People-focused knowledge management

Metastrategic Knowing
about Strategies to Address
Task Goals
Metatask Knowing
about
Task Goals
Metacognitive Knowing
Metaknowledge about
Declarative knowing
Procedural Metaknowledge
“Know How”
Knowing Strategies for How to Proceed
Declarative Metaknowledge
“Know What”
Knowing What Is Known
General Principles
Understanding Case
Gestalt
Schemata
Critical Thinking
Strategies
Scripts
Risk Evaluation
Methodologies
Operational Models
Calculating Risks
and Impacts
Routines / Rote Actions
Obtaining Facts
Completing Forms
General Principles
Understanding 
Business Risks
Schemata
Conceptualizing
Situation
Scripts
Underwriting
Procedures
Operational Models
Evaluating Risks
and Impacts
Routines / Rote Actions
Obtaining Facts
Completing Forms
General Principles
Social Conduct
Business Operations
Schemata
Identifying
Out-of-Scope Challenges
Scripts
Selecting Methods for
Seeking Assistance
Operational Models
Collaborating &
Incorporating Advice
Routines / Rote Actions
Accessing Expert
Network
General Principles
Understanding
Society & Environment
Schemata
Understanding World
Role of Underwriting
Scripts
Relating Case to Its
Societal Context
Operational Models
Identifying Public
Information Sources
Routines / Rote Actions
Accessing Public
Agencies
Metacognition
Metaknowledge
Topic Knowledge
Methodology Domain
Topic Knowledge
Work Domain
Topic Knowledge
Enterprise Nevigation
Topic Knowledge
World Understanding
Working Knowledge
Working Knowledge
Working Knowledge
Figure 3-10
A model of knowledge at different levels of abstraction, with selected examples from insurance underwriting,
and indicating the knowledge domains for methodology, primary work, enterprise navigation, and world
understanding. Copyright © 2000 Knowledge Research Institute, Inc. Reproduced with permission.

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Actions Are Initiated by Knowledgeable People
85
of routines, scripts, and schemas to deal with the world. When a
person repeatedly observes similar situations, such as the behavior of
authority figures, the mental models of such situations are reinforced,
and, very importantly, associations are constantly strengthened
between the mental models of these situations and the responses that
are observed as being typical. The mental models become mental ref-
erence models.
As we become more familiar with particular behaviors after
repeated exposures, we find them to be more acceptable — even per-
missible and desirable — as responses to situation types in whose
contexts they have been observed. Examples include how a store
clerk deals with an angry customer, how an office worker chooses to
participate in office gossip, how a loan officer handles a personal 
loan application with credit problems, and so on. The more familiar
we are with a situation type (i.e., the stronger our associations are),
the more automatic is our response. When associations are very
strong, we tend to react without reflection. When a person meets with
any situation, he relies on his library of mental reference models to
interpret the situation and decide how to handle it. We hypothesize
that the selection of the mental models that guide the situation is
based primarily on the strength of associations; that is, the number
and intensity of exposures to similar situations, real or fictitious.
However, as may be apparent from earlier discussions, the 
situation-at-hand will be different in some respect from any previous
situation, and therefore the mental reference models need to be mod-
ified, primarily by conceptual blending.
On Mental Models
Kenneth Craik (1943) suggested that the mind constructs “small-
scale models” (mental models) of reality that it uses to anticipate
events. It has since become evident that such mental models are also
used to generate decisions and actions. People construct mental
models from what they perceive or imagine or from readings and
communications with people. Mental models may be visual images
or abstract representations of situations. We use the broader repre-
sentation of “mental models” to mean representations in the mind
of situations, events, etc., that have been experienced or are learned
from other sources. These are real mental models. We also include
mental models that result from thought experiments and self-
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86
People-Focused Knowledge Management
imagined situations. These are imaginary mental models, and may 
be untrue.
Mental model structures may be analogous to the structure of the
situations that they represent, unlike, say, the abstract structure of
logical equations used in formal rule theories. Many recent studies
present experimental evidence that corroborates the predictions of
the mental model theory of reasoning, while others suggest revisions
and modifications to some of the theory’s tenets to accommodate new
data. Critics of the model theory include proponents of alternative
theories such as deduction based on inference rules. The controversy
about whether people reason by relying on models or on inference
rules has led to better experiments and to developments of the mental
model theory of thinking and reasoning in novel domains.