The shadow economy

About the IEA
The Institute is a research and educational charity (No. CC 235 351), limited by guarantee. Its mission is to improve understanding of the fundamental institutions of a free society by analysing and expounding the role of markets in solving economic and social problems.
The IEA achieves its mission by:
• a high-quality publishing programme
• conferences, seminars, lectures and other events
• outreach to school and college students
• brokering media introductions and appearances
The IEA, which was established in 1955 by the late Sir Antony Fisher, is an educational charity, not a political organisation. It is independent of any political party or group and does not carry on activities intended to affect support for any political party or candidate in any election or referendum, or at any other time. It is financed by sales of publications, conference fees and voluntary donations.
In addition to its main series of publications the IEA also publishes a termly journal, Economic Affairs.
The IEA is aided in its work by a distinguished international Academic Advisory Council and an eminent panel of Honorary Fellows. Together with other academics, they review prospective IEA publications, their comments being passed on anonymously to authors. All IEA papers are therefore subject to the same rigorous independent refereeing process as used by leading academic journals.
IEA publications enjoy widespread classroom use and course adoptions in schools and universities. They are also sold throughout the world and often tra nslated/reprinted.
Since 1974 the IEA has helped to create a worldwide network of 100 similar institutions in over 70 countries. They are all independent but share the lEA's mission.
Views expressed in the lEA's publications are those of the authors, not those of the Institute (which has no corporate view), its Managing Trustees, Academic Advisory Council members or senior staff.
Members of the Institute's Academic Advisory Council, Honorary Fellows, Trustees and Staff are listed on the following page.

The Institute gratefully acknowledges financial support for its publications programme and other work from a generous benefaction by the late Alec and Beryl Warren.

1^ This monograph focuses on the size and development of the shadow economy for individual countries and not for regions. Recently first studies have been undertaken to measure the size of the shadow economy as well as the ‘grey’ or ‘shadow’ labour force for urban regions or states (e.g. California). See, e.g., Marcelli et al. (1999). Marcelli (2004), Chen (2004), Williams and Windebank (4998, 20ora, 20orb), Flaming et at (2005), Alderslade et at (2006), Bruck et al. (2006). Herwartz et al. (2009) and Tafenau et al. (2oro) estimate the size of the shadow economy of 234 EU-NUTS regions for the year 2004, for the first time demonstrating a considerable regional variation in the size of the shadow economy.
Ushbu monografiyada xufiyona iqtisodiyotning hududlarda emas, balki alohida mamlakatlardagi hajmi va rivojlanishiga e'tibor qaratilgan. Yaqinda yashirin iqtisodiyot hajmini, shuningdek, shaharlar yoki shtatlar (masalan, Kaliforniya) uchun "kulrang" yoki "soya" ishchi kuchini o'lchash bo'yicha birinchi tadqiqotlar o'tkazildi. Masalan, Marcelli va boshqalarga qarang. (1999). Marchelli (2004), Chen (2004), Williams & Windebank (4998, 20 orb, 20 orb), Flaming va boshqalar (2005), Alderslade va boshqalar (2006), Brook va boshqalar (2006). Herwartz va boshqalar (2009) va Tafenau va boshqalar. (2oro) 2004 yil uchun 234 ta EI-NUTS mintaqalarining er osti iqtisodiyoti hajmini baholang, bu birinchi marta yashirin iqtisodiyot hajmidagi sezilarli mintaqaviy farqlarni ko'rsatmoqda.

2^ This definition is used, for example, by Feige (4989, 4994), Schneider (4994a, 2003, 2005) and Frey and Pommerehne (4984). Do-it-yourself activities are not included. For estimates of the shadow economy and do-it-yourself activities for Germany, see Buhn et al. (2009) or Karmann (4986, 4990).
Bu ta'rif, masalan, Feige (4989, 4994), Schneider (4994a, 2003, 2005) va Frey va Pommeren (4984) tomonidan qo'llaniladi. O'z-o'zini boshqaradigan faoliyatlar kiritilmagan. Germaniyada yashirin iqtisodiyot va o'z-o'zini ish bilan ta'minlash haqidagi taxminlar uchun Buhn va boshqalarga qarang. (2009) yoki Karmann (4986, 4990).

