Factionalism and Islamisation
79
the conversion of an individual was unlikely to be significant for the
finances of the state.
10
In the Umayyad period, though, this system (admittedly more
complex in practice) did not yet exist fully, and, largely as a result
of the work of D.C.Dennett, it is apparent that we have to speak of
fiscal systems rather than of one system covering the whole
empire. Nevertheless, Dennett seems to have shown that, in spite
of
the diversity, there was at the level of the tax payer over most of
the empire a dual system of poll tax and land tax, and a reasonably
precise terminology to distinguish them. Acceptance of Islam
should in theory have brought relief from the poll tax in most
areas, but the land tax would continue to be payable so long as the
convert remained on his land.
11
It seems, therefore, that the
extensive effort made by Dennett to refute Wellhausen’s picture of
the Umayyad fiscal system does not lead to a radically different
result. Full fiscal benefit would be gained
both by conversion and
by abandonment of the land, but it was abandonment of the land
which was crucial since this freed a man from the land tax and
removed him from the clutches of the tax official. It was this
abandonment of the land which caused the problems for the
Umayyads in both Egypt and Iraq, and it is against this background
that al-Hajjaj’s measures against the
mawali
make sense. Almost
everywhere widespread acceptance of Islam would lead to a
decline of revenue, either for the government
where it collected the
taxes directly (as in Iraq and Egypt) or for the local non-Arab
rulers and notables charged with levying it and paying the
government an agreed amount (as in Khurasan). To prevent this
decline in revenue the government or the local notables, as the case
may be, either tried to prevent conversion to Islam or took no
account of it when collecting taxes. To this extent, therefore,
Dennett’s more sophisticated treatment of Umayyad taxation does
not greatly alter the fact that there was a tension between the needs
of the state and the demands of Islam.
It would be unwise to attempt to be too specific about ‘Umar
II’s response to this situation. Beyond a general acceptance that
there should be no distinction in Islam between Arab and non-Arab
and that there should be no obstacles
to acceptance of Islam by
non-Arabs, it is difficult to pick out specific measures which we
can be sure about. Some reports say that he forbade the acquisition
of tax-paying land by the Muslims after the year 100 AH (AD 718–
19).
12
This seems to indicate that Muslims did not expect to pay tax
80
Factionalism and Islamisation
on their lands and as more and more tax-paying land passed into
Muslim hands, either through its acquisition by Arabs from its
previous non-Arab cultivators or by the conversion of its non-Arab
cultivators, so the government was deprived of a vital source of
taxation. There is a possible allusion to this measure in the ‘Fiscal
Rescript’, but the wording is rather vague and there is no mention
of any date.
13
It is reported that in Khurasan a deputation led by the
pious Abu ’l-Sayda’ complained to ‘Umar
that the governor al-
Jarrah b. ‘Abd Allah al-Hakami was imposing circumcision as a
test on would-be converts who were flocking to Islam in response
to ‘Umar’s insistence that the
mawali
should be freed from their
kharaj
tax and receive proper pay in the army. ‘Umar’s response
was to depose the governor, forbid the circumcision test while
insisting that ‘God sent Muhammad to call men to Islam, not as a
circumciser’, and to demand that the non-Arabs entering Islam
should receive equality of treatment with the Arabs.
14
But whatever ‘Umar did or did not do,
it is clear that he did not
provide a permanent solution to the problem, for after him we
continue to hear of non-Arab Muslims being subjected to what
they saw as unrighteous taxation, of consequent discontent and
even revolt, and of renewed attempts by individual governors to
recognise their rights. The problem seems to have been especially
acute in the east where it caused constant trouble in the territories
east of Khurasan, while in Khurasan itself we hear that in 738
thousands of Muslims were still taxed while many non-Muslims
were getting off scot free.
15
Dennett argued
that the dual system of
land tax and poll tax, with remission of poll tax but not necessarily
of land tax for those who accepted Islam, should have remedied the
grievances of the
mawali
without injuring the interests of the state.
But this works only if it is assumed that the system was respected,
and then only in those areas where it operated. As Dennett himself
pointed out, the system did not work in the east where the Arabs
generally left the levying of taxes to local rulers and notables,
insisting only on an agreed annual lump sum, and not concerning
themselves with how or upon whom the taxes were imposed.
When, therefore, as seems to have happened
from time to time, an
attempt was made to encourage the local population to accept
Islam by promising remission of taxes, it was the local rulers and
notables who came under pressure because they were the ones
responsible for paying the agreed sum to the Arab governor. The
Arabs were, then, in a difficult situation: either they supported the
Factionalism and Islamisation
81
rights of the local notables and rulers and allowed them to raise the
tribute demanded in any way they saw fit, or they supported the
rights of the local
mawali
and made it
difficult or impossible for
the local authorities to meet the tribute demanded. The
consequences appeared especially in events in the east during the
long caliphate of Hisham.
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