117 Concluding remarks
different domains, the appropriate knowledge can be extracted from these strategies
(and others), and used to recommend an increasingly consolidated viewpoint. The
applicable gaps and overlaps would help to provide efficient and integrated solutions
(be they regulatory, technical, ethical, legal or societal) to existing threats and could
also help to anticipate (and therefore prevent) future ones.
CONCLUDING REMARKS This chapter has reviewed a number of examples of cyber-attacks. Based on dif-
ferent legal and political jurisdictions they may constitute as a criminal offence.
For example in the case of the SEA conducting “hacktivism” is claimed to be a
method for making the voices of people who would not normally have a voice,
be heard. Carrying out phishing attacks and DDoS for this group seems to be a
form of political mobilization but in many instances—government websites are
not at the forefront of these attacks—businesses are. It drums up publicity for their
cause—whilst highlighting that there are security breaches in even in the largest
organizations that are supposed to be leaders of security—thus increasing their no-
toriety. Without condoning or condemning their actions, this seems to be a simple
way of causing disruption for companies—and is one which replaces protesting
on the streets. Key to their voice being heard is the fact that they know there is a
need for them to have a social media presence—to the point where they have to
create a new social media pages sometimes daily. With a constant social presence
and continued phishing attacks and DDOS attacks aimed at various outlets they
manage to create not just a social media presence but a presence in the media and,
consequently, to some extent an awareness of their cause. On the other hand, the
SEA may be targeting nonpolitical websites because they are vulnerable opportu-
nities and may be claiming moral significance to obtain publicity. Either way it is
slightly incongruous that they claim to not trust media in general but make use of
it for their own means.
Stuxnet is thought to be the first case of publicly known cyber warfare and whilst
it is politically driven, it may also have moral and financial motives. The case is
shrouded in speculation—experts have guessed that it was the work of a nation state
and if there was hard evidence to support these assertions this case would be catego-
rized as political. Whilst legally it remains unclear who carried out the attack, moral
motivates can be applied (in relation to the point of the attack: to disrupt the produc-
tion of nuclear outputs) whilst also disrupting the finances of the country through
damaging industrial systems.
Operation High Roller directly points to financial motivations since fraud ac-
tivities were committed during the attacks. Whilst DDoS attacks disrupt banking
services they can also cover up fraudulent activity, and can be classed as financial,
they can also be classed as moral since hackers also claim that banks are corrupt.
The threat here remains with the banking sector but can have a direct impact upon
individuals.