Not all implications generated by a legal text, including a written constitution,
need to be understood as the results of communicative intentions. It is possi-
ble to identify a category of implications that arise not as a result of lawmakers’
those intentions), but that arise as a result of the legal text containing terms
or a certain sort of administrative action, is a burden upon direct choice (e.g.,
action will be unconstitutional, because it is at odds with the constitutional
and enforcing the law may establish a constitutional role for judicial review of the validity of
legislation, even if this is not expressly stated in the constitutional text.
Sections 7, 24.
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Patrick Emerton
mandate.
39
Or, if a certain group of voters are without doubt members of the
people, then a law which would disenfranchise them will be unconstitutional,
because it is at odds with the constitutional mandate.
40
These consequences,
which can properly be described as implications – they are constitutional con-
straints upon government action which are not expressly stated in the text –
follow not from the intentions of the lawmakers,
41
but from their production of
a text which talks about certain things (direct choices, people) and establishes
certain requirements in relation to them.
42
The second example begins with the mandate in the Australian Constitution
that there shall exist a federal supreme court (the High Court of Australia) in
which shall be vested the judicial power of the Commonwealth (i.e., federal
judicial power),
43
and that this court shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals
from the Supreme Court of any Australian state.
44
It is understood that when
the constitution refers to
the judicial power of the Commonwealth, and to a
federal court that is to wield this power, these are not terms that get their con-
tent simply from lawmakers’ subjective intentions or understandings in the
use of such terms. Rather they refer to real phenomena, whose character must
be properly understood in order to establish what the constitutional mandate
requires.
45
This in turn generates, by way of implication, constraints upon the
sort of functions that legislation may vest in the High Court, or in other bod-
ies: the High Court cannot be vested with functions that would be at odds with
its character as a court; and other bodies which are not courts cannot be vested
with functions that would be tantamount to the exercise of the judicial power
of the Commonwealth.
46
The establishment of a judicial hierarchy, with the High Court exercis-
ing appellate jurisdiction over state courts, generates a further implication
in a similar fashion. The vesting of functions in a state court, by way of state
39
See e.g., Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
40
See e.g., Roach v. Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 16.
41
Other than perhaps their linguistic intentions, to use certain referring terms (namely, direct
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