3^ This definition is taken from Dell’Anno (2003), Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003) and Feige (1989); see also Thomas (1999). Fleming et at (2000) or Feld and Larsen (2005: 25).
Ushbu ta'rif Dell'Anno (2003), Dell'Anno and Schneider (2003) va Feige (1989) dan olingan; Shuningdek qarang: Thomas (1999). Fleming va at (2000) yoki Feld and Larsen (2005: 25).

4^ See also the excellent discussion of the definition of the shadow economy in Pedersen (2003: 13–19) and Kazemier (2005a), who use a similar definition.
Shunga o'xshash ta'rifdan foydalanadigan yashirin iqtisodiyot ta'rifining ajoyib muhokamasi uchun Pedersen (2003: 13-19) va Kazemier (2005a) ga qarang.

5^ Compare Chapter 6, however, where it is shown that shadow economy activities are partly captured in the official statistics in some countries. Biroq, yashirin iqtisodiyotdagi faoliyat qisman ayrim mamlakatlarning rasmiy statistikasida aks etganligini ko'rsatadigan 6-bobni solishtiring.

6^ Compare also Feld and Schneider (2010) and Schneider (2011). Shuningdek, Feld and Schneider (2010) va Schneider (2011) ni solishtiring.

7^ For the strengths and weaknesses of the various methods, see Bhattacharyya (1999), Breusch (2005a, 2005b), Dell’Anno and Schneider (2009), Dixon (1999), Feige (1989), Feld and Larsen (2005), Feld and Schneider (2010), Giles (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Schneider (1986, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2011), Schneider and Enste (2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2006), Tanzi (1999), Thomas (1992, 1999). Turli usullarning kuchli va zaif tomonlari uchun qarang: Bhattacharyya (1999), Breusch (2005a, 2005b), Dell'Anno and Schneider (2009), Dixon (1999), Feige (1989), Feld and Larsen (2005), Feld and Schneider (2010), Giles (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Schneider (1986, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2011), Schneider & Enste (2000a, 2000b, 20919), , 1999).

8^ These methods are presented in detail in Schneider (1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 2005, 2011), Feld and Schneider (2010) and Schneider and Enste (2000b, 2002, 2006). Furthermore, these studies discuss advantages and disadvantages of the MIMIC and the money demand methods as well as other estimation methods for assessing the size of illicit employment; for a detailed discussion see also Feld and Larsen (2005). Ushbu usullar Schneider (1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 2005, 2011), Feld and Schneider (2010) va Schneider and Enste (2000b, 2002, 2006) da batafsil bayon etilgan. Bundan tashqari, ushbu tadqiqotlar MIMIC va pul talab qilish usullarining afzalliklari va kamchiliklarini, shuningdek, noqonuniy bandlik hajmini baholashning boshqa usullarini muhokama qiladi; batafsil muhokama uchun Feld and Larsen (2005) ga qarang.

9^ This indirect approach is based on the assumption that cash is used to make transactions within the shadow economy. By using this method one econometrically estimates a currency demand function including independent variables such as tax burden, regulation, etc., which ‘drive’ the shadow economy. This equation is used to make simulations of the amount of money that would be necessary to generate official GDP. This amount is then compared with the actual money demand and the difference is treated as an indicator of the development of the shadow economy. On this basis the calculated difference is multiplied by the velocity of money of the official economy and one gets a value added figure for the shadow economy. Ushbu bilvosita yondashuv naqd pul mablag'lari yashirin iqtisodiyot doirasida operatsiyalarni amalga oshirish uchun ishlatiladi degan taxminga asoslanadi. Ushbu usuldan foydalanib, valyutaga bo'lgan talab funktsiyasini, jumladan, soliq yuki, tartibga solish va boshqalar kabi yashirin iqtisodiyotni "harakatlantiruvchi" mustaqil o'zgaruvchilarni ekonometrik baholash mumkin. Ushbu tenglama rasmiy YaIMni yaratish uchun zarur bo'lgan pul miqdorini modellashtirish uchun ishlatiladi. Keyin bu miqdor pulga bo'lgan haqiqiy talab bilan taqqoslanadi va farq yashirin iqtisodiyotning rivojlanishi ko'rsatkichi sifatida qaraladi. Shu asosda, yashirin iqtisodiyot uchun qo'shilgan qiymat ko'rsatkichini olish uchun hisoblangan farq rasmiy iqtisodiyotdagi pul aylanish tezligiga ko'paytiriladi.

