Tourism, Security and Safety From Theory to Practice

Table 2
Visitor Arrivals by Month, 1998–2000
% change 
Month
1998
1999
2001 (Target)
2000 Actual
1999/2000
January
26,687
28,950
26,965
30,321
4.7%
February
22,556
25,263
24,253
30,058
19%
March
28,319
31,589
31,788
34,840
10.3%
April
30,570
29,082
29,839
38,069
30.9%
May
29,289
34,203
32,955
29,352
−
14.2%
June
34,602
38,445
36,121
12,066
−
68.6%
July
36,471
41,031
38,977
12,804
−
68.8%
August
37,821
40,680
40,160
12,265
−
69.9%
September
32,479
36,806
35,631
19,867
−
46%
October
32,198
36,800
34,080
24,275
−
34%
November
29,626
35,180
31,150
25,724
−
17%
December
30,724
31,926
32,283
24,429
−
24%
TOTAL
371,342
409,955
394,202
294,070
−
29.1%
Source:
Fiji Visitors Bureau, 2001.
H7898_Ch04.qxd 8/24/05 8:30 PM Page 77

---

It is critically important that all stakeholders in this industry from government,
landowners, hoteliers, etc. understand that any serious destabilizing event attract-
ing international attention will turn the tourist tap off again (TAG, 2000b).
Although the events of 2000 remain partially unresolved at the time of writing
there are a number of lessons to be learned from the approach adopted by TAG,
given the apparent effectiveness of its work in both 1987 and 2000.
Fiji Tourism in an Insecure World
It has been suggested by a Fiji academic that the country needs to consider what
should be done to deal with the 
next
coup, not make plans 
in case
there would be
Tourism Security and Safety: From Theory to Practice
78
Table 3
Visitors by Source and Month of Arrival, 1999 and 2000
Month of Arrival
Country of 
Residence
Jul
Aug
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec
Australia
1999
12,504
12,292
12,621
9,680
8,828
10,047
2000
2,217
1,524
5,550
6,203
7,650
8,201
% Change
−
82.3
−
87.6
−
56.0
−
35.9
−
13.3
−
18.4
New Zealand
1999
8,949
7,397
8,274
7,417
4,258
3,734
2000
2,202
1,500
5,946
7,061
5,473
3,343
% Change
−
75.4
−
79.7
−
28.1
−
4.8
28.5
−
10.5
United States
1999
6,529
5,224
3,766
6,047
6,691
5,852
2000
3,862
3,282
2,615
3,184
3,358
4,248
% Change
−
40.8
−
37.2
−
30.5
−
47.3
−
49.8
−
27.4
Canada
1999
1,227
1,284
696
1,155
1,613
1,219
2000
450
431
273
684
783
1,012
% Change
−
63.3
−
66.4
−
60.8
−
40.8
−
51.5
−
16.7
Japan
1999
3,187
4,858
4,113
3,126
2,820
2,519
2000
255
448
901
1,020
936
1,209
% Change
−
92.0
−
90.8
−
78.1
−
67.4
−
66.8
−
52.0
Korea
1999
147
139
90
62
120
131
2000
125
533
448
535
690
479
% Change
−
15.0
283.4
397.8
762.9
475.0
265.6
Continental 1999
3,293
3,413
2,355
3,618
4,396
2,864
Europe
2000
999
881
1,056
1,469
1,975
1,962
% Change
−
69.6
−
74.1
−
55.2
−
59.4
−
55.0
−
31.5
Pacific 1999
2,244
2,967
1,793
2,651
3,088
2,643
Islands
2000
1,033
1,127
825
1,534
2,218
1,543
% Change
−
54.0
−
62.0
−
54.0
−
42.1
−
28.2
−
41.6
Others
1999
2,119
2,267
2,034
2,229
2,619
2,071
2000
1,186
1,768
1,451
1,903
2,056
1,939
% Change
−
44.0
−
22.0
−
28.7
−
14.6
−
21.5
−
6.4
Total all 
1999
691
723
968
607
571
667
visitors
2000
388
719
717
552
448
797
% Change
−
43.8
−
0.6
−
25.9
−
9.1
−
21.5
19.4
H7898_Ch04.qxd 8/24/05 8:30 PM Page 78

