place. On 9 October 1934, French Foreign Minister Barthou went to Marseilles to greet King Alexander of Yugoslavia on his arrival. The King’s visit was meant to add credibility and strength to the proposed Mediterranean entente. A tragedy struck both France and Yugoslavia, as the Croatian Nationalists assassinated the King and also killed Bartou who was accompanying him in Marseilles.⁶⁰³

After Barthou’s death, French policy towards Italy was marked by ambiguity. Pierre Laval, who succeeded Barthou, tended to pay more attention to France’s bilateral relations with individual Mediterranean countries rather than to regional cooperation. In November 1934, Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu asked a French diplomat which of the two options his country would be more inclined to pursue in the near future: a Mediterranean pact or a treaty of alliance with Turkey. The French diplomat pointed to the second option.⁶⁰⁴ Although Ankara would welcome a rapprochement with Paris, it strongly favored multilateral cooperation to a bilateral treaty. A multilateral pact would serve Turkish security interests better.⁶⁰⁵ It was also reported that the Turkish diplomacy favored improvement in bilateral relations with France. However Turkey gave priority to the creation of a Mediterranean pact. Therefore, improved relations with France would be relevant to Turkey’s diplomatic objectives particularly if they supplemented the progress towards a Mediterranean entente.⁶⁰⁶

New French Foreign Minister Laval knew how important a Mediterranean entente was to Ankara. Hence, he initially assured the Turkish Ambassador in Paris that he would try to talk Mussolini into such an arrangement.⁶⁰⁷ Soon after this conversation with the Turkish Ambassador, he made an official visit to Rome in January 1935. He could work out a deal with Mussolini, but not on Mediterranean cooperation. The terms of the deal reflected the shift in France’s strategic calculations. Laval traded France’s economic interests in Abyssinia with Italian solidarity in the event of any German action in Austria. As a part of the deal, he also made territorial concessions to Italy in Libya, the south of Tunisia, Chad and Eritrea. One aspect of the deal was related to the Mediterranean security. Mussolini pledged to renounce eventually Italy’s claims on Yugoslavia.⁶⁰⁸

In other words, the new political situation in Europe after Hitler compelled France to reshuffle its geographical priorities. Paris could give Italy a free hand in Africa, in return for Italian support against Hitler’s Germany in Europe.⁶⁰⁹ Moreover, Britain gave its blessing to the Rome agreements between Italy and France at Stresa in April 1935. Mussolini’s Four-Power Pact may have failed, but he could reasonably expect to build a ‘Three-Power Pact’ between Italy, France, and Britain around the Rome agreement.

These turn of events indicated a significant loss of enthusiasm in Paris about the formation of a Mediterranean pact. By concluding the Rome agreement, France now became a “half-ally of Italy”, at least according to Turkish diplomats. Tevfik Rüştü Aras told the British Ambassador James Morga that “Now that Italy is a half-ally of France, she can not possibly pretend - unless she is insincere - that any Mediterranean power constitutes a danger to her.”⁶¹⁰ Under these conditions, the earlier French proposal for a Mediterranean stood little chance of success. Mussolini had another agenda to pursue. In February, 1935, the Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade Ali Haydar confided to his British counterpart N. Henderson that the Italian government renewed its proposals to the governments of Greece and Turkey for a tripartite Mediterranean agreement.⁶¹¹ The fascist government favored a small coalition with few countries over a Mediterranean entente. Rome could expect to enjoy a controlling influence over the former whereas the latter including great powers such as France would not be as amenable to the Italian influence.

Italian undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Fulio Suvich, suggested to the Greek Ambassador in Rome that Rome would prefer an agreement including Greece and Turkey, but excluding all others.⁶¹² Furthermore, he added that this proposal had been endorsed by the Turkish government. Turkish Foreign Minister Aras, however, did not approve Suvich’s interpretation of Ankara’s position in the Mediterranean. The French diplomatic records link this confusion to temporary absence of Tevfik Rüştü Aras. The new Italian ambassador in Ankara, Carlo Galli, got the impression from the acting Foreign Minister Şükrü Kaya that Ankara was inclined towards such a tripartite arrangement. Şükrü Kaya later admitted that he shared his views with the Italian ambassador in general terms on the possibilities of a Mediterranean pact but denied absolutely that there was any discussion of a specific tripartite agreement involving Italy, Turkey and Greece. ⁶¹³

