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The Third Civil War
changes into the heart of the Umayyad caliphate—into its central
province, Syria, and into the person of the caliph himself. While it
was the rising of the Hashimiyya which finally toppled the structure,
in part at least the developments which led to and were intensified
by the civil war had already fatally weakened it.
In essence, the civil war reduced Syria to the condition of the
other provinces. In the provinces, as we have seen, one of the main
developments of the Marwanid period was the emergence and
intensification of rivalry between army factions and military leaders.
Syria, however, had remained aloof from this process because there
the caliphs were in charge and the caliphs were not army
commanders but a sort of hereditary aristocracy. Hisham remained
as caliph whether power in Iraq was devolved to the Mudar or the
Yemen. Under Hisham, however, some members of the Umayyad
family began to be closely associated with particular military
groups. Marwan was associated with the predominantly Qaysi army
of the Mesopotamian frontier and Sulayman b. Hisham with his own
private army, the Dhakwaniyya. At the same time, the Syrian army
was developing into two distinct groups with the potentiality of the
development of hostility between them—the predominantly Qaysi
army of Mesopotamia and the predominantly Kalbi army of central
and southern Syria which was sent to serve in Iraq, North Africa and
other parts of the empire.
The personal and religious factors which subsequently triggered
off the third civil war, the actions of al-Walid II and the religious and
personal hatred which they inspired, then provided the opportunity
for these developments to emerge fully. Yazid III was clearly
supported mainly by the Yemeni faction and the religious opposition
associated with the Ghaylaniyya, while Marwan came to power as
the leader of the Qaysis. Unlike earlier caliphs, therefore, those
brought to power by the civil war were clearly identified with one or
another of the factions and this meant that the factional rivalry
which had hitherto been confined to the provinces was now brought
to the centre. In future the replacement of the domination of one
faction by that of another would involve a change not only of
provincial governors but of caliphs.
Furthermore, if Syria was now on a level with the other
provinces, what reason was there for maintaining it as the capital
province of the empire? Mu‘awiya’s rise to power had depended
largely on the special conditions of Syria which had provided him
with a united and disciplined army in contrast to those of his
The Third Civil War
103
opponents, but now Syria no longer provided these advantages.
Marwan’s move to Qaysi Harran in Mesopotamia and his apparent
transfer of the
jund
of Qinnasrin from Syria to Mesopotamia, while
perhaps inspired by more short-term considerations, appears in the
long run as a symbolic recognition of the loss of primacy by Syria.
13
Notes
1. P.Crone,
Slaves on horses,
46–8 for an overall interpretation.
2. On Walid II’s upbringing and personality: F.Gabrieli, ‘Al-Walid ibn
Yazid’,
RSO,
15 (1935); R.Blachère, ‘Le prince omayyade al-Walid (II)’;
D.Derenk,
Leben und Dichtung,
27–38; J.Wellhausen,
Arab kingdom,
350–
2.
3. Articles ‘Ghaylan al-Dimashki’ and ‘Kadariyya’ in
EI2;
W.M.Watt,
Formative period of Islamic thought,
85–8; J.van Ess, ‘Les Qadarites et la
Gailaniyya de Yazid III’,
SI,
31 (1970); M.A.Cook,
Muslim dogma,
chapter
14, n. 30.
4. J.Wellhausen,
Arab kingdom,
352–66; M.A.Shaban,
New
interpretation,
153–5; D.Derenk,
Leben und Dichtung,
44–7.
5. J.Wellhausen,
Arab kingdom,
366–9; M.A.Shaban,
New
interpretation,
155– 60; J.van Ess, ‘Les Qadarites et la Gailaniyya de Yazid
III’.
6. J.Wellhausen,
Arab kingdom,
371–3; article ‘Marwan b. Muhammad’
in
EI2
.
7. J.Wellhausen,
Arab kingdom,
373–6; D.C.Dennett,
Marwan b.
Muhammad,
226–34.
8. J.Wellhausen,
Arab kingdom,
378–9; D.C.Dennett,
Marwan b.
Muhammad,
238–9; article ‘Harran’, in
EI2
.
9. J.Wellhausen,
Arab kingdom,
379–83.
10. J.Wellhausen,
Arab kingdom,
383–7; article “Abd Allah b.
Mu‘awiya’ in
EI2;
W.Tucker, “Abd Allah b. Mu‘awiya’,
SI,
51 (1980).
11. J.Wellhausen,
Arab kingdom,
387–92; M.A.Shaban,
New
interpretation,
160–2; article ‘Dahhak b. Kays al-Shaybani’ in
EI2
.
12. J.Wellhausen,
Arab kingdom,
387–92; M.A.Shaban,
New
interpretation,
163; W.Tucker, “Abd Allah b. Mu‘awiya’,
SI,
51 (1980).
13. P.Crone,
Slaves on horses,
46–8.
104
Chapter 8
The Overthrow of the Umayyad
Caliphate
Within three years of the restoration of Umayyad control over the
central provinces by Marwan II, his power and that of his dynasty
were completely destroyed. The agent of destruction was a rising
which, beginning in Khurasan, was carried through mainly by
Khurasanis and organised by a group known as the Hashimiyya. The
result was the passing of the caliphate into the possession of the
‘Abbasid family.
1
Difficulties occur when we begin to ask questions about the
nature and composition of the movement which overthrow the
Umayyads, its aims and the reasons why it attracted support. These
difficulties arise chiefly because the movement was necessarily
secret in the years before its success, and as the historical tradition
came to be stabilised in the period when the ‘Abbasids were ruling
as caliphs, the views of the new rulers and their relationship with
Islam were changing too, making necessary a certain reformulation
of the traditions about their rise to power and the bases of their
legitimacy. There has been room, therefore, for considerable
controversy over the nature of what is often called ‘the ‘Abbasid
revolution’, an expression which, if it has any validity, should be
understood as referring to the many and profound developments
which followed the accession of the dynasty, not merely to the
overthrow of the Umayyads and establishment of the ‘Abbasid
caliphate itself. In recent years some new sources have been found
which seem to throw more light on the Hashimiyya and its
relationship to the ‘Abbasid family in the time before the overthrow
of the Umayyads. Although it is possible that these sources may
have been evaluated too enthusiastically, they do contain some
reports which were not available to earlier scholars like Wellhausen
and which may help to clarify some of the obscurities.
2
The Overthrow of the Umayyad Caliphate
105
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