The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

man Rights: Constitution-Making as a Learning Process 19.

7 

Kis characterizes the coordinated transition as an interruption of legitimacy, but continuity 

of legality. Kis, Supra note 6, 317. See also critical reflections of the legitimacy of the 1989 

Constitution: A. Arato, “Dilemmas Arising from the Power to Create Constitutions in Eastern 

Europe,” in M. Rosenfeld (ed.) Constitutionalism, Difference, Identity, and Legitimacy (Dur-

ham: Duke University Press, 1994), 165–94; J. Kis, “Introduction: From the 1989 Constitution 

to the 2011 Fundamental Law,” in G. A. Tóth (ed.) Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On 

Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law (Budapest; New York, NY:  Central European University 

Press, 2012), 1–23.

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544 

Gábor Attila Tóth

body of freely elected representatives adopts, in the sovereign people’s name, 

a new constitution.

8

Consequently, in formal terms, the 1989 Constitution was a mere modifi-

cation of the 1949 Constitution. In substantive terms, however, the 1989 polit-

ical transition breathed new life into the Hungarian Constitution. Since the 

models of the reshaped Constitution were international human rights instru-

ments, as were the more recent Western constitutions, they were written in 

the language of modern constitutionalism: rules for free and fair elections, 

representative government, a parliamentary system, an independent judiciary, 

ombudspersons to guard fundamental rights, and a Constitutional Court to 

review the laws for their constitutionality.

9

 Like other East Central European 

democracies, Hungary followed Western European traditions in establishing 

a parliamentary system instead of importing a US presidential architecture.

10

 

A 1990 constitutional amendment made it clear that the Prime Minister 

heads the executive and the Government is the supreme body of that branch, 

responsible to Parliament.

Unlike the other postcommunist countries, however, Hungary omitted 

the second step, as it did not formally adopt a new constitution prior to 2011. 

Although the 1989 Constitution was amended several times – for example, to 

qualify Hungary to join the European Convention of Human Rights, NATO, 

and the European Union – the country did not accomplish the symbolic mis-

sion: it failed to adopt a constitution, a step which would have demonstrated a 

successful completion of the democratic transition.

This failure may seem unexpected, because compared to those of other 

European states the 1989 Hungarian Constitution was easy to amend. Despite 

the fact that the Constitution could not be modified or amended by the ordi-

nary lawmaking procedure according to a simple majority rule, it was regarded 

as relatively flexible rather than rigid, in the sense that it did not render any pro-

vision or principle unamendable, and it required only the votes of two-thirds 

   8 

In the aftermath of the Polish Round Table Agreement, the old constitution was amended in 

April 1989, and the first democratic parliament then reshaped the relations between the legis-

lative and executive branches of the state (“Small Constitution”). The reformed constitution 

was finally replaced in 1997 by a completely new constitution for Poland. The old constitu-

tion of Czechoslovakia was also amended in 1989. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and 

Basic Freedoms was incorporated in 1991. After the dissolution of the federal state, the Czech 

Republic and the Slovak Republic each adopted a new constitution in 1992. In Bulgaria and 

Romania, the second step was taken in 1991.

   9 

In more detail, see G. A. Tóth, “Hungary,” in L. Besselink et al. (eds.) Constitutional Law of