The Project Gutenberg eBook, An Introduction to Philosophy, by George

method of attaining to truth.  Hence, it has not properly a place in this chapter among the 
attempts which have been made to attain to the truth of things. 
 
It is, in fact, not concerned with truths, but with assumptions, and with assumptions which are 
supposed to be made on the basis of no evidence.  It is concerned with “seemings.” 
 
The distinction is a very important one.  Our Turk cannot, by willing to believe it, make his 
hypothesis true; but he can make it seem true.  Why should he wish to make it seem true whether 
it is true or not?  Why should he strive to attain to a feeling of subjective certainty, not by 
logically resolving his doubts, but by ignoring them? 
 
The answer is given us by our author.  He who lives in the midst of doubts, and refuses to cut his 
knot with the sword of belief, misses the good of life.  This is a practical problem, and one of no 
small moment.  In the last section of this book I have tried to indicate what it is wise for a man to 
do when he is confronted by doubts which he cannot resolve. 
 
Into the general question whether even a false belief may not, under some circumstances, be 
more serviceable than no belief at all, I shall not enter.  The point I wish to emphasize is that 
there is all the difference in the world between producing a belief and proving a truth. 
 
We are compelled to accept it as a fact that men, under the influence of feeling, can believe in 
the absence of evidence, or, for that matter, can believe in spite of evidence.  But a truth cannot 
be established in the absence of evidence or in the face of adverse evidence.  And there is a very 
wide field in which it is made very clear to us that beliefs adopted in the absence of evidence are 
in danger of being false beliefs. 
 
The pragmatist would join with the rest of us in condemning the Turk or the Christian who 
would simply will to believe in the rise or the fall of stocks, and would refuse to consult the state 
of the market.  Some hypotheses are, in the ordinary course of events, put to the test of 
verification.  We are then made painfully aware that beliefs and truths are quite distinct things, 
and may not be in harmony. 
 
Now, the pragmatist does not apply his principle to this field.  He confines it to what may not 
inaptly be called the field of the unverifiable.  The Turk, who wills to believe in the hypothesis 
that appeals to him as a pious Turk, is in no such danger of a rude awakening as is the man who 
wills to believe that stocks will go up or down.  But mark what this means: it means that he is not 
in danger of finding out what the truth really is.  It does not mean that he is in possession of the 
truth. 
 
So I say, the doctrine which we are discussing is not a method of attaining to truth.  What it 
really attempts to do is to point out to us how it is prudent for us to act when we cannot discover 
what the truth is.[6] 
 
 [1] “An Essay concerning Human Understanding,” Book II, Chapter I, section 2. 
 
 
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Criticism, and Critical Empiricism 
[2] Book I, Chapter I, section 4. 
 
[3] Book I, Chapter I, section 1. 
 
[4] “Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,” article “Pragmatism.” 
 
[5] Published in 1897 and 1898. 
 
[6] For references to later developments of pragmatism, see the note on page 312. 
 
 
 
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 Chap. XVI – Logic 
V. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
LOGIC 
 
65. INTRODUCTORY: THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. – I have said in the first chapter 
of this book (section 6) that there is quite a group of sciences that are regarded as belonging 
peculiarly to the province of the teacher of philosophy to-day.  Having, in the chapters preceding, 
given some account of the nature of reflective thought, of the problems touching the world and 
the mind which present themselves to those who reflect, and of some types of philosophical 
theory which have their origin in such reflection, I turn to a brief consideration of the 
philosophical sciences. 
 
Among these I included logic, psychology, ethics, and aesthetics, metaphysics, and the history of 
philosophy.  I did not include epistemology or “the theory of knowledge” as a separate 
discipline, and my reasons for this will appear in Chapter XIX.  I remarked that, to complete the 
list, we should have to add the philosophy of religion and an investigation into the principles and 
methods of the sciences generally. 
 
Why, it was asked, should this group of disciplines be regarded as the field of the philosopher, 
when others are excluded?  The answer to this question which finds the explanation of the fact to 
lie in a mere historical accident was declared unsatisfactory, and it was maintained that the 
philosophical sciences are those in which we find ourselves carried back to the problems of 
reflective thought. 
 
With a view to showing the truth of this opinion, I shall take up one by one the philosophical 
sciences.  Of the history of philosophy I shall not speak in this part of the work, but shall treat of 
it in Chapter XXIII. 
 
66. THE TRADITIONAL LOGIC. – Most of us begin our acquaintance with logic in the study 
of some such elementary manual as Jevons’ “Lessons in Logic.” 
 
