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[[@Summa:STh., II-II q.5]]Question Five OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH

We must now inquire concerning those who have faith. Four questions are asked. 1. Whether angels and man had faith in their first state. 2. Whether devils have faith. 3. Whether heretics who err in one article of faith have faith in the other articles. 4. Whether, of those who have faith, one has greater faith than another.

[[@Summa:STh., II-II q.5 a.1]]Article One Whether Angels and Man had Faith in their First State

We proceed to the first article thus:

1. It seems that neither angels nor man had faith in their first state. For Hugo St. Victor says (Sentent. 1; 10 De Sacrament. 2): “it is because the eye of contemplation is not open that man cannot see God, or what is in God.” But the eye of contemplation was open in angels in their first state, before their confirmation or their lapse. As Augustine says, they “saw the realities in the word” (2 Gen. ad Litt. 8). It seems, also, that the eye of contemplation was open in the first man during his state [[@Page:279]]of innocence, since Hugo St. Victor says in the same work (6, cap. 14): “in his first state, man knew his Creator not with the knowledge wherein the gate is open to hearing only, but with the knowledge which is of inward inspiration; not with the knowledge of those who by faith seek God while he is absent, but with clear vision of God as present to their contemplation.” Hence neither men nor the angels had faith in their first state.

2. Again, the knowledge of faith is dark and dim, according to I Cor. 13:12: “now we see through a glass, darkly.” But in their first state there was dimness neither in man nor in the angels, since darkness was the penalty of sin. Hence neither man nor the angels can have had faith in their first state.

3. Again, the apostle says in Rom. 10:17: “faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.” But there was no place for this in the first state of man or the angels, since they did not hear anything from another. Neither then was there faith in this state, whether of man or of angels.

On the other hand: the apostle says (Heb. 11:6): “he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” Now in their first state, angels and man were coming to God. It follows that they had need of faith.

I answer: some say that the angels did not have faith before their confirmation or lapse, nor man before his sin, on account of their clear contemplation of divine things. But the only manifestation which excludes the character of faith is that wherein the principal object of faith is made apparent, or seen. For as the apostle says: “faith is the evidence of things not seen” (Heb. 11:1), and as Augustine says in Tract. 40 in Joan., and in 2 Quaest. Evang., Q. 39, “by faith we believe what we do not see.” Now the principal object of faith is the first truth, the vision of which makes us blessed, and supersedes faith. But neither the angels before confirmation nor man before sin were in the state of blessedness wherein God is seen in his essence. It is obvious, therefore, that they did not have the clear knowledge which would exclude the character of faith. Hence if they did not have faith, this could only be because they were entirely ignorant of the object of faith. If man and the angels had been created in the purely natural state, as some say they were, one might have maintained that neither angels before confirmation nor man before sin had faith. For the knowledge of faith is beyond the natural knowledge of God, with angels no less than with men. But as we said in [[Pt. I, Q. 62, Art. 3 >> Summa:STh., I q.62 a.3]], [[@Page:280]]and [[Q. 91, Art. 1 >> Summa:STh., I q.91 a.1]], the gift of grace was given to man and to angels at the time when they were created.

We must therefore say that the hope of blessedness began in man and in the angels in consequence of the grace which they received, before this grace was consummated. Now as we said in [[Q. 4, Art. 7 >> Summa:STh., II-II q.4 a.7]], this hope is begun in the intellect through faith, while it is begun in the will through hope and charity. Hence we are bound to say that the angels had faith before they were confirmed, and that man had faith before he sinned. But we must bear in mind that the object of faith has a formal aspect, as the first truth which transcends the natural knowledge of any creature, and also a material aspect, as that to which we assent when we acknowledge the first truth. In its formal aspect, faith is the same for all who know God by way of acknowledging the first truth, while future blessedness is as yet unattained. Of the things which are materially proposed for belief, however, some are believed by one and clearly known by another, even in this present state, as we said in [[Q. 1, Art. 5 >> Summa:STh., II-II q.1 a.5]], and [[Q. 2, Art. 4, ad 2 >> Summa:STh., II-II q.2 a.4 ad 2]]. We may accordingly say that angels before confirmation and man before sin had to some extent a clear knowledge of the divine mysteries, which we can know only by faith.

On the first point: although these words of Hugo St. Victor are the words of a master, and have the force of authority, it may be said that the contemplation which makes faith unnecessary is the contemplation of heaven, whereby supernatural truth is seen in its essence. Now the angels did not have contemplation of this kind before confirmation. Neither did man before he sinned. Their contemplation was nevertheless of a higher order than our own. For it brought them nearer to God, and thereby gave them a clear knowledge of more things concerning the divine effects and mysteries than is possible for ourselves. Hence they did not have faith such as ours, which seeks God while he is absent, since God was more present to them by the light of wisdom than he is to us. But he was not present to them as he is present to the blessed by the light of glory.

