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t h e n e w f a u lt l i n e s
t h e m u s l i m wo r l d
We have already discussed the Islamic world in general as a fault line. The
current crisis is being contained, but the Islamic world, overall, remains un
stable. While this instability will not gel into a general Islamist uprising, it
does raise the possibility of a Muslim nation- state
taking advantage of the
instability, and therefore the weaknesses within other states, to assert itself as
a regional power. Indonesia, the largest Muslim state in the world, is in no
position to assert itself. Pakistan is the second- largest Muslim state. It is also
a nuclear power. But it is so internally divided that it is difficult to see how
it could evolve into a major power or, geographically, how it could spread its
power, bracketed
by Afghanistan to the west, China and Russia to the
north, and India to the east. Between instability and geography, Pakistan is
not going to emerge as a leading Muslim state.
After Indonesia and Pakistan, there are three other major Muslim
nation- states. The largest is Egypt with 80 million people, Turkey is second
with 71 million people, and Iran is third with 65 million.
When we look at the three economically, Turkey has the seventeenth-
largest
economy in the world, with a GDP of about $660 billion. Iran is
twenty- ninth, with a GDP of just under $300 billion. Egypt is fifty- second,
with a GDP of about $125 billion a year. For the past five years Turkey’s
economy has been growing at 5 to 8 percent a year, one of the highest sus
tained growth rates for any major country. With the exception of two years
of recession, Iran has also had a sustained GDP growth rate of over 6 per
cent for the past five years, as has Egypt. These two countries are growing
fast, but they are starting with a much smaller base than Turkey. Compared
to European countries, Turkey already has the seventh- largest economy and
is growing faster than most.
Now, it’s true that economic size is not everything. Iran appears to be the
most aggressive of the three geopolitically—but that is actually its basic
weakness. In trying to protect its regime
against the United States, Sunni
Muslims, and anti- Iranian Arabs (Iran is not an Arab country), Iran is con
stantly forced to be prematurely assertive. In the process, it draws the atten
tion of the United States, which then inevitably focuses on Iran as a
dangerous power.
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t h e n e x t 1 0 0 y e a r s
Because of its interests in the Persian Gulf and Iraq, Iranian goals run
counter to those of the United States. That means Iran must divert resources
to protect itself against the possibility of American attack at a time when its
economy needs to develop very rapidly in order to carry it into the first rank
regionally. The bottom line is that Iran irritates the United States. Suffi
ciently alarmed, the United States could devastate Iran. Iran is simply not
ready for regional power status. It is constantly forced
to dissipate its power
prematurely. Attempting to become a major regional power while the world’s
greatest power is focused on your every move is, to say the least, difficult.
There is also the question of geography. Iran is on the margins of the re
gion. Afghanistan is to the east, and there is little to be gained there. In any
expansion of influence to the north, Iran would collide with the Russians.
Iraq is a possible direction in which to move, but it can also become both a
morass and a focal point for Arab and American countermeasures. It is not
easy to increase Iranian regional power. Any move will cost more than it is
worth.
Egypt is the largest country in the Arab world and has been its tradi
tional leader. Under Gamal Abdel Nasser, it
made a major play to become
the leader of the Arab world. The Arab world, however, was deeply frag
mented, and Egypt managed to antagonize key players like Saudi Arabia.
After the Camp David accords with Israel in 1978, Egypt stopped trying to
expand its power. It had failed anyway. Given its economy, and its relative
isolation and insularity, it is hard to see Egypt becoming a regional power
within any meaningful time frame. It is more likely to fall into someone
else’s sphere of influence, whether Turkish, American, or Russian, which has
been its fate for several centuries.
Turkey is a very different case. It is not
only a major modern economy,
but it is by far the largest economy in the region—much larger than Iran,
and perhaps the only modern economy in the entire Muslim world. Most
important, it is strategically located between Europe, the Middle East, and
Russia.
Turkey is not isolated and tied down; it has multiple directions in which
it can move. And, most important, it does not represent a challenge to Amer
ican interests and is therefore not constantly confronted with an American
threat. This means it does not have to devote resources to blocking the
United States. With its economy surging, it will likely soon reemerge in its
old role, as the dominant force in the region.
It must be remembered
that until World War I, Turkey was the seat of
a major empire (see map, page 82). Shorn of its empire, Turkey became a
secular state governing a Muslim population. It was, until 1918, the most
powerful Muslim country in the world. And, at its height in the fourteenth
to sixteenth centuries, the Turkish empire was far reaching and extremely
powerful.
By the sixteenth century, Turkey was the dominant Mediterranean
power, controlling not only North Africa and the Levant but also southeast-
ern Europe,
the Caucasus, and the Arabian Peninsula.
Turkey is an internally complex society, with a secular regime protected
by a military charged constitutionally with that role and a growing Islamist
movement. It is far from certain what sort of internal government it might
end up having. But when we look at the wreckage of the Islamic world after
t h e n e w f a u lt l i n e s
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