158
i n t e r nat i o na l l aw
Similarly, the early pure incorporation cases gave way to a more cautious
approach.
145
The current accepted position is that customary international law in
the US is federal law and that its determination by the federal courts is
binding on the state courts.
146
The similarity of approach with the UK
is not surprising in view of common historical and cultural traditions,
and parallel restraints upon the theories are visible. US courts are bound
by the doctrine of precedent and the necessity to proceed according to
previously decided cases, and they too must apply statute as against any
rules of customary international law that do not accord with it.
147
The
Court of Appeals reaffirmed this position in the
Committee of United
States Citizens Living in Nicaragua
v.
Reagan
case,
148
where it was noted
that ‘no enactment of Congress can be challenged on the ground that it
violates customary international law’.
149
It has been noted that the political and judicial organs of the United
States have the power to ignore international law, where this occurs pur-
suant to a statute or ‘controlling executive act’. This has occasioned much
controversy,
150
as has the general relationship between custom and incon-
sistent pre-existing statutes.
151
However, it is now accepted that statutes
supersede earlier treaties or customary rules of international law.
152
It has
also been held that it would run counter to the Constitution for a court
to decide that a decision of the International Court of Justice overrules
a binding decision of the US Supreme Court and thus affords a judicial
145
See e.g.
Cook
v.
United States
288 US 102 (1933); 6 AD, p. 3 and
United States
v.
Claus
63
F.Supp. 433 (1944).
146
See
US
v.
Belmont
301 US 324, 331, 57 S.Ct. 758, 761 (1937); 8 AD, p. 34 and
Third
US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
, St Paul, 1987, vol. I, pp. 48–52. See also
Kadi´c
v.
Karadˇzi´c
70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995); 104 ILR, pp. 149, 159; and
In Re Estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation
978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992); 103 ILR,
pp. 521, 529. However, see C. A. Bradley and J. L. Goldsmith, ‘Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position’, 110
Harvard Law
Review
, 1997, p. 816, and J. Paust, ‘Customary International Law in the United States:
Clean and Dirty Laundry’, 40 German YIL, 1997, p. 78.
147
See e.g.
Schroeder
v.
Bissell
5 F.2d 838, 842 (1925).
148
859 F.2d 929 (1988).
149
Ibid.
, at 939. See also
Tag
v.
Rogers
267 F.2d 664, 666 (1959); 28 ILR, p. 467 and
US
v.
Yunis (No. 3)
724 F.2d 1086, 1091 (1991); 88 ILR, pp. 176, 181.
150
See
Brown
v.
United States
12 US (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814) and
Whitney
v.
Robertson
124 US 190, 194 (1888). See also Henkin, ‘International Law’, p. 1555. See also
Rodriguez-
Fernandez
v.
Wilkinson
654 F.2d 1382 (1981); 505 F.Supp. 787 (1980);
US
v.
PLO
695
F.Supp. 1456 (1988) and
Klinghoffer
v.
SNC Achille Lauro
739 F.Supp. 854 (1990).
151
See
Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
, pp. 63–9 (
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