On the second point: in their first state, man and the angels were not affected by any darkness of guilt or punishment. There was nevertheless in them a certain natural dimness of the intellect, since every creature is dim compared with the immensity of the divine light. Such dimness was sufficient to make faith necessary.

On the third point: although man in his first state did not [[@Page:281]]hear anything outwardly, God inspired him inwardly. The prophets also heard in this way, according to Ps. 85:8: “I will hear what God the Lord will speak.”

[[@Summa:STh., II-II q.5 a.2]]Article Two Whether Devils Have Faith

We proceed to the second article thus:

1. It seems that devils do not have faith. For Augustine says that “faith depends on the will of those who believe” (De Praed. Sanct. 5). Now the will whereby one wills to believe in God is good. But there is no deliberate good will in devils. Hence it seems that devils do not have faith.

2. Again, faith is a gift of grace, according to Eph. 2:8: “For by grace ye are saved through faith . . . it is the gift of God.” Now the gloss on Hosea 3:1, “who look to other gods, and love flagons of wine,” says that the devils forfeited the gift of grace by their sin. It follows that faith did not remain in them after their sin.

3. Again, unbelief seems to be one of the more serious sins, according to what Augustine says (Tract. 9 in Joan.) on John 15:22: “If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin: but now they have no cloak for their sin.” Now some men are guilty of the sin of unbelief. Their sin would then be worse than that of devils, if devils had faith. But this is impossible. Therefore devils do not have faith.

On the other hand: it is said in James 2:19: “the devils also believe, and tremble.”

I answer: as we said in [[Q. 1, Art. 2 >> Summa:STh., II-II q.1 a.2]], and [[Q. 2, Art. 1 >> Summa:STh., II-II q.2 a.1]], the intellect of the believer assents to what he believes neither because he sees the thing as it is in itself, nor because he understands it through its first principles seen as they are in themselves, but because his will moves his intellect to give its assent. Now there are two ways in which the will may move the in-intellect to give its assent. In the first place, the will may be directed to the good, in which case belief is a praiseworthy act. Secondly, the intellect may be sufficiently convinced to judge that what is said ought to be believed, without being convinced by any evidence of the thing itself. Thus if a prophet should predict something as by the word of God, and if he should also give a sign by raising one who was dead, the intellect of one who saw would be convinced by the sign, and he would know assuredly that this was spoken by God who does [[@Page:282]]not lie, even though what was predicted was not apparent. The character of faith would then remain.

Hence we must say that the faith of those who believe in Christ is praised as being of the first kind. Devils, on the other hand, do not have faith of this kind, but only of the second kind. For they see many unmistakable signs by which they know that the doctrine of the Church is given by God, although they do not see the things themselves which the Church teaches, for example, that God is Three and also One, and the like.

On the first point: the faith of devils is such as the evidence of signs compels. Their belief is therefore no credit to their will.

On the second point: even though it should be unformed, faith which is the gift of grace inclines a man to believe out of regard for what is good. The faith of devils is therefore not the gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe by what they perceive by their natural intellect.

On the third point: devils are displeased by the very obviousness of the signs which compel them to believe. Hence the evil in them is not diminished by their belief.

[[@Summa:STh., II-II q.5 a.3]]Article Three Whether One Who Disbelieves One Article of Faith can Have Unformed Faith in the Other Articles

We proceed to the third article thus:

1. It seems that a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith can have unformed faith in the other articles. For the natural intellect of a heretic is no better than that of a catholic, and the intellect of a catholic needs the help of the gift of faith in order to believe in any of the articles. It seems, then, that neither can heretics believe in any articles of faith, unless through the gift of unformed faith.

2. Again, the faith contains many articles, just as a single science, such as geometry, contains many conclusions. Any man can have a scientific knowledge of geometry in respect of some geometrical conclusions, even though he is ignorant of others. Similarly, any man can have faith in some of the articles of faith, even though he does not believe the others.

3. Again, just as a man obeys God in believing the articles of faith, so does he obey him in keeping the commandments of the law. He may be obedient in regard to some of the commandments, and not in regard to others. He may therefore have faith in regard to some of the articles, and not in regard to others.[[@Page:283]]

On the other hand: as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is disbelief in one article contrary to faith. Now charity does not remain after a single mortal sin. Neither then does faith remain after disbelief in a single article.

I answer: neither formed faith nor unformed faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article. The reason for this is that the species of any habit depends on what we mean by its formal object, and cannot remain if this is taken away. Now the formal object of faith is the first truth, as manifested in the sacred Scriptures and the doctrine of the Church, which proceeds from the first truth. Hence anyone who does not adhere, as to an infallible and divine rule, to the doctrine of the Church, which proceeds from the first truth manifested in the sacred Scriptures, does not possess the habit of faith, even if he maintains the things of faith otherwise than by faith. It is similarly obvious that one who maintains a conclusion without knowing the premise by means of which it is demonstrated has no scientific knowledge of it, but only an opinion. It is plain, on the other hand, that one who adheres to the doctrine of the Church as an infallible rule assents to everything that the Church teaches. For if he were to maintain such doctrines of the Church as he might choose, and not such as he did not wish to maintain, he would not adhere to the doctrine of the Church as an infallible rule, but only in accordance with his own will. It is clear then, that a heretic who persists in disbelieving one article of faith is not prepared to follow the doctrine of the Church in all matters. If he did not so persist, he would not be a heretic, but merely one who erred. It is thus apparent that one who is a heretic in one article does not have faith in the other articles, but holds an opinion in accordance with his own will.

