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The Umayyad Rise to the Caliphate
having benefited from ‘Uthman’s alleged nepotism since he owed
his appointment in Syria to ‘Uthman’s predecessor, the venerable
‘Umar. At this time Mu‘awiya was not claiming the caliphate for
himself, merely demanding vengeance for ‘Uthman and questioning
‘Ali’s right to rule. In the spring of 657 ‘Ali marched north from
Kufa on campaign against Mu‘awiya and the latter, who had been
attempting to wrest Egypt from ‘Ali’s governor, headed for
Mesopotamia to meet him.
The two met at Siffin, a site which has not been securely
identified but which seems to have been in the vicinity of Raqqa but
on the right bank of the Euphrates. It was late spring or early
summer, and we are told that the armies faced each other for some
time before fighting commenced. Then, according to the Muslim
reports (contradicted by the Byzantine chronicler Theophanes),
‘Ali’s men were on the point of victory when there occurred an
episode which has become famous. What happened is to some extent
obscure but it is generally accepted that Mu‘awiya’s men raised
copies or parts of the Koran on the ends of their spears and ‘Ali’s
men, or the more pious among them, seeing this, forced ‘Ali to stop
fighting and enter into negotiation with Mu‘awiya.
Whether the raising of the Korans was intended as a general
reminder that both parties were Muslims and should not be fighting
one another, or whether it was intended as a more specific signal that
the dispute should be resolved by reference to the Word of God, is
not clear, but there is a tendency to see it as no more than a ruse by
the Syrians to get out of a difficult situation. The idea of it is
credited, not to Mu‘awiya himself, but to his right-hand man, ‘Amr
b. al-‘As. ‘Amr, who had previously led the Arab conquest of Egypt
and had served as governor there before being removed by ‘Uthman,
was not himself an Umayyad but another of those Meccans whose
acceptance of Islam was regarded as opportunistic. During the
Fitna
he appears rather as Mu‘awiya’s evil genius, though this is perhaps a
device to save the reputation of Mu‘awiya to some extent, and the
implication is that he supported Mu‘awiya in order to win back the
governorship of Egypt. The essence of the trick of the raising of the
Korans is that ‘Amr is supposed to have realised that ‘Ali’s army
included a large number of religious enthusiasts (the so called
qurra’
) and that sight of the Scripture would cause them to waver in
their determination to fight.
Whatever the truth of the matter, the episode is said to have led to
the breaking off of the fighting. Discussions were held and the two
The Umayyad Rise to the Caliphate
29
sides agreed to put their dispute to arbitration. Each side was to
name a representative and, at an agreed time and place, the two
representatives were to meet and arbitrate the dispute. Like the
raising of the Korans, the arbitration too has become famous.
Mu‘awiya appointed ‘Amr b. al-‘As as his representative while ‘Ali
chose a former governor of Kufa and early Muslim with a reputation
for piety, Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari.
Why ‘Ali chose Abu Musa is something of a problem. He had
been governor of Kufa when ‘Ali arrived there in pursuit of ‘A’isha,
Talha and al-Zubayr before the battle of the Camel, and he had made
it clear that he did not want to become involved in the
Fitna,
advising the Kufans to remain aloof. After ‘Ali gained possession of
Kufa, Abu Musa was forced to leave the town. Now, however, we
find him chosen as ‘Ali’s representative in the vital arbitration
process. The only explanation which appears to make sense is that
he was forced upon ‘Ali by those pious followers who had been
instrumental in getting him to accept the arbitration principle in the
first place.
The traditions about the meeting of the arbitrators are confused
and often contradictory. For one thing, it is not at all clear what they
were to discuss. Was it merely the question of the legitimacy of
‘Uthman’s murder, or the choice of a caliph? For another, how was
the arbitration to proceed? We are told that the Book of God and the
Sunna
were to be examined, but this raises questions about the
significance of these terms at such an early date and how they were
to provide answers for the problems facing the Muslims. Different
dates and places for the meeting of the arbitrators are given, and this
has led some to suggest that they met more than once and in
different places. There is general agreement that the arbitration was
inconclusive and that it broke up in disarray, but the reports about it
do not really make sense. Abu Musa is said to have been tricked by
‘Amr b. al-‘As into publicly abandoning his support for ‘Ali on the
understanding that ‘Amr would abandon his support for Mu‘awiya,
but, after Abu Musa had fulfilled his side of the bargain, ‘Amr
refused to honour his side. It has been pointed out that if such a
blatant piece of trickery did occur, it would have been easy for ‘Ali
and his supporters to refuse to accept any outcome of the arbitration.
In any case, the arbitration does not appear to have had much
importance for the further development of the
Fitna,
except insofar as
‘Ali had diminished his status as caliph by agreeing to take part in it.
More important was the major split which occurred in the support for
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