Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

C. 
STRATEGIES OF ENGAGEMENT 
During the occupation the British initially adopted a strategy of engagement vis-à-
vis Jewish militias. The following section will examine three periods of cooperation with 
the Haganah and assess the effects of engagement on stability. The first period deals 
with the recognition and endorsement of Jewish militias as a legitimate security apparatus 
during the Arab insurgency of 1936 to 1939. The groups that were that were established 
and supported by the British military were known as the Jewish Settlement Police and 
Special Night Squads and staffed by members of the Haganah during this time period.
The next section examines the effects of Britain’s strategy of engagement with the 
Haganah and their endorsement of a special Jewish military unit known as the Palmach, 
which was created to reinforce the British military against the threat of invasion during 
World War II. The last section examines a strategy of cooperation between the British 
military and Haganah in reducing the threat of violence in the period after the 
assassination of Lord Moyne in 1944. 
1. 
Insurgency of 1936-1939 
From 1936 to 1939 the Palestinian Arab population began to violently resist and 
demonstrate against the occupying British military and Yishuv (Jewish community) and 
against the continuing immigration of Jews into Palestine. The resistance “consisted of a 
strike including withholding of taxes, of acts of sabotage against British forces, 
assassination of British officials, murder of Jewish civilians and murder of other 
Arabs.”
224
In response, the British engaged the Haganah militia to maintain local 
security. An official local security force known as the Jewish Settlement Police (JSP) 
224
“Arab Revolt in Palestine,” in Zionism and Israel Information Center [database online]. October 
16, 2007 [cited 2007]. Available from http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/Arab_Revolt.htm. John and 
Hadawi, 
The Palestine Diary, 1914-1945
, 253-254, 256. On November 25, 1935, Arab leaders presented 
four demands to the occupying British government (High Commissioner). First, they wanted to establish a 
democratic government that would maintain a Palestinian Arab majority. Second, prevent future transfer 
and sale of Arab lands to Jews. Third, was to immediately halting Jewish immigration until a committee 
could determine the “absorptive capacity”. Additionally, implement legislation to carry identification cards 
for everyone considered a lawful resident. Lastly was the importance of placing increased investigative 
emphasis on illegal immigration. However, by January 1936, the British government in London rejected 
the Palestinian Arab requests and recognized the right for the Jewish community to “make use of all the 
opportunities” at their disposal. 

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was established, and trained in techniques of low intensity conflict and counterinsurgency 
warfare. Since the Haganah were still technically viewed by the British occupation as 
illegal, establishment of the JSP enabled the British to legally acknowledge the Haganah 
as local protectorates for Jewish communities The Haganah used the JSP as an informal 
academy, training over thirteen thousand members between 1936 and 1945, when the JSP 
was dissolved. The British provided the JSP with a multitude of supplies including 
weapons, uniforms, and vehicles, and authorized it to control “land around Jewish 
villages.”
225
This engagement facilitated the transformation of Haganah from a local 
defense force to a capable offensive force. The Jewish Settlement Police were used to 
conduct mobile and surprise attacks against insurgents in conjunction with the British 
military.
226
The JSP ranks swelled to over 16,000 by 1940, and were critical in 
augmenting British security forces while increasing security and stability in Jewish 
communities.
227
The policy of co-opting Jewish militias to assume a greater role in performing 
local security functions was not accepted by everyone in the British military. Many 
Senior British military officers such as General Archibald Wavell, the commanding 
general in Palestine were well versed in conventional military tactics that were developed 
on the linear battlefields of World War I. However, few senior officers were prepared for 
the complexities of military occupation in Palestine. Part of these complexities involved 
the integration and cooperation with Jewish militias who were providing much needed 
security to their settlements. The British security forces in Palestine were far to stretched 
out to provide legitimate protection to their inhabitants. Yet, they had been unwilling to 
cooperate and share the burden of security with non-British forces, Jewish militias in