Beyond the democratic state: anti-authoritarian interventions in democratic theory

Mouffe and Agonal Democracy
Whereas Rawls and Habermas see in difference a threat to democracy, Mouffe sees their 
proposed solution to difference – consensus or unanimity – as the real problem. “To negate the 
ineradicable character of antagonism and to aim at a universal rational consensus – this is the real 
threat to democracy” (Mouffe 2000, 22).
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The condition of pluralism is the very condition of 
democracy, so efforts to suppress that difference are, at their core, anti-democratic. For Mouffe 
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This is not the only central difference between these thinkers, of course. For instance, whereas, Habermas sees 
liberalism and democracy as mutually constitutive, Mouffe sees them as fundamentally in tension.

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(2000, 15-16) we must accept that “conflict and division are inherent to politics and that there is 
no place where reconciliation could be definitely achieved as the full actualization of the unity of 
‘the people.’” The challenge for democratic politics then is 
not
to find the right procedure – 
whether that be “public reason” or “communicative action” – for achieving consensus. Instead, 
democratic politics should be aimed at enabling and fostering contestation over competing values 
and competing interpretations of those values. Though Mouffe argues that “antagonism” is 
basically “ineradicable,” she contends that the aim of democratic politics is to transform it.
While antagonism occurs between enemies, agonism occurs between adversaries – though we 
disagree with adversaries we recognize their right to defend their views. The aim of Mouffe’s 
vision, therefore, is to enable conflict, but transform conflict from antagonism to agonism (
ibid
. 
102-103).
While agonal democrats like Mouffe do 
valorize
conflict as a necessary element of 
democratic politics, I think, they are wrongly viewed as
 glorifying
conflict. It is not that conflict 
is the highest aim of democratic politics, but rather that in the context of pluralism it is 
unavoidable and, hence democratically necessary. “In a democratic polity, conflicts and 
confrontations, far from being a sign of imperfection, indicate that democracy is alive and 
inhabited by pluralism” (Mouffe 2000, 34). Attempts to permanently resolve such disagreements 
through the achievement of consensus do not constitute the pinnacle of democracy, but its 
annulment. They are a flight from democratic politics, as such. 
What is misguided is the search for a final rational resolution…Such a search 
should be recognized for what it really is, another attempt at insulating politics 
from the effects of the pluralism of value…Democratic theory should renounce 
those forms of escapism and face the challenge that the recognition of the 
pluralism of values entails” (Mouffe 93). 

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More fundamentally, and in a way, I take this as Mouffe’s central point, attempts to reach 
consensus in a pluralistic world are, fundamentally, exercises of power. Perhaps as a result of 
their emphasis on process and procedure, what deliberative democrats miss, or at least under-
theorize, is “the moment of ‘decision’” (Mouffe 2000, 130). Deliberative democrats “are unable 
to recognize that bringing a deliberation to a close always results from a 
decision
which excludes 
other possibilities” (Mouffe 2000, 105). For Mouffe, we should acknowledge the “moment of 
decision” for what it is: an expression of power.
Consensus in a liberal-democratic society is – and will always be – the expression 
of hegemony and the crystallization of power relations…To deny the existence of 
such a moment of closure, or to present [it] as dictated by rationality or morality, 
is to naturalize what should be perceived as a contingent and temporary” 
hegemony (Mouffe 2000, 49).
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It is not that Mouffe thinks we should avoid, resist or put off the “moment of decision,” for this 
is an essential part of politics. Thus, it is a mistake to view Mouffe’s agonal democracy as 
simply an argument for perpetual contestation. Rather, she pays more attention to the “moment 
of decision” – the culminating act of governance – than deliberative democrats do. What she 
argues is that these moments, the very products of governance, always “entail an element of 
force and violence that can never be eliminated” (
ibid
. 130). At some point a decision has to be 
reached, and since consensus is an empirical (for Habermasians) or conceptual (for Mouffe) 
impossibility, a decision will be taken without consensus. Thus, there is no possibility of 
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Mouffe’s view that any consensus or decision is a mere “expression of hegemony and the crystallization of power 
relations” leaves her open to the criticism that she offers no standard for evaluating whether certain instances of 
consensus – or certain power relations – are better than others. Benhabib (1996, 78), for example, says: “I think it is 
fair to ask whether the radical democratic theories [including that elaborated by Mouffe]…allow for a coherent 
theory of rights such as would protect both basic rights and liberties for all, and defend minority rights against the 
tyranny of the majority.” Because Mouffe emphasizes the contingency of existing political arrangements – and that 
such arrangements are little more than manifestations of power relations – Benhabib contends that it cannot defend a 
system of rights, which liberal and deliberative democrats see as enabling the very contestation Mouffe valorizes.
Agonal democracy is a highly unstable form and perhaps contains within it the seeds of its own destruction insofar 
as it does not offer a standard for excluding forms of pluralism that are anti-pluralistic, or forms of contention that 
seeks to eradicate future contention. 

