Introduction to Geopolitics

potential
of the
EuroCorp to allow the EU to project military power independent of, and even against
the wishes of the world leader is evidence of delegitimation. However, the subordination
of EuroCorp within NATO, and the practical constraints on its ability to act indepen-
dently of the US is evidence of the continued power of the world leader.
In summary, the current signals from the EU are mixed: there have been verbal protests
against US actions. The political decisions of the EU and institutional developments such
as EuroCorps may also be interpreted as discontent with the world leader’s agenda.
Additionally, there have been trade disputes between the EU and US. Significantly, how-
ever, the trade disputes and construction of EuroCorps do not undermine the general agree-
ment over free-trade policies between the EU and US, nor the inability of the EU to define
and execute militarily operations free from the world leader’s agenda. The EU is still the
world leader’s key ally; though some would say an increasingly reluctant one.
The documents discussed above can be found at the EuroCorps website www.euro-
corps.org/site/index.php?language=en&content=home, revised and accessed September
12, 2005.
The geopolitics of the rise and fall of world leaders: 
the context of contemporary geopolitics?
Modelski’s model helps us to interpret the major contemporary global geopolitical issue:
the attempt by the United States to maintain its preeminent power status in the face of
challenges to its leadership. To do this we can consider the dynamics of two separate
but related concerns. First, is there a country willing and able to act, or as Modelski
may well say “serve,” as world leader? In other words, is there an availability of order,
the possibility of one country, the world leader, to offer and enforce a geopolitical inno-
vation? Second, does the rest of the world, or at least a significant majority, want that
order? In other words, is there a preference for the world leader’s imposed order, or
would countries rather face the “chaos” or “insecurity” of competing agendas? Note the
role of representation here again, as “insecurity” and “security” are often based upon
the degree of acceptance of the world leader’s agenda.
For each of the four phases of a cycle, we can compare the balance of preference
and availability of order (see Figure 2.2). In a period of global war, no one country is
strong enough, relative to others, to establish a global geopolitical order. After the emer-
gence of a world leader, there is a desire for order and the world leader’s agenda is
followed, more or less. By the next phase, delegitimation, the order being provided by
the world leader is beginning to be questioned. However, the world leader still retains
its relative power advantage, and hence challenge to the world leader rests, on the whole,
in the realm of diplomatic and verbal protest, though some sporadic military resistance
may be witnessed. During the deconcentration phase of the cycle, not only has dissent
toward the world leader’s order heightened, but also the world leader’s ability to enforce
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its agenda has declined too. In this phase, there is an increased challenge to the world
leader, not only in terms of diplomatic and political agendas, but also in the form of
organized military challenges.
Imperial overstretch
Global opinion is only one factor in explaining the process of the decline of world leader-
ship. Emphasis has also been placed upon the relationship between the demands placed
upon the cost of the world leader’s military and its economic strength, or the ability to
pay. During the world leadership phase of the cycle, where the new global agenda is
mostly accepted, enforcement can be attained by a global naval capacity—the strategy
of gunboat diplomacy whereby the mere presence of the world leader’s navy is enough
to keep potentially dissenting countries in line. Such a strategy is relatively cheap as the
very costly undertaking of protracted military conflict is largely avoided. However, as
the cycle progresses, and challenges to the world leader’s authority increase in frequency
and intensity, then the world leader is drawn increasingly into conflicts on land (Figure
2.3). Associated rising costs further drain the world leader’s power and invite more chal-
lenges. In addition, the ghastliness of warfare provokes specific incidents that are used
by opponents to challenge the moral authority of the world leader (see Box 2.4). In other
words, the resort to increased land conflict is costly in both economic and ideological
terms.
Interpreting popular representations of US geopolitics within 
Modelski’s model
The process of an increased need to fight land battles as the efficacy of naval presence
decreases is known as imperial overstretch (Kennedy, 1988). This idea was very much
in vogue in the late 1980s. However, the triumphalism of the “victory” of the Cold War
soon replaced the doubts regarding the “relative decline” of the United States. In the
language of President Reagan’s politics, US military expenditure had bankrupted 
the Soviet Union and 
not
the world leader. After the Cold War, and the geopolitical
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91
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5
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