domain, but many people (including me) nd it hard to
remember these terms, so I have swapped in original triggers and
current triggers. The term original trigger is not meant to imply
that there was once a time, long ago, when the module didn’t
make mistakes. I would use the term intended trigger except that
evolutionary design has no intentions.
33.
Natural selection is a design process; it is the cause of the design
that abounds in the biological world. It is just not an intelligent
or conscious designer. See Tooby and Cosmides 1992.
34.
For more on the origins and details of the theory, see Haidt and
Graham 2007; Haidt and Joseph 2004, 2007. The theory was
strongly in uenced by the work of Richard Shweder and Alan
Fiske. Our choice of the ve foundations is close to Shweder’s
three ethics. Our general approach of identifying evolved
cognitive modules that get lled out in culturally variable ways
was inspired by Alan Fiske’s Relational Models Theory. See Rai
and Fiske 2011 for the application of this theory to moral
psychology.
35.
For a recent list, see Neuberg, Kenrick, and Schaller 2010.
36.
In our original article (Haidt and Joseph 2004), we described
only four foundations, which we labeled Su ering, Hierarchy,
Reciprocity, and Purity. We noted that there were probably
many more, and we speci cally noted “group-loyalty” in a
footnote as a good candidate for a fth. I am grateful to Jennifer
Wright, who had argued with me by email while I was working
on that paper, that group loyalty is distinct from hierarchy,
which is where Craig and I had put it originally. Beginning in
2005, we changed the names of the ve foundations to use two
related words for each one, in order to reduce the
misunderstandings we were encountering. We used these names
from 2005 to 2009: Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, In-
group/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. In 2010
we reformulated the theory to expand it and x shortcomings
that I will describe in chapter 8. To avoid the confusion of
talking about multiple names for the same foundations, I adopt
the 2010 names here, when I describe the origins of the theory.
For Authority, I have focused here on the psychology of the
subordinate—the psychology of respect for authority. In the next
chapter I’ll explore the psychology of the superior leader as well.
37.
See, for example, the “suite” of moral emotions that Trivers
1971 proposed as the mechanism behind reciprocal altruism
(e.g., gratitude for favors received, indignation for favors not
returned by the other person, guilt for favors not returned by the
self.) For the Care foundation, for example, there might be one
module that detects su ering, another for intentional in iction
of harm, a third that detects kinship, and a fourth that detects
e orts to care or comfort. The important point is that there is a
set of innate “if-then” programs that work together to help
people meet the adaptive challenge. Some of these innate
modules may be innate as “learning modules,” which generate
more speci c modules during childhood development, as
described by Sperber. See Haidt and Joseph 2007 for a detailed
discussion of moral modularity.
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