Tourism, Security and Safety From Theory to Practice

Monthly Hotel Sales Tax Revenue in Washington, DC, 1999–2002 (in US: $)
1999
2000
2001
2002
January
2,083,597
1,771,533
3,058,810
3,008,947
February
1,577,849
1,566,657
726,744
1,432,790
March
2,488,339
3,386,583
3,817,280
3,125,787
April
3,151,812
2,584,570
3,241,299
3,387,121
May
3,627,154
4,186,446
5,159,761
4,826,261
June
3,784,271
4,577,912
4,100,036
2,929,979
July
3,190,065
3,376,907
3,552,188
3,153,909
August
2,452,792
3,405,266
3,092,084
—
September
2,209,657
2,922,143
1,794,747
—
October
3,117,743
2,957,742
2,158,430
—
November
4,015,429
4,957,742
2,672,048
—
December
2,726,053
2,702932
2,354,936
—
Source:
Washington Convention Center Authority, August 2002.
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Clearly, the Washington, DC, hotel industry desperately needed to find a better
way to address the market than the cutthroat, zero-sum rate war that appeared
inevitable.
Recovering from the Crisis
The Hotel Association of Washington, DC (HAWDC), coordinated with the
Washington, DC, Convention and Tourism Corporation (WCTC), the Washington,
DC, Convention Center Authority (WCCA), the Restaurant Association of
Metropolitan Washington (RAMW), and the District of Columbia government to
promote tourism in the District. The early recovery initiatives of this group
included (i) assuring a coordinated response by the Washington, DC, hospitality
industry; (ii) campaigning to reopen Reagan National Airport and major tourist
attractions; (iii) promoting government-related business travel to DC; and (iv)
building a marketing fund and developing a marketing plan to reestablish
Washington, DC, as a must visit destination (Irwin, 2001; WCTC, 2001a). The fol-
lowing discussion explains each of the crisis-management and recovery initiatives
deployed by the DC hospitality industry in coordination with its partners.