Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

 
Figure 10.
 
1947 United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine
273
 
F. CONCLUSION 
Despite the British forces’ failed effort to defeat the Jewish militias in the years 
immediately preceding Israeli independence, the military strategy of engaging local 
militia forces to work in conjunction with the occupying military between 1936 and 1945 
ultimately produced security forces to which British forces could hand responsibility for 
local and national security. This allowed the occupying military to reduce its footprint as 
the local militia forces gain in strength and responsibility. The Balfour Declaration 
committed the British government to a Jewish homeland in Palestine, which tended to 
reinforce the tactical strategy of engagement toward Jewish militias by the British 
military, at least until the de facto rejection of the principles of the Balfour Declaration by 
the Labour government in 1945. Nevertheless, the relationship between the British 
273
"Maps - Palestine & Jerusalem," The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International 
Affairs, http://www.passia.org/maps.htm (accessed January 4, 2008). 

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military and the militias was always complex. Despite its refusal to recognize the 
Haganah officially, the British military realized its importance in providing security to 
the Jewish community; something that the British military was not always able to 
achieve. Therefore, the description of the Haganah as “a semi-illegal underground militia 
with a limited operational spectrum and organizational structure” was vague enough for 
the British military to employ the Haganah when they were overwhelmed 
and
to call for 
its dissolution when it was no longer needed.
274
Thus, Haganah did not emerge as a 
capable, disciplined, fighting force because of overwhelming support from the British 
occupation forces. Rather, it was to the advantage of British military strategies of 
acceptance and engagement employed by the British military to make itself into such a 
force. As a result, the Jewish militias were able to force the withdrawal of British forces 
and
establish a legitimate national defense force based on its long term strategy of 
community protection. On the other hand, the Labour Party government’s decision to 
abandon engagement with militias and instead seek their defeat required it to increase 
troop levels to quell the rising levels of instability, which ultimately led to the decision to 
relinquish authority of Palestine to the United Nations. The United Nations then reversed 
course, endorsing the use of militias as a legitimate security force. The transformation of 
the Haganah into the Israeli Defense Force clearly shows that militias can evolve into a 
functional state security apparatus, under the right circumstances. 
274
David Tal, “Between Intuition and Professionalism: Israeli Military Leadership during the 1948 
Palestine War,”
 The Journal of Military History 
68.3 (2004): 888. 

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