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1. Zavtru 28 (June 1996).
2. What Russia Wants in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 24, 1995.
Turkmenistan, for much the same reason, has been actively exploring the construction of a new pipeline
through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea, in addition to the energetic construction of new rail links
with Kazakstan and Uzbekistan to the north and with Iran and Afghanistan to the south. Very preliminary and
exploratory talks have also been held among the Kazaks, the Chinese, and the Japanese regarding an ambitious
pipeline project that would stretch from Central Asia to the China Sea (see map on page 146). With long-term
Western oil and gas investment commitments in Azerbaijan reaching some $13 billion and in Kazakstan going
well over $20 billion (1996 figures), the economic and political isolation of this area is clearly breaking down
in the face of global economic pressures and limited Russian financial options.
Fear of Russia has also had the effect of
driving the Central Asian states into greater
regional cooperation. The initially dormant
Central Asian Economic Union, formed in
January 1993, has been gradually activated.
Even President Nursultan Nazarbayev of
Kazakstan, at first an articulate advocate of
a new "Eurasian Union," gradually became
a convert to ideas of closer Central Asian
cooperation,
increased
military
collaboration among the region's states,
support for Azerbaijan's efforts to channel
Caspian Sea and Kazak oil through Turkey,
and joint opposition to Russian and Iranian
efforts to prevent the sectoral division of the
Caspian Sea's continental shelf and mineral
resources among the coastal states.
Given the fact that the governments in
the area tend to be highly authoritarian, perhaps even more important has been the personal reconciliation
among the principal leaders. It was common knowledge that the presidents of Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and
Turkmenistan were not particularly fond of one another (which they made eminently plain to foreign visitors),
and that personal antagonism initially made it easier for the Kremlin to play off one against the other. By the
mid-1990s, the three had come to realize that closer cooperation among them was essential to the preservation
of their new sovereignty, and they began to engage in highly publicized displays of their allegedly close
relations, stressing that henceforth they would coordinate their foreign policies.
But more important still has been the emergence within the CIS of an informal coalition, led by Ukraine and
Uzbekistan, dedicated to the idea of a "cooperative," but not "integrated," commonwealth. Toward this end,
Ukraine has signed agreements on military cooperation with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Georgia; and in
September 1996, the foreign ministers of Ukraine and Uzbekistan even engaged in the highly symbolic act of
issuing a declaration, demanding that henceforth CIS summits not be chaired by Russia's president but that the
chairmanship be rotated.
The example set by Ukraine and Uzbekistan has had an impact even on the leaders who have been more
deferential to Moscow's central concerns. The Kremlin must have been especially disturbed to hear Kazakstan's
Nursultan Nazarbayev and Georgia's Eduard Shevardnadze declare in September 1996 that they would leave
the CIS "if our independence is threatened." More generally, as a counter to the CIS, the Central Asian states
and Azerbaijan stepped up their level of activity in the Organization of Economic Cooperation, a still relatively
loose association of the region's Islamic states—including Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan—dedicated to the
enhancement of financial, economic, and transportation links among its members. Moscow has been publicly
critical of these initiatives, viewing them, quite correctly, as diluting the pertinent states' membership in the
CIS.
In a similar vein, there has been steady enhancement of ties with Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Iran. The
Turkic-speaking countries have eagerly accepted Turkey's offers of military training for the new national
officer corps and the laying down of the Turkish welcome mat for some ten thousand students. The fourth
summit meeting of the Turkic-speaking countries, held in Tashkent in October 1996 and prepared with Turkish
backing, focused heavily on the enhancement of transportation links, on increased trade, and also on common
educational standards as well as closer cultural cooperation with Turkey. Both Turkey and Iran have been
particularly active in assisting the new states with their television programming, thereby directly influencing
large audiences.
A ceremony in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakstan, in December 199(1 was particularly symbolic of Turkey's
identification with the independence of the region's states. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of
Kazakstan's independence, the Turkish president, Suleyman Demirel, stood at the side of President Nazarbayev
at the unveiling of a gold-colored column twenty-eight meters high, crowned with a legendary Kazak/Turkic
warrior's figure atop a griffinlike creature. At the event, Kazakstan hailed Turkey for "standing by Kazakstan at
every step of its development as an independent state," and the Turks reciprocated by granting Kazakstan a
credit line of $300 million, beyond existing private Turkish investment of about $1.2 billion.
While neither Turkey nor Iran has the means to exclude Russia from regional influence, Turkey and (more
narrowly) Iran have thus been reinforcing the will and the capacity of the new states to resist reintegration with
their northern neighbor and former master. And that certainly helps to keep the region's geopolitical future
open.
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