In such books we are shown how terms represent things and classes of things or their attributes, 
and how we unite them into propositions or statements.  It is indicated at length what statements 
may be made on a basis of certain other statements and what may not; and emphasis is laid upon 
the dangers which arise out of a misunderstanding of the language in which we are forced to 
express our thoughts.  Finally, there are described for us the experimental methods by which the 
workers in the sciences have attained to the general information about the world which has 
become our heritage. 
 
Such books are useful.  It is surely no small profit for a student to gain the habit of scrutinizing 
the steps by which he has come into the possession of a certain bit of information, and to have a 
quick eye for loose and inconsistent reasonings. 
 
 
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But it is worthy of remark that one may study such a book as this and yet remain pretty 
consistently on what may be called the plane of the common understanding.  One seems to make 
the assumptions made in all the special sciences, e.g. the assumption that there is a world of real 
things and that we can know them and reason about them.  We are not introduced to such 
problems as: What is truth?  and Is any knowledge valid?  Nor does it seem at once apparent that 
the man who is studying logic in this way is busying himself with a philosophical discipline. 
 
67. THE “MODERN LOGIC.” – It is very puzzling for the student to turn from such a text-book 
as the one above mentioned to certain others which profess to be occupied with the same science, 
and which, yet, appear to treat of quite different things. 
 
Thus, in Dr. Bosanquet’s little work on “The Essentials of Logic,” the reader is at once plunged 
into such questions as the nature of knowledge, and what is meant by the real world.  We seem to 
be dealing with metaphysics, and not with logic, as we have learned to understand the term.  
How is it that the logician comes to regard these things as within his province? 
 
A multitude of writers at the present day are treating logic in this way, and in some great 
prominence is given to problems which the philosopher recognizes as indisputably his own.  The 
term “modern logic” is often employed to denote a logic of this type; one which does not, after 
the fashion of the natural sciences generally, proceed on the basis of certain assumptions, and 
leave deeper questions to some other discipline, but tries to get to the bottom of things for itself. 
The tendency to run into metaphysics is peculiarly marked in those writers who have been 
influenced by the work of the philosopher Hegel. 
 
I shall not here ask why those who belong to one school are more inclined to be metaphysical 
than are those who belong to another, but shall approach the broader question why the logicians 
generally are inclined to be more metaphysical than those who work in certain other special 
sciences, such as mathematics, for example.  Of the general tendency there can be no question.  
The only problem is: Why does this tendency exist? 
 
68. LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY. – Let us contrast the science of arithmetic with logic; and let 
us notice, regarding it, the following points: –  
 
It is, like logic, a general science, in that the things treated of in many sciences may be 
numbered.  It considers only a certain aspect of the things. 
 
Now, that things may be counted, added together, subtracted, etc., is guaranteed by the 
experience of the plain man; and the methods of determining the numerical relations of things 
are gradually developed before his eyes, beginning with operations of great simplicity. 
Moreover, verification is possible, and within certain limits verification by direct inspection. 
 
To this we may add, that there has gradually been built up a fine system of unambiguous 
symbols, and it is possible for a man to know just what he is dealing with. 
 
Thus, a certain beaten path has been attained, and a man may travel this very well without having 
forced on his attention the problems of reflective thought.  The knowledge of numbers with 
 
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which he starts is sufficient equipment with which to undertake the journey.  That one is on the 
right road is proved by the results one obtains.  As a rule, disputes can be settled by well-tried 
mathematical methods. 
 
There is, then, a common agreement as to initial assumptions and methods of work, and useful 
results are attained which seem to justify both.  Here we have the normal characteristics of a 
special science. 
 
We must not forget, however, that, even in the mathematical sciences, before a beaten path was 
attained, disputes as to the significance of numbers and the cogency of proofs were sufficiently 
common.  And we must bear in mind that even to-day, where the beaten path does not seem 
wholly satisfactory, men seem to be driven to reflect upon the significance of their assumptions 
and the nature of their method. 
 
Thus, we find it not unnatural that a man should be led to ask; What is a minus quantity really?  
Can anything be less than nothing? or that he should raise the questions: Can one rightly speak of 
an infinite number?  Can one infinite number be greater than another, and, if so, what can greater 
mean?  What are infinitesimals? and what can be meant by different orders of infinitesimals? 
 
He who has interested himself in such questions as these has betaken himself to philosophical 
reflection.  They are not answered by employing mathematical methods. 
 