On the first point: a heretic does not maintain the other articles of faith, in which he does not err, as a faithful man maintains them, that is, through adherence to the first truth, to which a man is bound to adhere if the habit of faith is in him. He maintains the things of faith according to his own will and judgment.

On the second point: the different conclusions of a science are proved by means of different premises, one of which may be known apart from the others. A man may therefore have scientific knowledge of some conclusions of a science without knowing others. Faith, however, accepts all the articles of faith on the ground of a single premise, namely, the first truth proposed to us in the Scriptures, according to the doctrine of [[@Page:284]]the Church, which understands it properly. He who rejects this premise is therefore altogether without faith.

On the third point: the several commandments of the law may be considered in reference to their several proximate motives, in respect of which one of them may be kept and not another. But they may also be considered in reference to their single primary motive, which is perfect obedience to God, in which anyone fails who transgresses any one commandment, according to James 2:10: “whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all.”

[[@Summa:STh., II-II q.5 a.4]]Article Four Whether Faith can be Greater in One Than in Another

We proceed to the fourth article thus:

1. It seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another, since the quantity of a habit is determined by reference to its object. Anyone who has faith has faith in all that the faith contains, since he who disbelieves in a single point is altogether without faith, as was said in the preceding article. Hence it seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another.

2. Again, that which depends on what is greatest does not admit of more and less. Now faith depends on what is greatest, since it demands that a man adhere to the first truth before all things. It follows that faith does not admit of more and less.

3. Again, it was said in [[Q. 1, Art. 7 >> Summa:STh., II-II q.1 a.7]], that the articles of faith are the first principles of the knowledge which is of grace. In the knowledge which is of grace, therefore, faith has the same relative status as has the understanding of principles in natural knowledge. Now the understanding of principles occurs equally in all men. Hence faith likewise occurs equally in all who believe.

On the other hand: wherever there is little and great, there is greater and less. Now there is little and great in faith. For the Lord said to Peter, “O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?” (Matt. 14:31), and to the woman, “O woman, great is thy faith” (Matt. 15:28). Thus faith can be greater in one than in another.

I answer: as we said in [[12ae, Q. 52, Arts. 1 and 2 >> Summa:STh., I-II q.52 a.1-2]], and [[Q. 112, Art. 4 >> Summa:STh., I-II q.112 a.4]], the magnitude of a habit may be considered in two ways; in respect of its object, and in respect of the subject who possesses it. Faith may be considered in two ways in respect of its object, which includes what we mean by the formal object [[@Page:285]]of faith, and also things materially proposed for belief. It cannot be different in different persons in respect of its formal object, since this is one and indivisible, as we said in [[Q. 1, Art. 1 >> Summa:STh., II-II q.1 a.1]]. In this respect, faith is the same in all men, as we said in [[Q. 4, Art. 6 >> Summa:STh., II-II q.4 a.6]]. But the things which are materially proposed for belief are many, and can be accepted either more or less explicitly. Hence one man can believe explicitly more things than another. Faith may therefore be greater in one man than in another, in as much as it may be more explicit.

In respect of the person who possesses it, faith may again be considered in two ways, since the act of faith proceeds from the intellect and also from the will, as we said in [[Q. 2, Arts. 1 and 2 >> Summa:STh., II-II q.2 a.1-2]], and in [[Q. 4, Art. 2 >> Summa:STh., II-II q.4 a.2]]. Faith may accordingly be said to be greater in one man than in another either when there is greater certainty and firmness on the part of the intellect, or when there is greater readiness, devotion, or confidence on the part of the will.

On the first point: he who persistently disbelieves any one of the things contained in the faith does not possess the habit of faith. But he who does not believe all things explicitly, yet is prepared to believe all of them, does possess the habit of faith. In respect of the object of faith, therefore, one man can have greater faith than another, in as much as he believes more things explicitly, as we have said.

On the second point: it belongs to the very nature of faith to put the first truth before all other things. Yet some of those who put it before all other things submit to it with greater assurance and devotion than others. In this way, faith is greater in one than in another.

On the third point: the understanding of principles is due to human nature itself, which occurs in all men equally. But faith is due to the gift of grace, which is not given to all men equally, as we said in [[12ae, Q. 112, Art. 4 >> Summa:STh., I-II q.112 a.4]]. We cannot then argue about them in the same way. Moreover, one man may know the truth of principles better than another, if he has more intelligence.