The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

Brigham Young University Law Review 41 (“[t]he concurrence of the President of the Court 

in The Death Penalty Case described the decision’s reliance on the right to human dignity 

as a utilization of the “invisible constitution” – [which is] beyond the [control of both the] 

Constitution, which is often amended . . . [, and] future Constitutions”); Vicki C.  Jackson, 

“Cook v. Gralike: Easy Cases and Structural Reasoning” (2001) 2001 Supreme Court Review 

299, 313–14 (“[statutes prohibiting] the use of government monies or resources for the purpose 

of supporting a particular candidate for election or reelection . . . may be thought of as a kind 

of “invisible constitution,’ reflecting, and supporting, constitutional values though not in their 

specific terms necessarily constitutionally required”); Laurence H. Tribe, The Invisible Consti-

tution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

2 

Thomas C. Grey, “Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?” (1975) 27 Stanford Law Review 

703.

3 

See Tribe, Supra note 1.

3

Originalism and the Invisible Constitution

Lawrence B. Solum

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62 

Lawrence B. Solum

Grey’s question has been echoed by Michael Moore,

4

 Antonin Scalia,

5

 Akhil 

Amar,

6

 and others.

7

 One of the motivations for Grey’s essay was the early stir-

rings of originalism. Descendants of the interpretivism and textualism that 

Grey interrogated now occupy center stage in contemporary debates about 

constitutional theory. But since Grey wrote, originalism and textualism have 

evolved. This chapter addresses the idea of an unwritten or invisible constitu-

tion from the perspective of contemporary originalist theory. Is the notion of 

an unwritten or invisible constitution consistent with the originalist claim that 

constitutional practice should be constrained by the original public meaning 

of the constitutional text?

“Originalism” is a family of contemporary theories of constitutional inter-

pretation and construction that share two core ideas. First, the communicative 

content of the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed 

and ratified – the “Fixation Thesis.”

8

 Second, constitutional practice should 

be constrained by that communicative content of the text, which we can call 

the “original public meaning” – the “Constraint Principle.”

9

 Other matters 

(such as original intent versus original public meaning) are debated by con-

temporary originalists.

We can begin with a three-step argument that highlights the problematic 

relationship between originalism and an invisible or unwritten constitution: 

(1) the predominant form of contemporary originalism is public meaning orig-

inalism, a form of textualism. (2) An unwritten or invisible constitution is not a 

text. (3) Therefore, public meaning originalists should reject the notion of an 

unwritten or invisible constitution.

This simple syllogism

10

 is misleading, in part because the phrases “invisi-

ble constitution” and “unwritten constitution” provide an unfortunate frame 

   4 

Michael S. Moore, “Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?” (1989) 63 Southern California 

Law Review 107.

   5 

Antonin Scalia, “Is There an Unwritten Constitution?” (1989) 12 Harvard Journal of Law and 

Public Policy 1.

   6 

Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2012).

   7 

The literature on unwritten constitutions, unenumerated constitutional rights, the Ninth 

Amendment, and related topics is vast. The work that influenced the writing of this chapter 

includes: Jed Rubenfeld, “The New Unwritten Constitution” (2001) 51 Duke Law Journal 289; 

Suzanna  Sherry, “The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution” (1987)  54  University of Chicago