10^ This part is taken from Feld and Schneider (2010: 115–16).
Ushbu qism Feld va Shnayderdan olingan (2010: 115–116).

11^ An earlier study by Merz and Wolff (1993) does not analyse the impact of deterrence on undeclared work.
Merz va Wolff (1993) tomonidan ilgari o'tkazilgan tadqiqot deklaratsiya qilinmagan ishlarga to'sqinlik qilish ta'sirini tahlil qilmaydi.

12^ The earlier study by Isachsen and Strøm (1985) for Norway also does not properly analyse the impact of deterrence on undeclared work.

13^ See Thomas (1992), Lippert and Walker (1997), Schneider (1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2009), Johnson et al. (1998a, 1998b), Tanzi (1999), Giles (1999a), Mummert and Schneider (2001), Giles and Tedds (2002) and Dell’Anno (2003).

14^ Deregulation Commisson. Deregulyatsiya komissiyasi.

15^ The importance of regulation on the official and shadow economy has been investigated more recently by Loayza, Oviedo and Servén (2005a, 2005b). Kucera and Roncolato (2008) extensively analyse the impact of labour market regulation on the shadow economy. Loaiza, Oviedo va Serven (2005a, 2005b) yaqinda rasmiy va yashirin iqtisodiyotni tartibga solishning ahamiyatini oʻrganishdi. Kucera va Roncolato (2008) mehnat bozorini tartibga solishning yashirin iqtisodiyotga ta'sirini batafsil tahlil qiladi.

16^ See, for example, Johnson et al. (1998a, 1998b), Friedman et al. (2000), Dreher and Schneider (2009), Dreher et al. (2007, 2009), as well as Teobaldelli (2011), Teobaldelli and Schneider (2012), Schneider (2010) and Bühn and Schneider (2011).

17^ The importance of this variable with respect to theory and empirical relevance is also shown in Frey (1997a, 1997b), Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b, 2007) and Torgler and Schneider (2009). Ushbu o'zgaruvchining nazariy va empirik ahamiyatga ega bo'lgan ahamiyati Frey (1997a, 1997b), Feld va Frey (2002a, 2002b, 2007) va Torgler va Schneider (2009) tomonidan ham ko'rsatilgan.

18^ This indicator variable might be influenced by state regulation and hence not be truly exogenous. Ushbu ko'rsatkich o'zgaruvchisi davlat tomonidan tartibga solish ta'sirida bo'lishi mumkin va shuning uchun ekzogen bo'lishi mumkin emas.

19^ The variable currency per capita or annual change of currency per capita is heavily influenced by banking innovations or payment; hence this variable can be pretty unstable. Similar problems have already been mentioned by Giles (1999a) and Giles and Tedds (2002). Aholi jon boshiga o'zgaruvchan valyuta yoki jon boshiga yillik valyuta o'zgarishiga bank innovatsiyalari yoki to'lovlar katta ta'sir ko'rsatadi; shuning uchun bu o'zgaruvchi juda beqaror bo'lishi mumkin. Shunga o'xshash muammolar allaqachon Giles (1999a) va Giles and Tedds (2002) tomonidan aytib o'tilgan.

20^ Compare also Schneider et al. (2010) and Feld and Schneider (2010). Shuningdek, Schneider va boshqalarni solishtiring. (2010) va Feld & Schneider (2010).

