Tertium Organum

causes of the three­
dimensionality of space. 
The method of analogies is, on the whole, rather disheartening. It makes one walk in 
a vicious circle. It helps to clear some things, but does not really give a straight answer 
to anything. After numerous and prolonged attempts to find one's way in complex 
problems with the help of analogies, one begins to feel the uselessness of all one's 

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efforts; one feels that, with these analogies, one is merely walking alongside 
a wall - and then, with a feeling of complete hatred and disgust for analogies, 
one begins to see the necessity for seeking some direct way which will lead 
straight to where one needs to go. 
This problem of higher dimensions has usually been tackled by means of 
analogies. Only very recently has science begun to work out that direct 
method which will be detailed later on. 
So, if we wish to follow the direct road, without deviating from it, we must 
rigidly adhere to Kant's fundamental propositions. But if we formulate 
Hinton's thought from the point of view of these propositions, we shall get 
the following result: we bear in ourselves the conditions of our space and 
therefore must find in ourselves the conditions which will enable us to 
establish the relation between our space and higher space.
In other words, it is in our mentality, in our perceiving apparatus, that we 
must find the conditions of the world's three-dimensionality. And it is also 
there that we must discover the conditions of the possibility of a higher­
dimensional world. 
If we set ourselves this task, we shall find we are on the direct road, and we 
should be able to get an answer to our question; what is space and its three­
dimensionality? 
How are we to approach the solution of this problem? 
Quite clearly, through the study of our consciousness and its properties. 
We shall be free of all analogies and start on the right and direct road towards 
the solution of the main problem of the subjective or objective character of 
space, if we decide to examine the mental forms in which we perceive the 
world, and see whether there is a correspondence between them and the 
three-dimensional extension of the world. In other words, we must see 
whether this idea of the three-dimensional extension of the world with its 
properties is not the outcome of certain properties of our own mentality. 

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CHAPTER 8 
Our perceiving apparatus. Sensation. Representation. Concept. Art as the language of 
the future. To what extent does the three-dimensionality of the world depend on the 
properties of our perceiving apparatus? What could prove this dependence? Where 
could we find a real confirmation of this dependence? Psychology of animals. In what 
does it differ from the human? Reflex. Irritability of the cell. Instinct. Pleasure - pain. 
Emotional thinking. Absence of concepts. Language of animals. Logic of animals. 
Different levels of intelligence in animals. The goose, the cat, the dog and the 
monkey. 
In order to find out the exact relation of our inner life to the outer world and to define 
what
in our perception of the world belongs to the world and 
what
belongs to ourselves, 
we must turn to elementary psychology and examine the mechanism of our perceiving 
apparatus. 
The basic unit of our perception is a 
sensation.
A sensation is an elementary change 
in the state of our inner life, produced, 
or so it appears to us, 
either by some change in 
the state of the outer world in relation to our inner life, or by a change in our inner life 
in relation to the outer world. So physics and psycho-physics teach us. I shall not deal 
here with the question of the correctness or incorrectness of the interpretations 
advanced by these sciences. It is sufficient to define a sensation as an 
elementary 
change in the state of the inner life, i.e. as the element, or the basic unit of this change. 
Experiencing a sensation, we assume it to be, so to speak, a reflection of some kind of 
change in the external world. 
The sensations experienced by us leave a certain trace in our memory. In 
accumulating, memories of sensations begin to blend in our consciousness into groups 
according to their similarity, to become associated, to be put together, or to be 
contrasted. Sensations, usually experienced in close connection with one another, will 
arise in our memory preserving the same connection. And gradually, out of 
memories of 
sensations
there are formed 
representations.
Representations are, so to speak, group 
memories of sensations. In the formation of representations, the grouping of sensations 
follows two clearly denned directions. The first direction is according to the 
character 
of the sensations:
thus sensations of yellow colour will be linked with 

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other sensations of yellow colour, sensations of acid taste, with other 
sensations of acid taste. The second direction is according to the 
time of 
receiving the sensation. 
When one group, forming 
one
representation, 
contains different sensations experienced simultaneously, the memory of this 
definite group of sensations is attributed to a common cause. The 'common 
cause' is projected into the external world, as the object; and it is assumed that 
the given representation reflects the real properties of this object. Such a 
group memory constitutes a 
representation, 
as, for instance, the representation 
of a tree -
this tree. 
Into this group enters the green colour of the leaves, their 
smell, their shade, the sound of the wind in the branches, and so on. All these 
things, taken together, form, as it were, the focus of rays emitted by our mind 
and gradually focused on the external object, which may coincide with it 
either badly or well. 
In the further complexities of mental life, memories of representations 
undergo the same process as memories of sensations. In accumulating, 
memories of representations or 'images of representation' become associated 
along the most varied lines, are put together, contrasted, form groups and, in 
the end, give rise to concepts.
Thus, out of the various sensations experienced at different times (in 
groups), there arises in a child the representation of a tree (this tree), and later, 
out of the images of representation of different trees is formed the 
concept of 
a tree,
i.e. not of this particular tree but of a tree in general. 
The formation of concepts leads to the formation of 
words
and the appearance 
of 
speech. 
The rudiments of speech may appear on the lowest level of intelligence, at
the stage of living by sensations; at the stage of living by representations 
speech becomes considerably more complex. But, so long as there are no 
concepts, it will not be 
speech 
in the true sense of the word. 
On the lower levels of intelligence certain sensations may be expressed by
certain sounds. In this way it is possible to transmit general impressions of 
fear, anger, pleasure. These sounds may serve as danger signals, as a 
summoning call, an entreaty, a threat and so on. But one cannot convey much 
by them. 
In the subsequent development of speech, if words or sounds express 
representations,
as in the case of children, it means that a given sound or a 
given word designates only 
this or that