even outside the Live OS. You can further explore the encryption of full disks on
Wikipedia
[144]
.
10.1.3 Live OS & Virtual Machines: the risks
VMs are a truly excellent tool: in a nutshell, they allow to create a computer
within a computer! They’re often used when the Operating System is not
compatible with some software (ex., when you want to use Windows
applications from a Mac).
However, I recommend you to perform all your tests in a Live working
environment, at least for now. The reason is related to different choices in terms
of workspace sanitization:
in Tails, for example, the “anti-forensic” properties
would be compromised if, launching a GNU/Linux distro within a Virtual
Machine, the latter writes the host computer swap with files otherwise destroyed
in Live; additionally, it may happen that, putting the VM in hibernation or stand-
by, the WHOLE operating system is stored
in a temporary page file, thus
exposing all the Tails content (by the way, VirtualBox & Co. are integrating disk
encryption options on top of the software).
In anonymity scenarios, using Live GNU/Linux distros is strongly advisable.
When necessary, you can set-up a USB/SD drive to contain user-reserved space
for their configurations, resulting in a hybrid system capable of working as a
Live, as well as storing files and whatnot like a normal installation.
10.2 Virtualized environments
When it comes to IT Security, a virtual environment
can ensure a good
isolation in different scenarios: just think that, if you wish to study the behavior
of some malware, it’s crucial to use a virtualized system, in order to safeguard
the central Operating System. Just like a Live, everything happening in a Virtual
Machine (usually) stays within the Virtual Machine: I wrote ‘usually’ because a
VM may be attacked and slip out
of the host computer control, but we’re going
off topic, probably.
Using an operating system anonymously within a VM is utterly wrong: most
of the aforementioned procedures refer to obfuscation methods that require the
full control of the hardware in use by the System (just think about the Mac
Spoofing). As the term suggests, virtualization is all about virtualizing hardware;
if we decide to perform the Mac Spoofing for a virtualized environment, we
would ONLY change the virtual Mac Address, and not the real one! Such
operation can be done ONLY from the host Operating System, namely the one
hosting the VM and not vice versa.
But what if the host is the Operating System providing
its Virtual Machines
with anonymity? Then the scenario would be extremely beneficial for the user.
10.2.1 Qubes OS
The Qubes OS
[145]
project dates back to 3 September, 2012 – created by an
IT researcher, Joanna Rutkowska. This particular Operating System introduces a
security approach defined as
isolation: essentially, it’s
taken for granted that
every piece of software may be potentially harmful and that a single bug may
compromise the entire IT system.
Qubes is based on Fedora Linux, but provides a para-virtualization system
through Xen: its microkernel allows to create separated workspaces, here known
as qubes, where the tools coexisting in the same domain can interact. To better
understand this concept, look at the Figure 47 carefully.
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