Let us now turn to logic.  And let us notice, to begin with, that it is broader in its application than 
the mathematical sciences.  It is concerned to discover what constitutes evidence in every field of 
investigation. 
 
There is, it is true, a part of logic that may be developed somewhat after the fashion of 
mathematics.  Thus, we may examine the two statements: All men are mortal, and Caesar is a 
man; and we may see clearly that, given the truth of these, we must admit that Caesar is mortal.  
We may make a list of possible inferences of this kind, and point out under what circumstances 
the truth of two statements implies the truth of a third, and under what circumstances the 
inference cannot be made.  Our results can be set forth in a system of symbols.  As in 
mathematics, we may abstract from the particular things reasoned about, and concern ourselves 
only with the forms of reasoning.  This gives us the theory of the syllogism; it is a part of logic in 
which the mathematician is apt to feel very much at home. 
 
But this is by no means all of logic.  Let us consider the following points: –  
 
(1) We are not concerned to know only what statements may be made on the basis of certain 
other statements.  We want to know what is true and what is false.  We must ask: Has a man the 
right to set up these particular statements and to reason from them?  That some men accept as 
true premises which are repudiated by others is an undoubted fact. Thus, it is maintained by 
certain philosophers that we may assume that any view of the universe which is repellant to our 
nature cannot be true.  Shall we allow this to pass unchallenged?  And in ethics, some have held 
that it is under all circumstances wrong to lie; others have denied this, and have held that in 
certain cases – for example, to save life or to prevent great and unmerited suffering – lying is 
 
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permissible. Shall we interest ourselves only in the deductions that each man makes from his 
assumed premises, and pay no attention to the truth of the premises themselves? 
 
(2) Again.  The vast mass of the reasonings that interest men are expressed in the language that 
we all use and not in special symbols. But language is a very imperfect instrument, and all sorts 
of misunderstandings are possible to those who express their thoughts in it. 
 
Few men know exactly how much is implied in what they are saying.  If I say: All men are 
mortal, and an angel is not a man; therefore, an angel is not mortal; it is not at once apparent to 
every one in what respect my argument is defective.  He who argues: Feathers are light; light is 
contrary to darkness; hence, feathers are contrary to darkness; is convicted of error without 
difficulty.  But arguments of the same kind, and quite as bad, are to be found in learned works on 
matters less familiar to us, and we often fail to detect the fallacy. 
 
Thus, Herbert Spencer argues, in effect, in the fourth and fifth chapters of his “First Principles,” 
as follows: –  
 
  We are conscious of the Unknowable,   The Unknowable lies behind the veil of phenomena,   
Hence, we are conscious of what lies behind the veil of phenomena. 
 
It is only the critical reader who notices that the Unknowable in the first line is the “raw material 
of consciousness,” and the Unknowable in the second is something not in consciousness at all.  
The two senses of the word “light” are not more different from one another.  Such apparent 
arguments abound, and it often requires much acuteness to be able to detect their fallacious 
character. 
 
When we take into consideration the two points indicated above, we see that the logician is at 
every turn forced to reflect upon our knowledge as men do not ordinarily reflect.  He is led to 
ask: What is truth?  He cannot accept uncritically the assumptions which men make; and he must 
endeavor to become very clearly conscious of the real meaning and the whole meaning of 
statements expressed in words.  Even in the simple logic with which we usually begin our 
studies, we learn to scrutinize statements in a reflective way; and when we go deeper, we are at 
once in contact with philosophical problems.  It is evidently our task to attain to a clearer insight 
into the nature of our experience and the meaning of proof than is attainable by the unreflective. 
 
Logic, then, is a reflective science, and it is not surprising that it has held its place as one of the 
philosophical sciences. 
 
 
 
 
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 Chap. XVII – Psychology 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
PSYCHOLOGY 
 
69. PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. – I think I have said enough in Chapter II (section 
10) about what we mean when we speak of psychology as a natural science and as an 
independent discipline.  Certainly there are many psychologists who would not care to be 
confused with the philosophers, and there are some that regard philosophy with suspicion. 
 
Nevertheless, psychology is commonly regarded as belonging to the philosophical group.  That 
this is the case can scarcely be thought surprising when we see how the psychologist himself 
speaks of the relation of his science to philosophy. 
 
“I have kept,” writes Professor James[1] in that delightful book which has become the common 
property of us all, “close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book.  Every 
natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements between 
which its own ‘laws’ obtain, and from which its own deductions are carried on.  Psychology, the 
science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2) a