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Hou Han Shu
, ch. 47: "When Pan Ch’ao arrived at
Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at first with great
politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his behavior underwent a sudden
change, and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch’ao spoke about this to the
officers of his suite: 'Have you noticed,' he said, 'that Kuang's polite intentions
are on the wane? This must signify that envoys have come from the Northern
barbarians, and that consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with
which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we
are told, can perceive things before they have come to pass; how much more,
then, those that are already manifest!' Thereupon he called one of the natives
who had been assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: 'Where are
those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some day ago?' The man was so
taken aback that between surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole
truth. Pan Ch’ao, keeping his informant carefully under lock and key, then
summoned a general gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began
drinking with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a little, he tried
to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them thus: 'Gentlemen, here we are
in the heart of an isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and honor by some
great exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in
this kingdom only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy
extended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy
prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones
will become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?' With one
accord, the officers replied: 'Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will
follow our commander through life and death.' For the sequel of this adventure,
see chap. XII. § 1, note.]
52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we
are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the
march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and
swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account
unless we make use of local guides.
[These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12-14—in order to
emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to regard
them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the following words.
With regard to local guides, Sun Tzu might have added that there is always the
risk of going wrong, either through their treachery or some misunderstanding
such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead
him into the neighborhood of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be
occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin
names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of Casinum, and
turning from his proper route, he took the army in that direction, the mistake not
being discovered until they had almost arrived.]
53. To be ignored of any one of the following four or five principles
does not befit a warlike prince.
54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship
shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy's forces. He
overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining
against him.
[Mei Tao-ch’en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so much
affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you can divide her
forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in
strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the
neighboring states will be frightened; and if the neighboring states are
frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from joining her." The following
gives a stronger meaning: "If the great state has once been defeated (before she
has had time to summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and
refrain from massing their forces." Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu take the sentence in
quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince may be, if he
attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to
some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening
confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the enemy, he will
surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his view thus: "If we recklessly attack a large
state, our own people will be discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be
the case) our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy, the
other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us."]
55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor
does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret
designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.
[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch’uan, appears to be this: Secure against
a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject entangling alliances and
simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enable him to dispense with
external friendships."]
Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.
[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch’in State became a
serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous Six
Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti.
Chang Yu, following up his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzu is condemning
this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.]
56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,
[Wu Tzu (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded and retreat
be heavily punished."]
issue orders
[Literally, "hang" or post up."]
without regard to previous arrangements;
["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is made
clear by Ts’ao Kung's quotation from the
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