Consequently, The Greek Ambassador in Rome had been instructed to deliver a joint Greek-Turkish reply to Suvich that the two capitals would not agree to any regional arrangement unless it provided for the participation of Romania and Yugoslavia, their partners in the Balkan Entente. Suvich, then, repeated the Italian objections to these two countries’ inclusion. His justification was related to their respective geographical positions. In the Fascist Italy’s understanding of the Mediterranean, there was no place for Yugoslavia which was an Adriatic country or Romania which was Black Sea country. Having granted that there might be a point in the joint Greek-Turkish proposal, Switch asked why Albania and Bulgaria should not be included, by the same token.⁶¹⁴

In his report to London, British Ambassador Henderson drew attention to the finer points of this diplomatic episode. Suvitch originally pressed for an arrangement that would be limited to Italy, Greece and Turkey, excluding other great and minor powers in the Mediterranean. The joint Greek-Turkish reply to the Italian proposal compelled him to tone down his opposition to opening of the project to Yugoslavia and Romania. He also brought up the participation of Albania and Bulgaria in a similar fashion. His apparent willingness to reconsider the position of other smaller powers did not necessarily translate into a more accommodating approach towards France and Britain.⁶¹⁵

In the spring of 1935, the Italian Ambassador to Turkey, Galli, made another attempt to recruit Turkish Foreign Minister Aras to Italy’s tripartite pact proposal. In order to sweeten the proposal, this time he did not forget to mention the prospective participation of Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria which, he argued, could follow the conclusion of the tripartite pact between Italy, Greece and Turkey. Aras found it too good to be true that Italy would be willing to include the four members of the Balkan Entente into its Mediterranean proposal. Nevertheless, Ankara was skeptical about the viability of such a constellation of Mediterranean powers unless it was guaranteed by Britain and France.⁶¹⁶

In August 1935, an official British assessment identified Ankara’s two immediate concerns as Britain’s reluctance to guarantee a “Mediterranean Locarno” and Mussolini’s change of mind about inclusion of Romania and Yugoslavia in it.⁶¹⁷ It was argued by the British that these primarily reflected the “exaggerated fears of Aras” who was making “pathetic attempts to protect his country.”⁶¹⁸ Ankara held an extremely pessimistic view about the future in the Mediterranean. Two issues were likely to compromise Turkey’s security situation. First, according to Ankara, British naval power in the Mediterranean was on decline, in contrast to rise of Italian naval power. Second, the League of Nations was unfolding. If the system of collective security collapsed totally, then Turkey’s existing alliance with the Soviet Union and its Balkan Entente membership would be insufficient to provide security.⁶¹⁹

Consequently, Turkish officials were energetically promoting a multilateral Mediterranean pact. The British documents imply that Turkish Foreign Minister Aras offered an overly optimistic assessment about Italian readiness to conclude a pact with the four Balkan Entente partners. At this point, Italy’s half-hearted commitment was not sufficient. A Mediterranean pact would have problems of credibility unless it was guaranteed by both Britain and France. For the Turkish Foreign Ministry, that was the only option to secure concomitantly Italy and the Balkan Entente against aggression. Despite its apprehensions about the Italian intentions, the multilateral arrangement Ankara promoted did not call for Italy’s exclusion. On the contrary, it was meant to accommodate or contain Italy within a multilateral security arrangement. In other words, Ankara took great strides in building bridges between Italy and the Balkan Entente powers as well France and Britain. This project sets the interwar Turkish diplomacy way apart from the Ottoman tradition. The latter usually revolved around exploiting the differences and conflicts between the great powers.

