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As with the
previous two views of language, synonymy is captured by similarity of
conceptual structure. For example,
throwing
and
tossing
are, at the level of conceptual
structure, both verbs of propulsion (1990:34). Speakers have different characterizations of
these actions, but this information is not included here. He adopts the notion of a 3D model,
which contains
information about shape, color and other physical attributes, which help a
speaker decide whether a given object or action in the world can be labeled with a specific
word (1990:33). A speaker can have a 3D
model of what an act of
throwing
looks like and
this is likely different from the 3D model for
tossing.
Synonyms are words with the same (or
similar) conceptual structure, even though they may differ in their 3D model.
There are issues, though, when it comes to the primitives chosen to be represented in
the conceptual structure. Verbs such as
walk
have the same conceptual structure as that
shown for
run
in (3) above, seemingly making them synonymous. The issue is that the entry
in (3) is only approximate, and there may in fact be other elements that must be included in
the conceptual structure (1990:45 fn 2). Our judgments on
synonymy will depend on the
amount of detail we include in the conceptual structure.
One way Jackendoff’s theory handles polysemy is by allowing primitives to express
different concepts depending on the domain. The concept BE can mean different things
depending on the semantic field: “In the spatial field, a Thing is located spatially; in
possessional,
a Thing belongs to someone; in ascriptional, a Thing has a property; in
scheduling, an Event is located in a time period.” (1990:26). A lexical item that contains the
primitive BE can have these various meanings without any difference being marked in the
conceptual structure.
Other meaning extensions can be captured using principles. Some meaning extensions
are common and apply to several lexical items. For example, a word denoting an object X can
also refer to a person characterized by X (an example of metonymy). These types of common
changes in sense should be covered by principles that apply to (most) lexical items (1990:21).
In these cases, there is no information in the lexical entry itself.
Jackendoff’s (1990) main focus is on exploring the relationship
between lexical
semantics and syntactic structure. He places very little focus on polysemy, and even less so
on synonymy. But both can be accommodated into his system to a certain extent. Synonymy,
like in all the previous views, implies similarity of structure. Polysemy is not marked in any
way in lexical entries. Instead primitives are allowed to express different types of meanings,
and principles can be applied to lexical items to derive new senses.