21^ For a more extensive discussion about the methods used and strengths and weaknesses of the various methods, see Schneider and Enste (2000a), Schneider (2005, 2011), Feld and Larsen (2005, 2008, 2009), Pedersen (2003) and Giles (1999a, 1999b, 1999c). Amaldagi usullar va turli usullarning kuchli va zaif tomonlari haqida batafsilroq muhokama qilish uchun qarang: Schneider and Enste (2000a), Schneider (2005, 2011), Feld and Larsen (2005, 2008, 2009), Pedersen (2003) va Giles. (1999a, 1999b, 1999c).

22^ Feld and Larsen (2008) argue that, owing to the extraordinarily low rate of participation based on a relatively small sample, the results for 2006 must be interpreted with extra care. Additionally it should be noted that these results measure shadow economic activities only in households and not in firms. Feld va Larsen (2008) ta'kidlashicha, nisbatan kichik namunaga asoslangan juda past ishtirok etish darajasi tufayli 2006 yil natijalari juda ehtiyotkorlik bilan talqin qilinishi kerak. Bundan tashqari, shuni ta'kidlash kerakki, bu natijalar faqat uy xo'jaliklarida yashirin iqtisodiy faoliyatni o'lchaydi va firmalarda emas.

23^ Of course, it is a moot point whether the shadow economy should be measured as a proportion of official national income or as a proportion of official national income plus the shadow economy (which should give total economic activity). The two different approaches would not change the ordering or the trends in the values and the former approach is used here. Albatta, yashirin iqtisodiyotni rasmiy milliy daromadning ulushi yoki rasmiy milliy daromadning ulushi va yashirin iqtisodiyotning ulushi sifatida o'lchash kerakmi (bu umumiy iqtisodiy faollikni berishi kerak) bahsli. Ikki xil yondashuv qiymatlar tartibini yoki tendentsiyalarini o'zgartirmaydi va bu erda birinchi yondashuv qo'llaniladi.

24^ This procedure is described in great detail in Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003, 2009). Ushbu protsedura Dell'Anno va Schneider (2003, 2009) tomonidan batafsil tavsiflangan.

25^ This part and the figures are taken from Schneider et al. (2010). Ushbu qism va raqamlar Schneider va boshqalardan olingan. (2010).

26^ In Appendix 2 a list of these 162 countries is shown in alphabetical order. 2-ilovada ushbu 162 davlat alifbo tartibida keltirilgan.

27^ The numbers for OECD countries are slightly different from the analysis above, which contained only a subset of OECD countries. OECD mamlakatlari uchun ko'rsatkichlar yuqoridagi tahlildan bir oz farq qiladi, bu faqat OECD davlatlarining bir qismini o'z ichiga oladi.

28^ The work of Hernando de Soto on this topic is particularly telling.
Ernando de Sotoning bu boradagi ishi, ayniqsa, ochib beradi.

29^ This is unweighted.

30^ For developing countries some literature about the shadow labour market exists: Dallago (1990), Pozo (1996), Loayza (1996), Chickering and Salahdine (1991) and OECD (2009a).
Rivojlanayotgan mamlakatlar uchun soya mehnat bozoriga oid adabiyotlar mavjud: Dallago (1990), Pozo (1996), Loayza (1996), Chickering va Salahdine (1991) va OECD (2009a).

31^ The selection of these two studies is based on the fact that they use data from 2010 and both provide important and detailed insights into why people choose to demand and supply shadow work. Compare also Feld and Larsen (2005, 2008, 2009) and Schneider (2011). Ushbu ikkita tadqiqotni tanlash, ular 2010 yilgi ma'lumotlardan foydalanishiga asoslanadi va ikkalasi ham odamlar nima uchun er osti ishlarini talab qilish va taklif qilishni tanlashlari haqida muhim va batafsil ma'lumot beradi. Shuningdek, Feld va Larsen (2005, 2008, 2009) va Schneider (2011) ni solishtiring.

32^ Note that the EU was much smaller in 1997/98. E'tibor bering, 1997/98 yillarda Evropa Ittifoqi ancha kichik edi.

