Russia 100811 Basic Political Developments

Chechnya: Divisions in the Ranks

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=120017
Doku Umarov’s attempt to resign has revealed a schism in the leadership of North Caucasus-based insurgency and terrorism networks, but whether he stays or goes will have no long-term impact on the network’s capabilities, Simon Saradzhyan comments for ISN Security Watch.

By Simon Saradzhyan in Moscow and Boston for ISN Security Watch

Two days after the internet release of a video showing the leader of the North Caucasus-based insurgency and terrorism networks, Doku Umarov, querying fellow warlords about his resignation, the self-styled amir of ‘Imarat Kavkaz’ (Emirate “Caucasus”) ordered a new video in which he denied plans to step down.

“In the current situation in the Caucasus I believe it is impossible for me to step down from the post of the amir of Imarat Kavkaz,” Umarov said in a video uploaded on the networks' news portal Kavkaz Center on 3 August. “This statement of mine makes the previous statement void. That previous statement was completely fabricated,” the Chechen warlord claimed, referring to the video of his resignation uploaded two days earlier by the same Kavkaz Center.

That initial 1 August video addressed leaders of networks in the neighboring republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, with Umarov querying the warlords to support his decision to step down and recognize “commander of the Eastern front of the Imarat” Aslanbek Vadalov as their new amir. 

Flanked by this Chechen warlord and an unidentified third man in a forest, Umarov said “we have come to a joint decision today… I am leaving my post” to be replaced by Vadalov, who “is younger… more energetic” and will achieve “different results.”  

Vadalov - whom Umarov had earlier picked as his successor in the event of his death - curtly agreed with Umarov's proposal before giving floor to a third man, who said it was 46-year-old Umarov’s “age and aggravating health that do not allow the amir to continue resistance.” 

Umarov himself didn’t explain why he was resigning, but urged the emirs of Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria to get back to him “urgently” with their opinion on the proposal.

Confusion in the ranks

The appearance of the two videos apparently created confusion in the insurgents’ ranks, with some members posting open letters to Umarov on the Kavkaz Center’s website to “express alarm” over “contradicting statements.” 

Hussein Mailiyev, described as a “plenipotentiary representative of Imarat Kavkaz,” attempted to clarify the situation in a 6 August statement posted by Kavkaz Center. He blamed Movladi Udugov - who controls the news portal - for wrongly publicizing information that had been meant for “internal use only.” Mailiyev said that Udugov had been suspended from his duties as head of the Imarat Kavkaz’s “informational-analytical service” over the incident.

The appearance of two videos clearly illustrates the divisions among the networks’ leaders, regardless of the real reasons behind Umarov’s decision to seek the emirs’ approval for his replacement by Vadalov.

Udugov - who is known to have favored a pan-Caucasian state over a secular Chechnya - may have publicized the first video intentionally in an attempt to prevent the ascent of Vadalov. Vadalov has been seen as more focused on the cause of Chechen independence, and it should come as no surprise that the Chechen separatists’ exiled envoy, Akhmed Zakayev, was quick to praise him as a “non-Wahhabi” and express readiness to work with him as the new “amir.”

Another possibility is that the emirs of Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria were also seeking to prevent the rise of Vadalov, and passed the video to the Kavkaz Center to embarrass Umarov into backtracking on his decision after refusing to support it.

 
That Umarov ordered the disbanding of the foreign representation office of the Imarat Kavkaz in his second video on 3 August also demonstrates disagreement among those fighting on ground and those representing these networks abroad.

Representative inspiration

As importantly, the very fact that Umarov has floated the possibility of resigning for health reasons could be perceived as a sign of increasing weakness by the networks’ supporters both within and outside the North Caucasus. They are still smarting from the recent killing of two senior leaders and the arrest of Umarov’s previous No 2, the emir of Ingushetia, Magas.

Umarov’s ‘retirement’ would diminish the standing of networks fighting in the North Caucasus in the eyes of foreign financiers and other sponsors, and may result in a decrease of  assistance in financing, material support and recruitment.

After all, Umarov is the last well-known warlord who has not only served in the ‘Ichekerian government’ as secretary of the Security Council and  director of the National Security Service when Chechnya was de facto independent, but also fought at commanding positions in both Chechen wars. 

Umarov’s would-be successor, Vadalov, lacks the same legitimacy, scale, influence and connections, although he has gained notoriety in the past few years for the ruthless killings of Chechen police officers.

However, while internal divisions are bound to weaken the insurgency in the short-tem, the replacement of the amir of the Imarat Kavkaz will be largely irrelevant for the North Caucasus-based networks in the longer-term. Such a reshuffle will not have significant impact on these networks’ overall combat capabilities because they operate autonomously to achieve their tactical objectives, while their overarching goal of a pan-Caucasian caliphate represents an inspiring unifying vision rather than a realistic goal.

While remaining in command of his own unit, Umarov has also avoided major operations that required deployment of many dozens of fighters on the scale of the raids on the Ingush city of Nazran and the Kabardin-Balkar capital of Nalchik, which were co-organized by one of his predecessors - Russia’s most notorious terrorist Shamil Basayev.

Instead, Umarov would come out to publicly claim responsibility for actions organized by the leaders of neighboring networks and call for further attacks. He can certainly be replaced in this representational-inspirational role.

From secular to holy war

As importantly, Umarov has already accomplished the task of completing the long process of re-framing the low-intensity conflict fought in the North Caucasus from a secular war fought for Chechnya’s independence to a holy war fought for the establishment of an Islamist state in the North Caucasus.

This process began years before Umarov was appointed ‘president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’ in 2006, but it was Umarov who accelerated it by proclaiming the Imarat Kavkaz and appointing himself its amir. This decision prompted the 'Icherkian parliament' to fire him from the post of the 'president' in 2007, but didn’t halt the re-framing of the conflict.

Regardless of who is in command of the networks, there are a number of key factors that Russian policy-makers need to keep an eye on in addition to trying to address root causes and contributing factors behind the insurgency.

One is the 2014 Olympic Games in the nearby Black Sea resort area of Sochi, which may require these networks to boost their activities if only to prove that they remain a robust and relevant force. And, here, Russian authorities should be closely watching for further signs that the networks are trying to hijack the grievances of the Adygs and their ethnic cousins, who were expelled from the Sochi area during imperial Russia’s conquest of the North Caucasus.

Another factor is the security dynamics in such hotbeds as Afghanistan, Iraq and the greater Middle East. Sustainable improvement of the situation in these hotspots would free jihadists to turn their eyes back to the North Caucasus.

Simon Saradzhyan is a research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. He is the author of several papers on security and terrorism.