World leadership and the War on Terrorism
Rewriting the geographic understanding of global politics?
It is relevant here to turn back to Chapter 2 and our discussion of world leadership. As
world leader, the United States is the main target of contemporary terrorism and orga-
nizer of a coalition of states in the War on Terrorism. It also has the military power,
especially in terms of technological capacity, to conduct such extra-territorial actions.
These range from the establishment of military
bases in other countries, flying, using
Special Forces to train and coordinate armies across the globe, cooperating with foreign
police forces, as well invading countries, see Box 7.2 (Priest, 2003). On the other hand,
its presence across the globe (in terms of business, diplomacy, and the military) provides
numerous targets. Terrorists opposed to the United States’ extra-territorial power can
also find targets because of that extra-territoriality.
The power of the world leader rests not in its military strength alone, but rather on
the package of innovations it claims will benefit the whole world. The central ingredi-
ents of this package are national self-determination and democracy, or the rule of law.
Together these “innovations” combine to form the integrative power of the world leader:
the
collection of ideas, values, and institutions designed to bring order and stability to
the world. The targeting of the United States by al-Qaeda is a violent challenge to its
world leadership role, as we discussed earlier. More important is the fundamental under-
lying issue that while facing that challenge by defining and conducting the War on
Terrorism, the United States is violating the very ideals it claims are the basis of the
innovations that are the foundations of its world leadership.
The November 2002 execution of terrorist suspects in Yemen by an unmanned US
drone exemplifies the ability of the world leader to project its power across the globe:
in the form of troops stationed in the country as well as the technological capacity to
see and strike beyond the horizon. The actual amount of awareness the Yemeni govern-
ment had of this attack is not clear; they had good reason to deny any knowledge to
placate domestic groups hostile to any government cooperation with the US. Conducting
summary executions in other sovereign spaces signifies that
the world leader is reinter-
preting the territorial understandings that are the foundation of the political geography
underpinning its world leadership, state sovereignty and the rule law. The legitimacy of
the world leader, or the strength of its integrative power, is challenged if it is seen to
be breaking the very rules and values it argues for.
The threat to the world leader in the practice of the War on Terrorism is not just a
matter of its integrative power. If the world leader condones and practices an extra-
territorial geopolitics then these tactics may diffuse to other countries. Russia and
Israel have voiced their belief that they may conduct preemptive attacks on unilaterally
defined terrorist targets given the United States’ lead. The principle of the violation of
other countries’ sovereign space to conduct preventive, preemptive,
or revenge attacks
can legitimate state upon state violence across the world. The importance of sovereignty
in international law rests upon the gravity of violation of a country’s borders: the goal
being to prevent violence, and the escalation to war. However, the killing of another
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country’s citizens in their own territory as a matter of summary justice violates the
assumptions of international law and undermines any judicial consideration of who is
guilty and how they should be punished. The role of sovereignty in protecting citizens
and putting the brakes on international violence is undermined.
The potential for increased conflict around the world is the opposite of the world
leader’s goals of order and stability. If increased conflict was to occur, the military
demands of the United States across the globe are likely to increase. As we discussed
in Chapter 2, such “imperial overstretch” weakens the coercive and integrative power
capabilities
of the world leader, resulting in increased challenge and decline.
There is another way to look at the War on Terrorism, though. In the words of the
Bush administration in their response to 9/11, the world has changed and requires a
redefinition of war. The world leader is redefining our understanding of territorial sover-
eignty in the face of the new challenge of global terrorism to global order. In this
interpretation, the US is playing the necessary and useful role of a world leader, making
political and geographic innovations to provide stability. In this interpretation, the War
on Terrorism is seen by US policy-makers as a response to violent challenges of its
authority, but also serves as an “opportunity” (in the words of Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld) to advance the world leader’s agenda.
However, this interpretation may be looked at in a different way too. At a time of
violent challenge
to its world leadership role, the United States has had to legitimize its
reaction. The reaction violates commonly held views of how global politics is organ-
ized geographically, and will provoke greater challenge to the world leader and further
undermine its power. For example, UN Secretary-General Koffi Anan has been scathing,
well as scathing as a UN diplomat can be, toward what he sees as a cavalier approach
to the geographic axioms of world politics. To return to the language of Modelski’s
model (1987), responding to violent challenges (deconcentration) has also intensified
the diplomatic challenges (or delegitimation) facing the United States.
There is yet another interpretation, that the War on Terrorism is a created threat—
exaggerated to serve the purposes of states, especially, but not exclusively,
the United
States. In this argument, the capabilities of al-Qaeda are seen to be over-exaggerated in
order to justify military action overseas and also, such as in the case of Chechnya
(Chapter 5), repression of groups within the state. This interpretation follows the work
of Giorgio Agamben (1995) and his discussion of the Roman designation of
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