From Third World to First The Singapore Story pdfdrive com

Britannia
cast off its moorings to carry

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the last governor away. Patten had filled the last five years of British rule with
acrimony. He had derailed the “through train” the Chinese had agreed to
whereby the Legco elected in 1995 would have continued beyond reunification
in 1997, and left behind a legislature with a less liberal set of rules for elections
than if he had not unilaterally changed them.
As they took charge on 1 July 1997, Chief Executive Tung and his top
officials ran into the East Asian financial crisis, although they did not know this
until 1998. Thailand devalued its baht on 2 July, triggering off a rot that spread
through the region, on to Russia, and then Brazil. The Hong Kong dollar’s peg to
the US dollar forced Hong Kong to increase its interest rates. That brought down
property, share and all asset prices, causing a recession and unemployment.
Dissatisfaction with the government increased. The expectations of Hong Kong
people had changed. Under a foreign, colonial government they expected
nothing but protection from the Chinese communists. Under a Chinese
government of Hong Kongers, they expected much more. Hong Kong suffered
from chicken flu, a rare virus that particularly threatened old people and young
children. A million birds had to be killed; their owners demanded compensation
and got it. When red algae destroyed the stock of fish farmers, they too
demanded and were given compensation. Then an investment house went
bankrupt; investors who had deposited their share scrips with it were
compensated.
In Hong Kong for a conference in June 1999, I met many troubled people,
including some old friends and several new acquaintances. They analysed their
problems with clarity but could not see the solutions. They recounted that at the
tail end of empire, the British had relaxed their governance of Hong Kong.
Rather than arouse protests and confrontations by implementing unpopular
policies, they gave in to pressure groups, such as taxi drivers who had threatened
a strike when the government wanted to phase out diesel for taxis to cut down
pollution. Pressure groups have learnt to counter and abort hard policies by
mounting protests. Now with Hong Kong a part of China, their chief executive
had no political strength to counter such action. Unlike the British governors,
who took support from their legislative council (Legco) for granted, Tung faced
legislative councillors, none of whom felt any obligation to support his policies.
His civil service secretaries had no electoral mandate to back their views when
challenged by the elected members in Legco.

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Patten’s attempt to strengthen the democratically elected legislative council
failed. The Legco that was elected when Hong Kong was still under colonial rule
was dissolved. There are deep divisions within the educated elite on how to go
forward and make the present system work. The old system the British ran had
been weakened and cannot cope with the new political situation. On one side are
the pragmatists, businessmen and professionals who wanted to have a working
relationship with the government in Beijing and were bitterly opposed to
Patten’s policies. On the other side are the academics, media-men and
professionals who wanted to build up as strong a constitutional defence against
any heavy hand from Beijing as possible and, by garnering international support
especially from the United States, put pressure on China not to interfere in the
affairs of the SAR. The pragmatists were not prepared to enter the political fray
themselves, relying instead upon politicians in whom they had little confidence
to stand up for them against Beijing. It was an unhappy situation. Few were
prepared to come out and lead. To do so would mean having to face the reality
that Hong Kong’s interests can be advanced only if its leaders can win the
confidence of the leaders in Beijing.
Hong Kong people will have to reconcile the competing sectional interests –
employers like Li Ka Shing versus politicians playing for union and workers’
votes, professionals and managers versus lower-paid white-collar workers – over
who pays what taxes and who gets what subsidies for health, housing and
education. After balancing their competing sectional interests, they face the more
difficult part, to define their basic collective interests and fight for them, not as a
separate independent state, but as a Special Administrative Region in China.
This task is made doubly difficult because people in Hong Kong do not identify
themselves as Chinese. Those born on the mainland tell pollsters that they are
Hong Kong Chinese, those born in the colony call themselves Hong Kong
people. When the SAR government proposed that the Chinese national flag be
raised and the national anthem sung daily at all schools, 85 per cent of parents
opposed it. On the other hand, the tenth anniversary of Tiananmen drew some
50,000 people to a candlelight vigil. I suspect they were fearful more for what
could happen to them in Hong Kong than a repeat of what took place at
Tiananmen. In contrast, when the Chinese in China protested with outrage at the
bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in 1999, only a handful of Hong Kongers
put on a token demonstration outside the US consulate.
One controversial decision Tung made was to seek the help of the National
People’s Congress (NPC) to overturn a judgement of Hong Kong’s court of final

