The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

China’s Great Transformation (New York: Routledge, 2012) 157.

2 

The 1982 Constitution has been amended four times in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004, involving 

thirty-two particular articles, amounting to nearly a quarter of the Constitution. Over 75 per 

cent of amendments resulted from the evolving economic practice, featuring in the constitu-

tional recognition of private economy and protection of private property subsequently.

3 

Article 3(4), the 1982 Constitution (rev. 2004).

4 

Best illustrated by the revolutionary reform of rural land use which was substantially against 

the socialist ideology and the economic practices in the Special Economic Zone since the 

1979. See Sebastian Heilmann, ‘From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of  

China’s Distinctive Policy Process’ (2008) 59 The China Journal 1, 1. For an institutional analysis,  

see  Zhou  Xueguang, ‘The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in 

China’ (2009) 36 Modern China, 1.

5 

Robert  Benewick, ‘Towards a Developmental Theory of Constitutionalism: The Chinese 

Case’ (1998) 33 Government and Opposition 441, 443.

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The ‘Invisible Constitution’ seen Realistically 

403

Constitution, but also includes the implicit logic of its unitary system, which 

requires systematic deduction from the basic structure provided in both the 

text of the 1982 Constitution and its organic laws. The reality that any Chinese 

constitution must address is China’s regional diversity in various aspects 

throughout the country’s wide territory. To unify both geographic and polit-

ical peripheries in the pursuit of national prosperity, the 1982 Constitution 

provides a unitary system that accommodates three types of decentralisation: 

the unsettled decentralisation in fiscal powers during the reform period, 

regional national autonomy (RNA) and the Special Administrative Regions 

(SARs).

6

 Previous academic inquiries have focused on the contrast between 

the authoritarian appearances of the Chinese regime, which theoretically pro-

vides central control over subnational units, with the conspicuous gaps in pol-

icy implementation over many arenas.

7

 These decentralised arrangements are 

usually discussed separately and form a large body of existing literature.

8

 This 

chapter will therefore explain how subnational units are designed for central 

governance if we match them with the 1982 Constitution and its organic laws 

concerning decentralisation arrangements, rather than following the para-

digm of Chinese federalism. In a more implicit sense, the invisible part of the 

1982 Constitution is how sub-state decentralisation arrangements are designed 

to fit in the unitary system.

To provide a (relatively) full picture of the implementation and implicit 

logic of the unitary system, with proper methodological reflections, the fol-

lowing discussion will start with a brief review of the intellectual link between 

6 

The central-local relationship remains one of the core issues since the founding of the People’s 

Republic of China. See Linda Chelan Li, ‘Central-Local Relations in the People’s Republic 

of China: Trends, Progress and Impact for Policy Implementation’ (2010) 30 Public Adminis-

tration and Development 177.

7 

Linda Chelan Li, ‘Central Relations’ in Chris Ogden (ed.), Handbook of China’s Governance 

and Domestic Politics (London: Routledge, 2013) 143.

8 

To name a few, on the RNA, see Pitman B. Potter, ‘Governance of China’s Periphery: Balanc-

ing Local Autonomy and National Unity’ 19 (2005) Columbia Journal Asian Law 293; Maria 

Lundberg and Yong Zhou, ‘Regional National Autonomy under Challenge: Law, Practice and 

Recommendations’ (2009) 16 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 269. On the 

autonomous issues of Hong Kong SAR, see Albert H. Y. Chen, ‘Further Aspects of the Auton-

omy of Hong Kong under the PRC Constitution’ (1984) 14 Hong Kong Law Journal 341; Albert 

H. Y. Chen, ‘Some Reflections on Hong Kong’s Autonomy’ (1994) 24 Hong Kong Law Journal 

173; Albert H. Y. Chen, ‘The Law and Politics of Constitutional Reform and Democratization 

in Hong Kong’ University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2014/035; Yash P. 

Ghai, Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the