Particular attention must be paid to the special feature of the decision on the
partner selection for this form of project cooperation. The low level of structuring of
development projects in early phases means that the early involvement of coopera-
tion partners makes it inflexible and enables the outflow of know-how. It is
therefore extremely important to select partners for which it can be identified or
assessed that they will support the project and potentially become a permanent
supplier for subsequent projects upon successful completion of the initial project.
The developing company at least partially forgoes the option of obtaining various
proposals in late innovation phases and playing competitors at the supplier level off
against each other in favor of faster development times. Instead, the company
commits to structuring and managing the project with the partners. This kind of
decision requires extensive experience and confidence in the competence of these
partners. A contractual safeguard is also required, e.g. with confidentiality and
exclusivity clauses.
7
Project Cooperation “Between Market and Hierarchy”
Project cooperation in capital goods marketing is an intermediate form of economic
activity between the extremes of “market coordination” (with a decentralized
coordination of the decisions on the prices to be paid) and the “hierarchy” form
of coordination, i.e. the established form of doing business within an amalgamation
or an independent company. More recent economic theory approaches, especially
Table 13
Characteristics of simultaneous engineering
Simultaneous engineering
• Is the simultaneous development of products and production facilities with the support of
internal project teams and the broad involvement of suppliers and system manufacturers
• Aims to shorten the innovation cycles and improve performance through early coordination
• Is used, for example, in vehicle construction, in the electrotechnical industry and in industrial
plant construction
• Requires cross-product, -function and -divisional thoughts and actions, especially cooperation
• Synchronizes sales, production and procurement, etc.
• Must be applied across companies; suppliers, complementary suppliers and customers (users/
downstream processors) must be involved and coordinated
• Uses the opportunities provided by computer assisted design (CAD), engineering (CAE),
manufacture (CAM), etc., including with the aid of remote data transmission between the
companies involved
• Particularly makes use of the up-to-date methods of project management and project
organization
• Opens opportunities in the area of innovation, quality and commitment of suppliers and
customers
• Places high demands on partner selection, cooperation and organization
• Involves risks due to mutual dependencies
• Can or will often result in the establishment of long-term business relationships
388
B. Gu¨nter
those of New Institutional Economics, provide explanations as to why companies
select one of the two extreme forms of coordination of economic activities, or why
companies select cooperation as an intermediate form. The transaction cost theory
can help to explain and to optimize the selection of an organizational form. It
postulates the selection of the organizational form, or cooperation form that is
associated with the lowest transaction costs. The transaction costs to be compared
include the search costs, initiation costs, contracting costs and control costs
(Thommen and Achleitner
2012
, p. 861). Information and search costs arise for a
project cooperation during partner selection and costs associated with the negotia-
tion of cooperation contracts, while adaptation costs and control costs for these
contracts arise as part of the project, configuration and claim management, such as
for the industrial plant business. The transaction cost theory can also be used to
explain partner changes or the longer-term stability of supplier coalitions in the
industrial plant construction business.
A popular representation of the marketing participants is the so-called marketing
triangle (supplier-customer-competitor). It is intended to visualize customer and
competitor orientation in connection with the “conceptual competitive advantages”
(Gu¨nter
1997
;
2007
). However, as discussed above, an extension is required for
horizontal and, in a modified form, for vertical marketing cooperation and a
“marketing square” has to be assumed (cf. Fig.
7
; Gu¨nter
1992
). This contains the
cooperation partner(s) as the fourth element.
The marketing square provides a perspective that is aligned to cooperative
strategies for the preparation of corporate decisions in an extended conceptual
framework compared to the marketing triangle. It is a different way of thinking,
which is based on the consideration of cooperation in marketing. With the increas-
ing importance of vertical cooperation, the traditional perspective of the supplier
and consumer/customer as market opponents is becoming less relevant. Admit-
tedly, conflicts of interest between the supplier and the customer will continue to
exist, even for this kind of cooperation. However, depending on the intensity of
commitment of a business or cooperation relationship, an increasing importance or
even dominance of joint, uni-directional objectives is being noticed. For example,
Customers
Competitors
Suppliers
Supplier‘s cooperation partners
Fig. 7
The marketing square
Project Cooperation
389
this is ultimately manifested in partial mergers of the participating organizations in
project teams or teams for simultaneous engineering as well as in logistics and
information chains for just-in-time relationships.
A special form of project cooperation and an example of a combination between
a market-based and organizational hierarchy-based coordination is represented by a
cooperation for projects in the industrial plant construction business, which is
reflected in
BOT contracts
and
BOOT contracts
(cf. also Chap.
3
). Build-Operate-
Transfer and Build-Operate-Own-Transfer agreements are forms of a proposal and
management of plant construction projects between customers and certain
constellations of supplier coalitions. The identification of the contract types already
provides an indication of the supplier constellation. They are based on the require-
ment and expectation of the plant customer, to transfer the planning and the
construction of a plant (“build”) as well as the operation (“operate”) and potentially
the ownership or joint ownership of the plant (“own”) to the supplier. Customers
expect a particularly intense commitment from the supplier from these agreements
as well as relief in financing, know-how transfer and ultimately also risk reduction.
In practice, the implementation of these kinds of requirements means that the
supplier coalition also needs to include partners with operation know-how. These,
as well as other potential partners, also need to engage in an operating company in
the “Own” case. A common financing solution involves the remuneration for the
supplier being generated from the income from operating a plant.
