The Art of War

deviation
.
[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of
O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch’in army. The King of Chao first
consulted Lien P’o on the advisability of attempting a relief, but the latter
thought the distance too great, and the intervening country too rugged and
difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She, who fully admitted the hazardous
nature of the march, but finally said: "We shall be like two rats fighting in a
whole—and the pluckier one will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but
had only gone a distance of 30 
li
when he stopped and began throwing up
entrenchments. For 28 days he continued strengthening his fortifications, and
took care that spies should carry the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch’in general
was overjoyed, and attributed his adversary's tardiness to the fact that the
beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao
territory. But the spies had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced
march lasting for two days and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with
such astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding position on
the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his movements. A crushing
defeat followed for the Ch’in forces, who were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu
in all haste and retreat across the border.]

---

5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an
undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
[I adopt the reading of the 
T’ung Tien
, Cheng Yu-hsien and the 
T’u Shu
, since
they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to make sense. The
commentators using the standard text take this line to mean that manœuvers may
be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the
general.]
6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an
advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other
hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice
of its baggage and stores.
[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who
paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own rendering without much enthusiasm,
being convinced that there is some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the
whole, it is clear that Sun Tzu does not approve of a lengthy march being
undertaken without supplies. Cf. infra, § 11.]
7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make
forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the
usual distance at a stretch,
[The ordinary day's march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 
li
; but on one
occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts’ao Ts’ao is said to have covered the
incredible distance of 300 
li
within twenty-four hours.]
doing a hundred 
li
in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all
your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind,
and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
[The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don't march a hundred 
li
to
gain a tactical advantage, either with or without impedimenta. Manœuvers of
this description should be confined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said:

---

"The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the dangers of
battle." He did not often call upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was
only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he
sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ]
9. If you march fifty 
li
in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will
lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will
reach the goal.
[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be