111
N O N E X P E C T E D - U T I L I T Y T H E O R Y
P
3
$) while placing a higher value on the $-bet—i.e., M($)
.
M(P).
10
This is the
so called
preference reversal phenomenon
first observed by psychologists Sarah
Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic (1971) and Harold Lindman (1971). It presents a
puzzle for economics because, viewed from the standard theoretical perspective,
both tasks constitute ways of asking essentially the same question, that is, “which
of these two prospects do you prefer?” In these experiments, however, the order-
ing revealed appears to depend upon the elicitation procedure.
One explanation for preference reversal suggests that choice and valuation
tasks may invoke different mental processes that in turn generate different order-
ings of a given pair of prospects (see Slovic 1995). Consequently, the rankings
observed in choice and valuation tasks cannot be explained with reference to a
single
preference ordering. An alternative interpretation explains preference re-
versal as a failure of transitivity (see Loomes and Sugden 1983): assuming that
the valuation task reveals true monetary valuations, (i.e., M($)
|
$; M(P)
|
P),
preference reversal implies P
s
$
|
M($)
s
M(P)
|
P; which involves a violation
of transitivity (assuming that more money is preferred to less). Although attempts
have been made to explain the evidence in ways that preserve conventional
assumptions—see, for example, Holt (1986); Karni and Safra (1987); Segal
(1988)—the weight of evidence suggests that failures of transitivity and proce-
dure invariance both contribute to the phenomenon (Loomes, Moffat, and Sugden
1998; Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman 1990).
There is also widespread evidence that very minor changes in the presentation
or “framing” of prospects can have dramatic impacts upon the choices of decision
makers: such effects are failures of description invariance. Here is one famous ex-
ample by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in which two groups of subjects—call
them groups I and II—were presented with the following cover story:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs
are as follows:
Each group then faced a choice between two policy options:
Options Presented to Group I:
If program A is adopted, 200 people will
be saved
If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3
probability that 600 people will be
saved, and a 2/3 probability that no
people will be saved.
Options Presented to Group II:
If program C is adopted, 400 people will
die.
If program D is adopted, there is a 1/3
probability that nobody will die, and a
2/3 probability that 600 people will
die.
10
Reviews of this evidence are contained in Tversky and Thaler (1990), Hausman (1992), and
Tammi (1997).
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