The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung

45

 that where persons in ‘comparable situations’ are 

subject to differential treatment by law, the Government must justify such 

differential treatment by showing that (1) the differential treatment pursues ‘a 

legitimate aim’, in the sense that there is ‘a genuine need for such difference’; 

42 

Hysan Development v. Town Planning Board (2016) 19 HKCFAR 372, particularly paras. 73, 76, 

78, 135.

43 

See e.g., Gurung Kesh Bahadur v. Director of Immigration [2002] 2 HKLRD 775; Director of 

Immigration v. Lau Fong [2004] 2 HKLRD 204.

44 

A Solicitor v. Law Society of Hong Kong (2003) 6 HKCFAR 570.

45 

(2007) 10 HKCFAR 335.

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The Constitutional Orders of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ 

245

(2) ‘the difference in treatment’ is ‘rationally connected to the legitimate aim’; 

and (3) ‘the difference in treatment’ is ‘no more than is necessary to accom-

plish the legitimate aim’.

In cases concerning socio-economic policies such as the right to social wel-

fare and the provision of social services, the court has developed a less rigor-

ous version of the proportionality or justification test by modifying the third 

limb of the test (‘no more than necessary to accomplish the legitimate aim’, 

which may be called the standard of ‘necessity’) to become a standard of ‘rea-

sonableness’ (or ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’). The modified 

test was first enunciated by the CFA in Fok Chun Wa v. Hospital Authority, 

a case concerning differential charges for obstetric services in public hospi-

tals based on whether the woman giving birth was resident in Hong Kong.

46

 

The CFA noted that this case concerned a matter of ‘socio-economic poli-

cies’

47

 and ‘allocation of public funds’ under conditions of ‘limited financial 

resources’.

48

 Furthermore, the differential treatment that was challenged in 

this case was based on residence, rather than ‘core values relating to personal 

characteristics’

49

 and involving ‘the respect and dignity that society accords to 

a human being’, such as ‘race, colour, gender, sexual orientation, religion, 

politics, or social origin’.

50

 In this domain, the court considered it appropriate 

that a greater ‘margin of appreciation’

51

 or degree of ‘deference’

52

 be accorded 

to the government. Hence in applying the third limb of the ‘justification test’, 

the court would only strike down the differential treatment if it is ‘manifestly 

beyond the spectrum of reasonableness’ or ‘manifestly without reasonable 

foundation’.

53

 Applying this test, the court upheld the differential hospital fees 

in this case. Subsequently, this modified version of the proportionality test was 

also applied by the CFA in Kong Yunming v. Director of Social Welfare, but 

with the outcome of the impugned restriction (also based on residence) of the 

right to social welfare being struck down in that case.

54

 In Kwok Cheuk Kin v. 

Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland and Affairs, the application of the 

proportionality test was relaxed by the Court of Final Appeal on the ground 

46 

(2012) 13 HKCFAR 409.

47 

Paragraphs 61, 65 of the judgment.

48 

Ibid.

, para. 70.

49 

Ibid.

, para. 78.

50 

Ibid.

, para. 77.

51 

Ibid.

, para. 61.

52 

Ibid.

, para. 62.

53 

Ibid.

, para. 76.

54 

(2013) 16 HKCFAR 950.

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246