Introduction to Geopolitics

NSS
, 6); simply to strike before “our enemies strike first” (
NSS
, 15).
In language that echoed NSC-68, the War on Terrorism was global in scope 
and historic in its intentions; “a global enterprise of uncertain duration” (
NSS
, opening
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Activity
Am I correct in arguing that the concept of geopolitical codes is applicable to a
non-state agent such as al-Qaeda? 
To justify your answer think about how the means of maintaining allies and engaging
threats must differ for geopolitical agents other than countries, such as al-Qaeda.
Must representation differ too?

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statement). Matching our understanding of the role and tactics of a world leader, allies
were to be maintained through “lasting institutions” (
NSS
, opening statement) that would
provide the basis for “a truly global consensus about basic principles is slowly taking
shape” (
NSS
, 26). The intention was to secure the continuation of US world leadership;
“these are the practices that will sustain the supremacy of our common principles and
keep open the path of progress” (
NSS
, 28).
Such is the language we would expect from a world leader, but Modelski’s model
suggests that the US will face an increasingly violent challenge to its authority. Not
surprisingly, the NSS includes means other than institutions and “principles” to secure
allies. Indeed, now “is the time to reaffirm the essential role of American military
strength” (
NSS
, 29). But notably, the geography of this military strength was a global
mission rather than the securing of the United States’ borders: “The presence of American
forces is one of the most profound symbols of the US commitment to allies and friends”
(
NSS
, 29). Similar to NSC-68, the language of NSS balanced an identification of a threat
to the US society and people, in terms of continued terrorist attacks, with a global commit-
ment to promoting a particular vision of order; including economic relationships (Box
3.3). On the one hand, such order was deemed to be globally beneficial yet, on the other
hand, it was “a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values
and our national interests” (
NSS
, 1).
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Box 3.3 The geopolitics of the “Washington Consensus”
The geopolitical agenda and power of the US is as economic as it is mili-
tary. Its influence in the key global economic institutions of the World Bank,
IMF, and World Trade Organization (WTO) is a reflection of its material
interests and power to disseminate an ideological agenda. Indeed, since the
1990’s the term “Washington Consensus” has developed as a summary of
the economic policies that the US has pushed other countries to adopt, with
much success. Under the umbrella of the term are policies of trade and
investment liberalization, privatization, deregulation, fiscal and tax policy,
and changes in the direction of public spending. Over time, those critical of
such policies have also added issues of corporate governance, corruption,
labor policy, and social safety nets into the argument.
(“Washington Consensus” Global Trade Negotiations Home
Page, www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html.
April 2003—accessed 1/17/05)
In combination, these policies, whether they are seen positively or negatively,
fall under the phrase “Washington Consensus”: the economic side of the agenda
of US world leadership.
In what way can the “Washington Consensus” be explained within Modelski’s
model?

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The justification for the geopolitical code invoked language that was similar to that
used in NSC-68: personal freedom was the goal, free-market economics was the means.
The justification was targeted toward domestic and global audiences: “A strong world
economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the
rest of the world” (
NSS
, 17). The Strategy promoted free trade as the economic vehicle,
a policy that was portrayed as having benefits for everyone across the globe: “This is
real freedom, the freedom for a person—or a nation—to make a living” (
NSS
, 18).
In a related statement, made at a time of confidence after the “victory” in Afghanistan
that led to the removal of the Taliban regime by an American invasion as punishment
for their support of al-Qaeda bases, President George W. Bush used his annual State of
the Union speech to make focused geopolitical goals, within the framework of the War
on Terrorism’s global order. An “axis of evil,” comprising Iran, Iraq, and North Korea
was identified. The geopolitical threat posed by these states was, not just their alleged
ties to terrorism, but also the identification of programs to build nuclear, chemical, and
biological military capacity—weapons of mass destruction.
Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening our
friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes
have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature.
North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruc-
tion, while starving its citizens.
Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an
unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom.
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.
The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear
weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas
to murder thousands of its own citizens—leaving the bodies of mothers huddled
over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspec-
tions—then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to
hide from the civilized world.
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming
to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction,
these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms
to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack
our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the
price of indifference would be catastrophic.
We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state
sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons
of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to
protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should
know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security.
We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events,
while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The
United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes
to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.
(State of the Union Speech, 2002)
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Figure 3.4
”Freedom Walk.”

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This passage contains the elements of a geopolitical code. The threat is identified;
terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. A coalition of
allies will be built and maintained. The means of obtaining these goals are, given that
this was broad ranging political speech, understandably vague. However, the notion of
pre-emptive strikes and the identification of specific countries, especially Iraq, were
made clear. The justification of these actions was most direct: famine in North Korea,
Iraqi “mothers huddled over their dead children,” and “unelected” Iranian fundamentalist
leaders were the opposites of the global order of prosperity, freedom, and civilization
that the world leader had established as its agenda. Note the phrase “But we know their
true nature”; a claim that the US has the ability to cast an all-knowing “God-like” eye
across the globe. Public events, such as the “Freedom Walk,” embed the geopolitical
actions and the justifications for them in domestic places—making geopolitics a combin-
ation of “global” foreign policy and “local” everyday life (Figure 3.4).
Summary and segue
Understanding the concept of geopolitical codes allows for an analysis of the multiple
agendas that countries face and the diversity of policy options that are available to
address them. Moreover, geopolitical codes are contested within countries as different
political interests within a country seek different policies. Geopolitical agents do not
have complete freedom in defining their code, the context of what other, perhaps more
powerful, countries are doing must be taken into account. The dynamism of geopolitical
codes is a result of the interaction, perhaps inseparability, of domestic politics and the
changing global context. One way of defining the global context is through Modelski’s
model, though the concept of geopolitical code is still valid and useful without resort
to the model of world leadership. In the next chapter, we will concentrate on the fifth
element of geopolitical codes: the way they are represented to gain public support.
Having read this chapter you will be able to:
■
define geopolitical codes;
■
interpret government foreign policy statements as the manifestation of
geopolitical codes;
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