particular precious stone rather than to another, to a particular
kind of furniture or style, etc. Influence is also felt in another way.
Rates of pay depend upon a basic standard which corresponds to
the minimum amount of resources needed for a man to live. But
this standard, in every era, is fixed by public opinion. What was
regarded yesterday as a sufficient minimum no longer satisfies the
requirements of the moral conscience of today, simply because we
are more affected than in the past by certain feelings of humanity.
There are even forItls of production which are tending to become
general, not only because of their objective productivity, but by
reason of certain moral virtues that public opinion ascribes to
them: such, for example, is co-operatism.
From this viewpoint, the relationships between the science of
economics and the other social sciences present themselves to us in
a
different light. Both deal with phenomena which, at least when
considered under certain aspects, . are homogeneous, because in
some ' respects they are all matters of opinion. Then one can
conceive that moral, religious and aesthetic opinions can exert an
influence upon economic opinion, at least equal to that which
economic opinion exerts upon them. This emerges clearly from the
examples already quoted above. Political economy therefore loses
232 Writings of Durkheim on Sociology and its Method
that predominance which was once attributed to it, to become a
social science like the others, closely linked to them in a solid
relationship, without however being able to claim to direct them.
Yet, from another aspect, political economy does assume again
a sort of primacy. Human opinions emerge from the midst of social
groups and partly depend upon what these groups are. We know
that opinion differs as between populations densely packed
together and those which are dispersed, as between town and
country,
as
between large and small towns, etc. Ideas change
according to the density of the society, whether it is numerous or
sparse, according to whether its communications or transport
networks are numerous and rapid. But it seems certain that
economic factors have a profound effect upon the wa
y
in which the
population is distributed, its density, the form that human settle
ments take, and consequently upon the way tha:t these factors
often exert a profound influence upon the various states of
opinion. It is above all in this indirect way, the speaker concludes,
that economic facts act upon moral ideas.
Villey had no intention of speaking in this discussion. But he
was, he stated, something of an economist and of a lawyer and, in
this dual capacity, he felt somewhat shocked by certain of the
assertions that he had heard made.
Durkheim had said that law was a matter of opinion, that
political economy and value were matters of opinion and that, for
example, among Jews, pork ought to have very little value. Villey
believes that Durkheim had got himself into a muddle. Opinion
has a very great influence in the conception of the law and the
sanctions it imposes. But it does not shape the law. It has a very
great influence upon the conditions of the market, which affect
value, but it does not determine value, which is determined by
rigorous laws of nature.
,
Opinion has much influence upon the conception of the law and,
for example, it. is ceitain that some institutions have sometimes
been considered to be in conformity with the law that are
a:
clear
violation of it, such as slavery. Opinion has influence upon the
sanctions of the law; thus such and such an action which was
prohibited in the past, is allowed today, and vice versa. This is
because social needs are not always the same. But to conclude
from this thatJaw is a matter of opinion, is quite simply to deny the
law, to make it a pure conce.pt of the mind, essentially fluctuating
Debate on Political Economy and Sociology (1908) 233
and fanciful, and this is to, deliver over the fate of societies to the
caprices of the pilot whom chance has given them.
Again, in the same way opinion has much influence upon
market conditions. This is why pork may have been depreciated in
Jewish territory, just as fish must be sold dearer on Fridays in
Catholic territory. But it is always the "law of supply and demand,
completely independent of opinion, which regulates the price of
things, just as it determines all values.
As for the question - perhaps a little theoretical - which had
been posed, this is, according to the speaker, what one could
reply. Social science is the science of m4n living in society; social
life, like all life, may be analysed according to certain rules in
relation to a certain 'movement'; this 'movement', which consists
of the unfolding of all individual activities, isthe object of political
economy; the rule, which consists in the limitation of individual
activities, is the object of law, from which the speaker does not
distinguish. morality, since law is none other than morality in its
application to social relationships; thus political economy and law
appear to be th� two essential branches of social science.
Durkheim cannot make sense of the view felt and expressed by
Villey. He had taken care to state that he was not dealing with the
entirely metaphysical questi0n of knowing whether morality ex
isted, or an ideal law, inscribed in the nature of man, valid for all
ages and all countries. He had spoken solely of law and morality as
they existed, as they had been at any moment in history. Now it
was absolutely clear that a people had never put into practice any
moral and juridical ptecepts other than · those which the public
consciousness, that is to say, opinion, h"ad recognised as such. If
that opinion ceased to feel the weight of their authority, then that
authority would be as if it no longer existed; it would no longer act
upon the conscience; the precepts would no longer be obeyed.
That is all the speaker [Durkheim] meant;
We had to be on our guard against the derogatory sense which is
often given to the word 'opinion'. It almost seems as if it were
synonymous with mindless prejudices or fanciful feelings, etc. This
is to view opinion from only one of its aspects. It is to forget that
opinion is also the end result of the experiences of peoples over the
centuries - and that has imparted some authority to it. The
speaker feels at least as much respect for a moral rule when he
consiqers it to be the fruit of peoples' expenence over the
234
Writings of Durkheim on Sociology and its Method
centuries as when he conceives it as the result of the dialectical
constructs of the jurist and the moralist.
It is argued that opinion changes. But this is because morality
changes also, and does so legitimately. Durkheim does not believe
that many historians exist today who would admit that the
Romans, for example, could have pr�ctised a morality comparable
to our own. The respect that we have for the human person could
not have found a place in Rome without encompassing the
dissolution of Roman society. Fustel de Coulanges long ago
showed this . to be true. The variations through which moral
opinion passes are therefore not the product of mere aberrations
but are founded on the changes which have occurred simul
taneously in living conditions.
As
for economic matters, the speaker did not state in any way
that they were completely a matter of opinion, but that they too
derived some
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