Pragmemes and modes of presentation (on professors, teachers, cardinals and popes)

Conclusion
This paper has been a step towards constructing a theory of modes of presentation based on pragmemes. Undoubtedly, I have started to claim that modes of presentation are mandated by rules that are specific to certain (institutional) situations. The next step now would be to propositional attitude reports consider in this kind of logic. But this project has to be postponed for another paper. I believe it would be of theoretical interest to see if belief reports also require certain modes of presentation in specific contexts, as a matter of social conventions. But this would certainly require that the ‘believer’ be associated with a mode of presentation which the situation he is said to believe prescribes. One further step would be to require that a belief report is a report of an utterance through which a subject of belief expressed his belief: in other words that the belief report is constructed in such a way to preserve the features of the utterance though which belief was vocalized.

It is interesting to note that the recent literature on belief reports (e.g. Devitt) stresses the connection between belief reports that use modes of presentation recognizable by the hearer (instead of the original modes of presentation which would be used by the subject of the belief reported) and a theory of action. Belief reports (assuming that (authoritative) beliefs can be taken to guide one’s conduct) are subordinated to modifying the hearer’s beliefs and to lead him towards a certain conduct. If the beliefs reported allow us to have a certain picture of reality which otherwise we would not have, then it may be licit to use modes of presentations (as embedded in belief verbs) that allow the hearer to recognize a certain referent, rather than the mode of presentation actually used in the utterance of the subject whose belief is reported.

I believe, therefore, that this paper correctly makes the connection between the use of modes of presentation and the actions which are to be carried out. This issue, however, needs to be deepened further, as I am afraid that the philosopher of mind may retort to the philosopher of action by saying that, after all, having beliefs may lead the subject of the belief towards a certain line of conduct and thus, in order to explain that conduct, it would be necessary to report his beliefs with exactly those modes of presentations under which a certain referent presented itself to him.

Suppose that John looks at himself in the mirror and sees a man who walks furtively in the house. John does not recognize himself as say ‘John Woodchuck’. Therefore, he does not believe that John Woodchuck is about to steal from his house, but he believes that a man who behaves furtively is about to steal from the house. John, decides to embark on a certain course of action, and to shoot at the stranger. Certainly, he does not believe that he is about to shoot at himself. If he knew that the man he sees is John Woodchuck, he would never take the decision to act in such a manner.

I have shown that the issue cannot be decided easily. Yet, this kind of discussion has to be postponed fro another deeper paper.