The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective

choice and people).

42 

For a fuller discussion, see Patrick Emerton, ‘Political freedoms and entitlements in the Aus-

tralian Constitution – An example of referential intentions yielding unexpected legal conse-

quences’ (2010) 38 Federal Law Review 169.

43 

Section 71.

44 

Section 73.

45 

See e.g., Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v. J W Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434, 

451 (per Barton J): ‘Whether persons were Judges, whether tribunals were Courts, and whether 

they exercised what is now called judicial power, depended and depends on substance and not 

on mere name.’

46 

See e.g., Boilermakers’ case (R v. Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia) (1956) 94 

CLR 254; affirmed in Attorney-General (Cth) v. The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529.

---

 

The Centrality and Diversity of the Invisible Constitution 

163

legislation, engages, in a prospective way, the High Court’s exercise of the 

judicial power of the Commonwealth. This is because either (a) the High 

Court may be apt to hear appeals in respect of the decisions issuing from the 

exercise of that function, or (b) the exercise of that function may not be apt for 

appeal to the High Court (e.g., if the function of the state courts is not an exer-

cise of judicial power), meaning that vesting that function in the state court 

will shape the scope and character of the relationship between the courts in 

the constitutionally mandated hierarchy.

47

 The constitutional consequence 

is that state legislatures may not vest functions in their courts which would 

change those courts in ways that would undermine or distort this judicial hier-

archy that has the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth at 

its apex.

48

 This constitutional limitation upon the power of state legislatures 

is not expressly stated: it arises by way of implication. But the implication is 

not the result of lawmakers’ intentions, but rather the textual mandate that a 

certain judicial hierarchy shall exist.

49

This sort of realist approach to the meaning of the language of natural sci-

ence is well-known.

50

 Its application to legal language, which refers to social, 

political and institutional phenomena such as direct choice, the people, judicial 

power, courts, an appellate hierarchy having a certain court exercising a certain 

sort of power at its apex, etc., is less commonly discussed by philosophers of 

language.

51

 But as a matter of practice, it is implicit in the methodology that 

47 

See the remarks of Gummow J in Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 

CLR 51, 142–3.

48 

See e.g., Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; Kirk v. Industrial 

Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531.

49 

The implication is reinforced by the constitutionally-stated power of the federal legislature to 

vest state courts with federal jurisdiction (sections 71, 77), which establishes a further connec-

tion between state courts and the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth: see 

e.g., Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51.

50 

See in particular Hilary Putnam, ‘Dreaming and Depth Grammar’ in R. J. Butler (ed.), An-