The commercial planning and implementation of this form of cooperation
involves the following decision-making problems:
The customer specification is at least partially the result of information
asymmetries, especially the customer’s quality uncertainty regarding the quality
of the performance. Suppliers can counteract this by quality signals, such as the
submission of information or the establishment of a reputation and communication.
However, the key tool and transaction design in terms of information economics is
the conclusion of contingent contracts. BOT and BOOT agreements can
also
be
interpreted as “contingent contracts” in this sense; at least they contain elements of
such contracts. They contain contractual safeguards for the customer and principal
in the event that the contractor(s) behave(s) opportunistically and do(es) not pro-
vide the desired assistance during or after completion, e.g. when operating the plant
and to ensure it fulfills its function. This requires suppliers to reduce the customer’s
uncertainty by concluding these kinds of contingent contracts. As a result, operator
know-how must be integrated during the partner selection and the commitment
under commercial law in the case of “own” needs to be economically calculated and
defined. The same applies to the financial commitment in the latter case, which
suggests the involvement of financially strong partners.
The fundamental question of involvement is posed for every company involved
in a supplier coalition, which must be decided based on the strategic positioning and
the supplier’s self-perception. But, the decision will also have to be considered with
respect to competition and risk perspectives, especially for customers with a weak
market position. In this case, the personnel and financial resources as well as
potential withdrawal opportunities are extremely important.
390
B. Gu¨nter
BOT and BOOT contracts deal with organization options that are also interme-
diate forms between a pure market-based coordination and an integrated coordina-
tion within an individual company. The above shows that this current form of
project cooperation is connected with decision-making issues, which are not just
not fully resolved in corporate practice, but which are experiencing interesting
directions of analysis and activity in light of the New Institutional Economics.
Exercises
1. What are the different phases of proposal planning and order processing?
2. What reasons may lead to cooperation in proposal planning?
3. For what kind of purchases does cooperation with other suppliers seem appro-
priate? Justify your answer!
4. What is meant by a multi-organizational selling center, and how is it related to
inter-company project management?
5. What are the reasons for the early formation of a supplier coalition?
6. What content of a proposal do the key coordination requirements relate to for
cooperative proposal planning?
7. What selection criteria for proposal partners are particularly important if a
supplier has to cooperate with foreign cooperation partners of which they have
almost no knowledge?
8. What reasons may induce a supplier to favor a less well-known foreign supplier
as a proposal partner instead of a well-known German supplier?
9. What are the key reasons why company A, who (only) delivers the boilers for a
power plant to be constructed, would not take on the role of general contractor?
10. Under what conditions is a supplier in a position to take on the role of a general
contractor?
11. Why may cooperation, e.g. in a consortium, also be required between compet-
ing suppliers?
12. Customer K requests the installation of control units manufactured by electron-
ics provider E from machine manufacturer M for a new development. What
could be the key reasons for these kind of preferences?
13. Why would a plant customer request a supplier coalition
14. in the form of a consortium,
15. in the form of a general contractor?
16. To what extent do the financing requirements of a plant customer influence a
plant supplier’s cooperation decisions?
17. How important are property rights (licenses) for decisions on and in supplier
coalitions?
18. What is the basic reason for a consortium cooperation?
19. What is the specific importance of aligning cooperation and supplier contracts
to the plant contract (customer contract)?
20. What are the benefits of a “Build-Own-Operate-Transfer” solution from a
project investor’s perspective?
Project Cooperation
391
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393
Index
A
Activity based cost accounting, 42
Adaptation cultural, 235
Adjudication, 202
Agent, 236
Agreement zone, 216
Allocation of competencies between the
project and line operations, 332–334
Analysis of relationships with other projects,
318
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)
approaches, 68
Anchor cognitive, 230, 246
Anchor effect, 234
Anchoring effect, 254
Appendices, 175
Arbitration, 202
Arguments in a negotiation, 244, 259
Assessments of the future, 225
Authorizations, 62
B
Bargaining pie, 217, 224, 246
Bargaining range, 217
distribution of, 219
enlargement of, 219
BATNA, 216, 222, 258, 262
Battle of the forms, 195
Behavioral science, 215
Best practice in terms of the use of project
management methods, 339
Bias cognitive, 242, 244, 255
Bid decision, 163
Big five personality traits, 230
Blueprint, 21
Bluff in a negotiation, 253
BOOT contracts, 390
BOT contracts, 390
Business
case, 283, 289, 329
negotiation, 25
transaction, 27
Business opportunity management, 38
Buying center, 15, 212
C
Capacity utilization, 61
Choice of law, 173
Claim management, 197, 301, 329–331
Claim manager, 340, 347
Collectivism, 233, 235
Commitment in a negotiation, 237, 253, 264
Communication, 249
elements, 250
high-context, 233
low-context, 233
process, 239
science, 215
Competition analysis, 361
Competitive
advantages, 360
bidding, 264
Competitor analysis, 17
Compliance, 62
Concessions in a negotiation, 209, 226, 230,
244, 248, 255, 257
Condition precedent, contract, 196
Confidence, over, 247
Conflict
about facts, 199
resolution, 200
resolution mechanism, 202
types, 199
Conflict of interest, 208
#
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016
M. Kleinaltenkamp et al. (eds.),
Business Project Management and Marketing
,
Springer Texts in Business and Economics, DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-48507-1
395
Consortium, 364, 378
contract, 372, 374, 379, 382
manager, 379
open, 164
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