The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

Journal 195, 196.

112 

Constitution Alteration (Rights and Freedoms) 1988 (Cth).

113 

On the nature of the amendments, and the interpretive questions raised, see e.g., Rosalind 

Dixon, ‘Amending Constitutional Identity’ (2012) 33 Cardozo Law Review 1847. See also Beryl 

Bainbridge etc., history cited in Amending Identity.

114 

See e.g., Williams and Hume, Supra note 73, 207–8; Constitutional Commission, Final 

 Report of the Constitutional Commission (1988) ss 9.148–9.151; Expert Panel on Constitutional 

Recognition of Indigenous Australians, note 71, 169.

---

 

Constitutional Implications in Australia 

369

committee headed by leading lawyer Father Frank Brennan, tasked with 

investigating the question of enacting a UK-style national human rights char-

ter, the Commonwealth Parliament adopted a far more modest form of legis-

lative change. Vocal opponents to the introduction of a national human rights  

charter – who were often political and legal elites – pointed to a shift in power 

from the political branch to the judicial branch in the jurisdictions of Canada, 

New Zealand and the United Kingdom, despite the ‘ultimate’ authority rest-

ing with the politicians. They therefore argued that even a statutory bill of 

rights would result in a fundamental shift in constitutional and political power 

from the elected legislature to the ‘unelected judges’.

115

 Parliament’s muted 

response to the Brennan Report was to enact the Human Rights (Parliamentary 

Scrutiny) Act 2011, which requires a parliamentary committee to test the  

compatibility of legislation against a range of international human rights 

norms, but explicitly attempts to avoid any form of judicial enforcement of 

relevant rights.

116

More recently, the political suspicion of judicial review of parliamentary 

judgment in the rights arena also manifested in opposition to a proposal  

by a government-commissioned Expert Panel to introduce a racial anti- 

discrimination clause into the Constitution as part of the wider recognition of 

the history, culture and rights of Indigenous peoples. Opposition to the pro-

posed section 116A – which would have banned racial discrimination – relied 

on similar arguments to those raised against a statutory bill of rights. This 

opposition has significantly shaped the course of the debate on constitutional 

recognition, including the development of a new proposal to insert a polit-

ical limitation rather than a legal limitation to protect the interests of First 

Nations. The proposal takes the rough form of a constitutionalised Indigenous 

representative body that must be consulted by Parliament in legislating on 

matters affecting Indigenous peoples.

117

 The turn in this debate towards a leg-

islative,  political protection of rights, and away from conferring any power 

on the judiciary for making unreviewable judgments that might require the 

115 

See e.g., Bob Carr, ‘Bill of Rights is the Wrong Call’ The Australian, 9 May 2009, 

www.theaus-

tralian.com.au/news/inquirer/bill-of-rights-is-the-wrong-call/story-e6frg6z6-1225710664130

; 

James Allen, ‘Let’s Draw a Line through a Bill of Rights’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 Sep-

tember  2005

 www.

smh.

com.

au/

news

/opi

ni

on/

let

s-

dr

aw-

a-

li

ne-

thr

ough-

a-

bi

ll

-of

-r

ight

s/

2005/

09/

25/

11

2758674

2586.

ht

ml

 www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/lets-draw-a-line-through-a-bill-of-rights/2005/ 

09/25/1127586742586.html

, and Philip  Ruddock, ‘Bills of Rights Do Not Protect Freedoms’