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achieving a non-coercive consensus. Agreement, from this angle, is an act of violence. Though 
expressed in a somewhat different way, Maeckelbergh (2009, 32) argues that it is precisely this 
concern that motivates the alter-globalization movement to resist state-centric forms of 
democracy: 
[A]s long as democracy is defined as a system of majority rule it necessarily 
requires an apparatus of coercive force…This relationship between democracy 
and violence is part of what leads many movement actors to question the 
desirability of democracy and to insist… [on] a radically different form.
The rejection of the ideal consensus or agreement – regardless of the procedures for 
attaining it – does not spell the end of democracy, though, for either Mouffe or alter-
globalization movement activists. Rather it points us toward a democracy not oriented toward 
consensus. For Mouffe, this means an orientation toward contestation– an impetus to question 
the existing consensus and problematize them as moments of closure. Surely, alter-globalization 
movements and many other social movements, as well, agree on this point. However, I think 
movement practices suggest that they want to do more than that. Not only do they contest 
existing decisions, but they also strive to develop models of decision-making that minimize, if 
not avoid entirely, the coercion and violence that the politics of consensus entails.
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In other 
words, I would like to argue that social movements – through the practice of networked 
organization – reformulate what the “moment of decision” itself looks like. What if the 
“moment of decision” could incorporate different decisions, specifically, decisions to act 
differently? Rather than thinking about decision as necessarily involving agreement, consensus 
and unanimity, networks enable people to act together, while acting differently. 
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Though, as we shall see, some contemporary social movements have remained wedded to consensus through the 
model of the “general assembly.” I will argue later in the chapter that this is the wrong move and that movement 
actors should find ways of implementing a networked form of organization, even when sharing a common space. 

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If Rawls and Habermas suppress difference in order to govern, and Mouffe enables 
differences but does not offer a more liberatory model of governing, my aim is to find something 
of a middle ground between these two approaches – or, perhaps, a radical alternative to them.
On the one hand, I want to take difference and pluralism as a given and see the conflict that such 
facts generate as an unavoidable component of democracy; in short, I agree with Mouffe, that 
consensus is an impossibility in a democratic context. On the other hand, I do not want to 
abandon the task of governance or fail to distinguish between better and worse “moments of 
decision,” since they are all necessarily mere functions of power. Rather, I argue that social 
movement actors develop and employ practices that help individuals and groups work together 
despite their differences – to simultaneously cooperate and act while “resisting unity through 
networks” (Maeckelberg 2009, 188). In this way, I hope to show that networks avoid the 
problems associated with both Rawls and Habermas, i.e. the way both seek to suppress 
difference. They neither exclude persons from participation at the outset – indeed, the 
boundaries of the networked are blurry and fluid, perhaps even to a fault – nor do they require a 
consensus or even agreement as an end product. At the same time, networks offer a more 
liberatory way of thinking about “the moment of decision” and challenge of self-governance 
insofar as they make it possible for people to act together, while retaining their differences. We 
can, therefore, avoid the conclusion that consensus is necessary in order to coordinate, or that 
agreement is necessary in order to act together. Networks offer a model of self-governance 
appropriate for contexts characterized by difference, diversity, and pluralism.