33^ The assumption that the shadow economy labour force is at least as high in rural areas as in major cities is a very modest one. That this is so is supported by Lubell (1991). Some authors (e.g. Lubell, 1991, Pozo, 1996 and Chickering and Salahdine, 1991) argue that the illicit labour force is nearly twice as high in the countryside as in urban areas. But since no (precise) data exists on this ratio, the assumption of an equal size may be justified arguing that such a calculation provides a lower bound for the size of the shadow economy.
Qishloq joylarda er osti ishchi kuchi hech bo'lmaganda yirik shaharlardagi kabi yuqori degan taxmin juda kamtarona. Bu holat Lubell tomonidan tasdiqlangan (1991). Ba'zi mualliflar (masalan, Lubell, 1991, Pozo, 1996 va Chickering va Salahdine, 1991) noqonuniy ishchi kuchi qishloq joylarida shaharlardagiga qaraganda deyarli ikki baravar yuqori ekanligini ta'kidlaydilar. Ammo bu nisbat bo'yicha (aniq) ma'lumotlar mavjud emasligi sababli, teng o'lchamdagi taxminni bunday hisob-kitob yashirin iqtisodiyot hajmi bo'yicha pastki chegarani ta'minlaydi, deb ta'kidlash orqali oqlanishi mumkin.

34^ The following results and figures are taken from the OECD (2009a) executive summary. Quyidagi natijalar va raqamlar OECD xulosasidan (2009a) olingan.

35^ This section is adapted from Schneider and Enste (2002: part 5, pp. 43-51). Ushbu bo'lim Schneider va Enste (2002: 5-qism, 43-51-betlar) dan moslashtirilgan.

36^ These high values strongly indicate that a considerable number of these illicit workers also have (at least part-time) jobs in the official economy. Yet the number of these ‘double-job-holders’ is unknown and may differ from country to country. Given this, the ratio of the shadow economy labour force as a percentage of the official labour force should be interpreted very cautiously, since it is unclear what this ratio actually stands for. Hence interpretation is very difficult. In addition, making comparisons between different countries is very complicated and such comparisons provide only a very crude picture. Arguably, the rate of the shadow economy labour force as a percentage of the population is a somewhat better gauge. Ushbu yuqori raqamlar ushbu noqonuniy ishchilarning katta qismi rasmiy iqtisodiyotda ham ish (kamida yarim kunlik ishlar) mavjudligini aniq ko'rsatmoqda. Biroq, bu "part-taymerlar" soni noma'lum va har bir mamlakatda farq qilishi mumkin. Shu bilan birga, yashirin iqtisodiyotning ishchi kuchining rasmiy ishchi kuchiga nisbati juda ehtiyotkorlik bilan talqin qilinishi kerak, chunki bu nisbat aslida nimani anglatishi aniq emas. Shuning uchun talqin qilish juda qiyin. Bundan tashqari, turli mamlakatlar o'rtasida taqqoslash juda qiyin va bunday taqqoslashlar faqat juda taxminiy rasmni beradi. Ehtimol, yashirin iqtisodiyotda ishchi kuchining aholiga nisbatan ulushi biroz yaxshiroq ko'rsatkichdir.

37^ See also Feld and Schneider (2010), Schneider et at (2010), Williams (2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b) and Hazans (2011).

38^ The UK is an example of a country where there are very few advantages from making social security (national insurance) contributions as benefits are not related to contributions in most parts of the system. Employers and employees between them can save about 23 per cent of the gross wage by avoiding social security contributions with very little loss to benefits. Buyuk Britaniya ijtimoiy sug'urta (milliy sug'urta) badallarini to'lashdan juda kam foyda oladigan mamlakat misolidir, chunki imtiyozlar tizimning aksariyat qismlarida badallar bilan bog'liq emas. Ish beruvchilar va xodimlar birgalikda ijtimoiy sug'urta badallarini to'lamaslik orqali yalpi ish haqining taxminan 23 foizini tejashlari mumkin.

39^ Much of the first part of Chapter 6 is taken from Feld and Schneider (2010). 6-bobning birinchi qismining katta qismi Feld and Schneider (2010) dan olingan.

40^ This section, including the box and tables, closely follows OECD (2011:11-12, Box 2).