Third section

B. The revocation of citizenship in the present case: on the domestic legal 
framework and its application by the competent authorities
12. We have no hesitation whatsoever in concluding, like the majority, 
that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 8.
The question is: how should the Court reach such a conclusion?
13. The majority argue that there are a number of shortcomings in the 
applicable legal framework, namely the Russian Citizenship Act and the 
Regulation on the Examination of Issues Related to Citizenship of the 
Russian Federation.
They argue, in particular, that the relevant provisions are not sufficiently 
clear, as these provisions do not specify the nature of the information that, if 
not adequately submitted in the application for citizenship, can be the basis 
for revoking the citizenship thus granted (see paragraph 67 of the 
judgment).

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USMANOV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION
26
They also argue that under the applicable provisions the authorities were 
not required to give a reasoned decision specifying all the factual grounds 
on which it had been taken (see paragraph 68 of the judgment). On this 
latter point, they refer to the Government’s statement that, “after it had been 
established that the information submitted by the applicant was incomplete, 
the authorities had no other choice but to annul the decision granting him 
Russian citizenship”, and they add that “it has not been shown that the 
national courts had to consider” a number of relevant factors (see 
paragraph 69 of the judgment).
14. To our regret, we are unable to follow our colleagues in their blunt 
criticism of the legal framework, as though the applicable rules did not 
permit the competent authorities to apply them in a Convention-compliant 
way.
The law is the law as interpreted by the courts. In this case, there was 
clear case-law of the Constitutional Court on how the Russian Citizenship 
Act was to be applied. On 21 April 2011 and 25 October 2016 –that is, well 
before the decision was taken to revoke the applicant’s citizenship – the 
Constitutional Court had interpreted section 22 of the Act in such a way that 
it could be applied only “in cases where individuals did not satisfy the 
conditions 
required 
for 
obtaining 
Russian 
citizenship” 
(see 
paragraphs 37-38 of the judgment). This means that section 22 does not 
offer a basis for a “blind” revocation of citizenship, irrespective of the 
concrete importance of the information that has been concealed from the 
authorities.
Moreover, in a series of decisions, including on an appeal by the 
applicant himself, the Constitutional Court stated that “the competent 
authorities should take into account surrounding circumstances, such as the 
time elapsed since the decision granting Russian citizenship for their 
decision to comply with the requirements of necessary and proportionate 
interference with human rights” (decisions of 15 January, 12 and 
28 February 2019, referred to in paragraph 39 of the judgment). This is a 
clear application of some of the principles set out in this Court’s case-law, 
and allows for a balancing of interests in each concrete case. Admittedly, 
the Constitutional Court made these statements after the decision to revoke 
the applicant’s citizenship had been taken. However, since the statement 
reflects principles taken from this Court’s pre-existing case-law, it should be 
assumed that there had been nothing to prevent the competent authorities 
from previously taking these principles into consideration in the applicant’s 
case, and thus to apply the Russian Citizen Act in a Convention-compliant 
way.
It is true that section 54 of the Regulation on the Examination of Issues 
Related to Citizenship of the Russian Federation, as in force at the material 
time, did not explicitly provide for an obligation to state the reasons for the 
annulment of a decision on Russian citizenship (see paragraph 34 of the 

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USMANOV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION
27
judgment). It was only by a presidential decree of 17 June 2020 that such an 
obligation was introduced in section 54. There is now an explicit obligation 
to describe the circumstances which led to the adoption of the annulment 
decision (see paragraph 35 of the judgment). It seems to us, however, that 
there was nothing to prevent the competent authorities in an individual case 
from giving such reasons already, on the basis of the Russian Citizen Act as 
interpreted by the Constitutional Court.
15. The violation of the applicant’s rights is not therefore to be situated 
at the level of the legislature. The legal framework offered the competent 
authorities, both within the administration and the judiciary, the opportunity 
to refrain from revoking the applicant’s citizenship if there were no relevant 
and sufficient reasons for doing so. We cannot agree with the Government’s 
argument that the authorities had no other choice but to revoke the 
applicant’s citizenship.
It can be argued that the competent authorities applied the provisions of 
domestic law in a way that was incompatible with the Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation of the Russian Citizens Act. The conclusion then would be 
that the impugned measure lacked a legal basis in domestic law, and for that 
reason (which is different from the one advanced by the majority) was not 
“in accordance with the law”.
Alternatively, it is also possible to leave open the question whether the 
measure was in accordance with domestic law.
In any event, the domestic authorities adopted an “excessively 
formalistic approach” (see paragraph 70 of the judgment), paying no 
attention to any “surrounding circumstances” and thereby omitting any 
balancing of rights and interests. In these circumstances, they did not justify 
the proportionality of the impugned measure in the light of the aim pursued 
(the protection of national security, according to the Government; see 
paragraph 48 of the judgment). It has therefore not been demonstrated that 
the measure was “necessary in a democratic society”.