The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 135 (emphasis 

added).

98 

Williams and Hume, Supra note 73, 173.

99 

(2006) 228 CLR 45, 76.

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366 

Rosalind Dixon and Gabrielle Appleby

many pages justifying his judicial conclusions, and he developed a consistent 

jurisprudential approach across cases. But like Murphy J, Kirby J also ulti-

mately adopted an unorthodox approach to constitutional interpretation: 

Kirby J argued that international law should not only play an important role 

in shaping the development of the common law and interpretation of statutes 

in Australia, but also in the interpretation of the Constitution, particularly in 

relation to those provisions and limitations that protect rights. For Kirby J, such 

a role included interpreting the scope of implied constitutional limits – such 

as the need for an independent and impartial tribunal under the Kable prin-

ciple – consistently with international human rights standards

100

 and the reso-

lution of ambiguities in constitutional text by reference to international law.

101

The most direct – and blistering – criticism of Kirby J’s approach came 

from McHugh J in Al-Kateb v. Godwin. McHugh J, a strong proponent of the 

strict – and by that time uncontroversially orthodox – approach to drawing 

implications grounded in the text and structure of the Constitution, explained 

that there was a danger such that the approach advocated by Kirby J could 

result in judicial amendment of the Constitution, subverting the purpose of 

the referendum requirements of s 128.

102

 ‘As a matter of constitutional doc-

trine’, McHugh J declared, ‘it must be regarded as heretical’.

103

 He then took 

aim at the position that judges should refer to foreign authority in approaching 

constitutional interpretation. This, he said, would result in judges being given 

‘a “loose-leaf” copy of the Constitution’.

104

 A constitutional Bill of Rights, he 

argued, must be achieved through section 128 or not at all. Justice Heydon 

tallied up the score in Roach, noting that Kirby J’s approach to using interna-

tional law in constitutional interpretation has been ‘denied by 21 of the Justices 

of this Court who have considered the matter, and affirmed by only one’.

105

 

The rejection of Kirby J’s approach in this context also had potential connec-

tions to, or at least parallels with, the role played by Murphy J in an earlier era. 

Justice Kirby was unusual among members of the Court in publicly celebrat-

ing Murphy J’s legacy as a jurist,

106

 and because of this, his embrace of interna-

tional human rights law may itself have suffered from an indirect association 

100 

See e.g., Forge v. Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45.

101 

See e.g., Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513, 657–8; Kartinyeri 

v. Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 418 (Kirby J).

102 

Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 591–4.

103 

Ibid.

, 593.

104 

Ibid.

, 595.

105 

Roach v. Australian Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 225.

106 

See e.g., 

www.google.com.au/webhp?sourceid

=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8# 

q

=justice+kirby+justice+murphy

.

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