In their dealings with the British, Turkish officials constantly drew attention to the urgency of forming a pact in the Mediterranean. They portrayed it as a naval affair that should be of outmost concern to London. The British Ambassador in Turkey, Percy Loraine, was under the impression that Turkish Foreign Minister Aras would like to get him to understand that the French government would support such a pact as Aras had already brought up with French Foreign Minister Loraine the threat that the Mediterranean might turn into a Latin lake. To be precise, Aras asked Loraine: “Might not this come about if France joined the proposed pact and England was not associated?”⁶²⁰

By 1935, Turkish political leaders recognized the centrality of Britain in preventing any aggression in the Mediterranean. However, as Ankara calculated, Britain alone could not restrain the ever-growing Italian power and threat to the region. This flaw could only be rectified by building the largest possible regional coalition. In this frame of mind, when Mussolini finally signaled that he might approve inclusion of Romania and Yugoslavia into his proposed tripartite alliance with Italy, Turkey, and Greece, Aras, then, raised the bar and suggested further expansion that would transform the modified Italian proposal of five-power into a Mediterranean Locarno. ⁶²¹

At any rate, Italy always remained the weak link in a multitude configurations evaluated for regional security. Turkish Foreign Minister Aras again questioned the ulterior motives of Rome in agreeing to expand the scope of a possible Mediterranean non-aggression pact to include all Balkan Entente members, although it marked alignment of the Italian position with that of Turkey and Greece. Aras suspected that this volte face came about due to the need “to guard Italy’s Eastern flank and to ensure that the Straits should remain open as a source of supplies” in the event of war with Abyssinia.⁶²² Hence, the early conclusion of the pact could play also into Italy’s hand and hasten the Abyssinian invasion. The tactical advantages of such behavior could not be discarded, at least according to the Turks who were deeply suspicious of every single Italian move.

As for secure access to the Black Sea through the Straits, Rome strove to build another pact with the two major Black Sea powers, the Soviet Union and Turkey. Hence, the Italian Ambassador in Turkey, Galli, began to promote an alternative Mediterranean pact idea that would include only these three countries.⁶²³ It was evident that Italian strategic requirements gave primacy to a regional arrangement with Moscow and Ankara in the north over a comprehensive Mediterranean pact. Furthermore, this proposed Black Sea arrangement would exclude a littoral country such as Romania. Finally, the Italian proposal can be regarded as an extension of the Italian-Soviet rapprochement into an anti-Nazi coalition in the East to forestall Anschluss.⁶²⁴

The Italian possession of the Dodecanese already provided Italy with the advantage of geographical proximity to the Black Sea. The international status of the Straits, however, could constrain Italian naval activity to and from the Black Sea.⁶²⁵ In Turkish assessments, Mussolini’s strategic objectives could be better served if Italy had possessed a base in the Black Sea.⁶²⁶ Short of this, Rome then focused on developing a regional agreement with Turkey and the Soviet Union. It is worth-nothing that Italy began to promote a trilateral arrangement in the Black Sea around the time when, Italy’s main rival in the Mediterranean, France, concluded a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union in May 1935.

To conclude this chapter, the Italian and Turkish strategies in the Mediterranean (including the Black Sea) can be compared. First, Rome’s diplomacy was designed to build alliances by exploiting regional conflicts and rivalries. Inevitably, various Italian proposals for Mediterranean cooperation emphasized the divisions between regional powers. Similarly, Rome never approved or welcomed pacts that were initiated and concluded by regional powers. For instance, Mussolini dismayed the Balkan Entente which he regarded as have taken shape under the French influence. For him, Belgrade’s inclusion to the Balkan Entente could lead to its destruction unless, as an ally of France, Yugoslavia made its intentions known regarding Italy.⁶²⁷ After the Balkan Entente materialized in 1934, Rome tried to lure Ankara and Athens into a tripartite arrangement so that it could split the Balkan Entente.

In contrast to Italy, Turkey stove to build bridges, particularly between the regional actors. Cooperation with other regional actors enhanced Ankara’s ability to resist Italian pressures. Furthermore, Ankara sought to enlarge the scope of the regional cooperation from the Balkans to the Mediterranean. To avoid domination by any single power, the largest possible coalition had to be built by recruiting as many powers – great, middle or minor – as possible to the proposed Mediterranean pact. In a way, the conclusion of the Balkan Entente prepared also the ground for a dramatic departure from previous Turkish strategy. After 1934, Ankara adopted a much less reserved attitude to regional cooperation schemes proposed by great powers such a France. In fact, Ankara did not only welcome the French proposal for Mediterranean cooperation but worked actively and enthusiastically to recruit the British to it.