---

another coup. One of the key lessons learned from the experience of the tourism
industry is much the same: the need to be prepared. Most tourism plans, particu-
larly those in tropical destinations, contain contingencies for natural disasters such
as cyclones. They also need to consider other types of crises, such as political
unrest. A key factor that facilitated the recovery program in 2000 was the speed at
which the tourism industry was able to respond to the crisis. Within a week of May
19, key industry players had met, leading to the rapid formation of TAG and the
formulation and operationalization of an initial strategy (TAG, 2000c). As a result,
the industry was relatively well prepared to respond quickly to the mounting cri-
sis. Beirman has highlighted this as an example of good practice, contrasting it
with the cancellation of key trade events in Australia in the immediate aftermath
of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (Beirman, 2001).
A coordinated and collective approach to the recovery process (i.e., one voice,
one message) was essential. Coordinating the recovery effort through TAG, under
the auspices of FVB, meant that a singular message was disseminated and that con-
sistent responses were made toward situations. This was particularly important in
dealing with the media and for downgrading the travel advisories. Although there
was some internal debate about the size of the financial contributions demanded
by the TAG and the promotion of a single product branding campaign, the strategy
has ultimately been successful in attracting visitors back to Fiji. The ability of Fiji
to reconvene the TAG at short notice following the terrorist attacks in the United
States was a major competitive advantage.
The fact that funding was expected to involve a partnership between the public
and private sectors is consistent with the “user pays” philosophy, which has
become increasingly characteristic in developed countries in the 1990s. This
difference between 1987 and 2000, then, is the result of the changing macroenvi-
ronment. Important lessons had been learned in 1987 about dealing with the
media. As Scott (1988, p. 69) stated, “While the media clearly have a duty to
inform, it was found that handling information with candor and integrity [could]
in fact ensure that media coverage [could] be harnessed to aid the recovery
process.” Although TAG and FVB had solid strategies in place for media liaison
and public relations, changes in information technology since 1987 meant that this
was a much more difficult task in 2000. The uncontrollable nature of the Internet
in particular posed significant challenges to Fiji’s international image, and hence,
to the recovery program.
As discussed above, land ownership also arose as a significant issue in 2000.
Customary land ownership is particularly problematic in that land has traditionally
been treated as a commodity not capable of alienation for individual ownership,
but rather as an asset held in the communal realm. Private capital and freehold land
ownership in tourism in Fiji, however, challenge this tradition. One of the mani-
festations of this juxtaposition was the takeover of various tourist resorts by indige-
nous landowners in 2000. Although outside the marketing-focused mandate of
TAG and FVB, these events clearly impacted very negatively on the recovery pro-
gram and needed to be addressed. The Spirit of Fiji campaign was one way of
addressing the issues. However, grassroots initiatives were also affected. One of
these was a Tourism Awareness Training Program initiated by the Savusavu
Tourism Association and the Tui Wailevu after the hostage taking of the New
Zealand pilots in Savusavu (Berno and Bricker, 2000; Carswell, 2000). Although
not directly targeted at land ownership issues, this campaign addressed similar
Fiji Islands: Rebuilding Tourism in an Insecure World
79
H7898_Ch04.qxd 8/24/05 8:30 PM Page 79

---

issues as the Spirit of Fiji, such as the economic importance of tourism to Fiji.
Despite these efforts, land ownership will clearly be an ongoing concern that will
need careful consideration.
Two periods of significant political instability within 13 years have done much
to damage Fiji’s image as a tourist destination. After the coups in 1987, a recovery
to pre-coup tourist arrival numbers was realized by the end of 1988. Despite the
success of TAG’s campaign, a full recovery after the coup in 2000 is likely to take
longer. It is going to take a continuing collaborative, concerted effort to recap-
ture the image of “Fiji—the world’s one truly relaxing destination.” As long as the
prospect of another coup cannot be ruled out, it may be difficult to offer tourists
the prospect of absolute relaxation. In some respects, Fiji may have lost its inno-
cence in 1987, leaving the tourism sector with no choice but to manage the new
reality. Words such as 
relaxation, paradise,
and 
idyllic
can become tinged with
irony. The events of September 11 have provided an extra layer of complexity. Prior
to that date, Fiji may have appeared a very unsafe place. Post–September 11, Fiji
appears like a haven of tranquility in a world where the most vulnerable targets for
terrorist attacks appear to be the icons of Western capitalism, such as the former
World Trade Center.
The Fiji experience is a timely reminder to other island destinations of the need
to consider the full implications of terms such as 
paradise, tranquility,
and 
true
relaxation
, which have been adopted by many island destinations. Fiji was better
prepared than many to confront the crisis when it arose because of the familiarity
of the country with cyclones and related natural disasters. Overcoming skepticism
on the part of the overseas travel industry and the traveling public is a bigger chal-
lenge. Fiji’s tourist sector recovered from the experience of 1987 and will do the
same again, though the downturn in world tourism following the terrorist attack in
the United States has been a further setback. It is clear that destinations are vulner-
able to a confluence of local issues (e.g., the coups) and global concerns (the impli-
cations of the terrorist attacks). At least Fiji’s experience of handling crises now
makes it better prepared than many other tourist destinations that have never had
to confront civil disturbances. Such destinations could learn from Fiji’s prepared-
ness for crisis, particularly the second time around.
From a research perspective, there is an urgent need for studies that investigate the
experience of recovering from crisis in a variety of different settings. The develop-
ment of widely applicable recovery models would be useful. Such research would be
positively received in a world where travelers need increasing reassurance that indus-
try and governments have the appropriate responses in place when crises strike.