The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

15.2.1.  Natural Law in Ireland’s Early Constitutional History

Natural law’s first major appearance in Ireland’s constitutional history came 

under the 1922 Constitution, the opening provisions of which declared that 

‘all lawful authority comes from God to the people’. This was relied upon 

by Kennedy CJ (dissenting) in State (Ryan) v. Lennon to oppose the enact-

ment by the Oireachtas (Parliament) of a draconian constitutional amend-

ment which provided, inter alia, for the establishment of a quasi-military 

Constitution (Special Powers) Tribunal with powers of criminal conviction 

and sentencing for certain offences.

3

 This included a power to impose the 

death penalty. Because the 1922 Constitution imposed no substantive limits on 

the power of the Oireachtas to introduce constitutional amendments within 

a transitional period (a period which the Oireachtas had extended by use of 

3 

[1935] 1 IR 170.

---

 

The Evolution of Natural Law in Ireland 

433

the same unfettered amendment power), it was argued (and accepted by the 

majority) that the amendment was not contrary to the Constitution. Kennedy 

CJ, however, suggested that the derivation of lawful authority God introduced 

additional (invisible) requirements for the valid exercise of lawful power.

Every act, whether legislative, executive or judicial, in order to be lawful 

under the Constitution, must be capable of being justified under the author-

ity thereby declared to be derived from God. From this it seems clear that, 

if any legislation of the Oireachtas (including any purported amendment of 

the Constitution) were to offend against that acknowledged ultimate Source 

from which the legislative authority has come through the people to the 

Oireachtas, as, for example, if it were repugnant to the Natural Law, such 

legislation would be necessarily unconstitutional and invalid, and it would 

be, therefore, absolutely null and void and inoperative.

4

Applying that approach to the amendment before the Court, he concluded 

that it was contrary to the natural law. Furthermore, he suggested that the 

judiciary’s authority could similarly – and directly – be traced back to God in 

a manner which effectively carved out the judicial power as an independent, 

distinct and exclusively court-based function.

Coming, as it did, as part of a dissenting judgment, the Chief Justice’s asser-

tion of an independent natural law jurisdiction on the part of the courts had lit-

tle immediate influence. It should not be overlooked, however, that Kennedy 

CJ’ s ‘celebrated dissent’

5

 was – and continues to be

6

 – regarded within legal 

circles as a brave and powerfully expressed effort to resist an unjust attack on 

fundamental rights.

In 1937, a new Constitution of Ireland was introduced. Article 6 of the 

Constitution retained a link between governmental authority and God, stat-

ing that ‘All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, 

under God, from the people’. In addition, however, the 1937 Constitution 

contained several new provisions with a more avowedly religious dimension. 

4 

State (Ryan) v. Lennon [1935] IR 170, 204–5.

5 

Tom Hickey, ‘Revisiting Ryan v. Lennon to Make the Case against Judicial Supremacy’ (2015) 

53 (1) Irish Jurist 125, 130.

6 

For example, the Supreme Court’s website lists it first in the thirty or so most important cases 

in Irish constitutional history. It has also been the subject of numerous academic articles in-

cluding G. Hogan, ‘A Desert Island Case Set in the Silver Sea: The ‘State (Ryan) v. Lennon’ 

in E. O’Dell (ed.), Leading Cases of the Twentieth Century (Dublin: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000); 

G. Quinn, ‘Dangerous Constitutional Moments: The “Tactic of Legality” in Nazi Germany 

and the Irish Free State Compared’ in John Morison, Kieran McEvoy and Gordon Anthony  

(eds.),  Judges, Transition and Human Rights (Oxford:  Oxford University Press,  2007); and 

Hickey, Supra note 5.

---

434