Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

 

---

211 
consider 
all 
his relevant beliefs. Rather, he considered only his beliefs about slavery 
and property.
What should we make of this interpretation of inverse-akrasia when considering 
MB? The first relatively uncontroversial points are that a) we are not perfect 
deliberators, sometimes failing to consider all the moral reasons we have for action, 
b) that sometimes we act against our better judgement and c) that sometimes acting 
against our better judgement is conducive to the good. That is not much of a 
surprise. The more important point here is that although akratic action may be 
irrational in the sense of acting against one’s best judgement, it does not mean that 
it is ‘bizarre’ in the sense of lack of responsiveness to any reasons. Akratic action, 
even though irrational overall, may be 
more or less
irrational depending on what set 
of reasons it is based on. We could simply wave away the issue since the action is 
involuntary, but I think that this would be missing something important. Even when 
we act akratically and fail to consider all the relevant reasons, it 
does
make a 
difference whether or not we act on the basis of attitudes, emotions and beliefs that 
are part of and consistent with our world view.
The difference in ethical significance is twofold. Firstly, given that we regularly act 
akratically (for support of this claim see 8.3.6.), it is better from the point of view of 
moral agency that those akratic actions are at least partially justified within what the 
agent finds important and valuable and has some actual connection to the moral 
reasons that the agent would endorse. This is why it makes a difference whether 
Huck’s akratic actions stem from reasons related to the value of friendship, keeping 
promises and loyalty (a moral stance) or Huck’s good act is motivated by reasons 
altogether non-moral (e.g., Jim is a good fisherman and Huck is hungry) or 
unendorsed considerations (e.g., Huck thinks friendship, loyalty and keeping 
promises is for moral weaklings and true morality consists of moral egoism 
unpolluted by attachment to any particular individuals). Secondly, although whether 
or not akratic acts are connected to moral reasons the agent has might not make a 
moral difference in that particular instance – insofar as the agent is acting 
akratically anyway – it 
is
important for the development of moral agency that the 
akratic actions are more, rather than less integrated with our world view. We remain 
imperfect moral agents, and the process of developing appropriate and endorsed 

---

212 
emotional responses, flexible control of those responses and doing so with 
reference to moral reasons is, well, a process. However, we know we are further 
from the goal when our acts are based on desires and inclinations that we in no way 
endorse from the moral perspective and which go against the moral reasons we find 
compelling.
I do not intend to suggest that akratic action constitutes the ideal moral agency we 
want to seek or promote. It further diminishes moral agency, and especially moral 
development, however, to more often act akratically on desires which we do not 
endorse and which give very little compelling (to us) reasons for action. 
Compulsory moral MB as proposed by Persson and Savulescu (2008), in contrast to 
voluntary agent-led MB, widens the gap between the ‘motivational pulls’ and the 
reasons we have 
even in the
akratic
. In doing so, it puts the agent further away not 
only from continent action, but also from virtue. By contrast, there is lesser 
prima 
facie
danger of this kind from voluntary and agent-led biomedical modifications.