HCSS REPORT
53
dynamics pose additional challenges for military establishments, including in Europe,
who already have a hard time rebalancing their defense and security portfolios within
lower defense budgets even without worrying too much about entanglements in
possible renewed great power conflict. Various major weapon acquisition programs,
for instance, appear under a very different light when looked at from the point of view
of potential great-power conflict rather than from the point of view of stabilization
operations.
Equally important for ‘price-takers’ (instead of price-makers) in the international
security arena: how do we deal with a future in which escalating assertiveness leads
to an even greater paralysis of an already extremely minimalist and fragile system of
global (security) governance? Not to speak of the political economic consequences of
a return to a 19
th
century European balance of power at a truly global level – and this,
in a period where the world is just starting to crawl back from a painful and prolonged
socio-economic crisis. Could these dangers possibly even provide more incentives for
exploring new-style multipolar management mechanisms?
For the time being, the ‘long peace’ soldiers on. Its actual dynamics – and its
(presumed) robustness – continue to be poorly understood. We observe many
profound, observable and seemingly incontrovertible trends that suggest brighter
skies in the future security forecast.
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These trends are often ignored by the traditional
security communities. But at the same time, this study – just like the other
contributions to this year’s HCSS Strategic Monitor – also sees a number of darker
clouds on the horizon. One of the major challenges for defense (and foreign policy)
planners is to find the proper balance between Cassandra’s Scylla and Pollyanna’s
Charybdis. The security community has lost much credibility because of its constant
Cassandra-like insistence on all the thing that could go wrong and its underappreciation
of all the things that were demonstrably going ‘right’ – also in the security field. Many
other foresight communities – like the technological one – may have gone too far
towards the Pollyana extreme.
We have gone to great lengths – and continues to strive to – maintain some balance
between these two extremes. We are now alternating between a year in which we try
to present the HCSS Strategic Monitor ‘big picture’ (including the many strongly
positive security trends) and a year in which we selectively – in close coordination
with our government customers – select a number of potential game-changers for a
more in-depth analysis. We continue to feel that defense and security planners should
take both into account. The trends described in this study are perceptible. They require
54
STRATEGIC MONITOR 2014
serious attention. But we strongly caution against the temptation to focus too much
on them alone. It is only through a more dispassionate, impartial assessment that we
are likely to strike the right balance. We trust that evidence-based analysis can and will
contribute to that balance.
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