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appeal. A provision in the Basic Law gave the right of entry and abode in the
territory to children born in China to Hong Kong residents. The court held that
children, including illegitimate ones, of Hong Kong residents and the offspring
of a mainland parent who only subsequently acquired permanent residence in
Hong Kong had this right of abode. The people of Hong Kong were alarmed
when the government disclosed that over one and a half million people would
eventually be entitled to enter Hong Kong.
In March 1999 the secretary for justice sought an interpretation of this
provision of the Basic Law from the NPC standing committee in Beijing. The
standing committee limited the right of abode to children of at least one parent
who was a Hong Kong resident at the time of birth. The legal fraternity, the
academics and the media were critical, fearing that the government had created a
precedent for the NPC to interfere in their judicial process. But most people
supported the government’s move and were not interested in legal niceties.
On 21 October 1999, at the 4th anniversary lecture of the Hong Kong Policy
Research Institute, a think-tank that does some work for the SAR government, I
spoke of the problems of transition that had proved more difficult than anyone
had expected. Hong Kong had been taken through a crash course on democracy
and human rights by Governor Patten, supported by the US and UK media. The
aim was to etch in the minds of the people the principles of freedom of
expression – especially of the press, popular elections with the widest franchise,
a bill of rights to protect fundamental liberties, the rule of law and independence
of the judiciary – and to hand over to China an irreversibly democratic-minded
Hong Kong. This led many in Hong Kong to assume that the economy would
look after itself, that if they protected democracy and human rights, all would be
well. It turned out otherwise.
Like every other country, Hong Kong people found their primary need to be
their survival and wellbeing. People felt frustrated that the old system, where
everybody worked hard for himself and nearly everybody succeeded, was no
longer working. But there could be no return to the old system. Expectations and
attitudes had changed. They had to move forward. As long as electoral politics
was responsibility-free, their Legco was a chamber for political posturing to win
votes in the next elections. The promises of their political leaders would never be
tested because they did not have the responsibility to deliver on their pledges.
There were two ways forward. First, their legislators could become more

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realistic and work within the framework of a Special Administrative Region
which was a part of China, and signal their acceptance of China’s overriding
national interests; in that case Beijing would probably allow a majority party to
assume power after 2007 when the constitution would be reviewed. Or second,
by a process of attrition, Beijing would wear down the recalcitrant politicians.
Hong Kong people had up to 2007 to decide which way to go. The Hong Kong
of old was history. Its future depended upon how its people acted to promote
their group interests.
In one hour of questions and answers, I stated the obvious to the audience at
the international convention centre, 1,200 of Hong Kong’s political, business
and media elite, that if Hong Kong became just another Chinese city, it was of
no value to China. What made Hong Kong useful to China were its strong
institutions, management expertise, sophisticated financial markets, the rule of
law, the transparency of legislation and regulations, a level playing field for all,
plus a cosmopolitan lifestyle with English as the language of business. These
made Hong Kong different. Hong Kong faced two contrary pulls. To be useful to
China, it must learn to work with Chinese officials and understand their different
social, economic and political systems and mindsets. But it must never allow
those attitudes to affect Hong Kong for otherwise it would become just another
Chinese city. It had to retain the characteristics that made it an indispensable
intermediary between China and the world, as during British rule.
I expected much media criticism for stating hard facts. The response of the
audience was warm; that of the media the next day was mild. Their reports
caused professional groups to reflect on the choices they faced. They were in a
situation completely different from the one Chris Patten had envisaged. The
heavy hand of China was nowhere in evidence, but the heavy heart of the people
of Hong Kong had immobilised them from moving ahead to define and work
towards goals that were practical and achievable in their new circumstances.
When British officials governed them Hong Kong people did not have to act
cohesively as a community. They were great individualists and daring
entrepreneurs, willing to take high risks to earn big rewards for themselves and
their families. Now they are faced with serious alternatives for their future; they
must make these choices together as a special sub-group of the Chinese nation.
For the present, between the aspirations of the people of Hong Kong, who
want more democracy to protect their comfortable, prosperous way of life, and
the expectations of China’s leaders, who want a Hong Kong that will be useful
and mischief-free, there is a wide and deep gap. Over the next 47 years both

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sides must move towards each other and converge. It may not be as difficult as
Hong Kong people now fear. It will be two more generations before they meet in
one country, one system. If the changes that have taken place in the one
generation since Chairman Mao died continue at the same pace, the convergence
should not be too uncomfortable.

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